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Recently, several philosophers have argued that nonreductive physicalism

is

a false, unstable,

critics

and incoherent

are attacking

issues about

a straw one.

which nonreductive

have an opinion:
exist at a

is

world,

relationships

i)

ii)

position.

I

argue that the position these

To help explain why

physicalists

let

us distinguish three

might plausibly be thought

ontological considerations about the types of things that
issues involving the existence

between the types

and nature

of

of things that exist at a world,

epistemological questions regarding the best

way

I

is

last issue.

and m)

argue that reductive and

with respect to the
nonreductive physicalists essentially agree
but disagree with respect to the

any dependency

to describe, explain, or

world.
characterize the types of things that exist at a

position that

to

first

two

issues,

Nonreductive physicalists advocate

a

but epistemologically
ontologically or metaphysically reductive,

Although this position could prove false on
or representationally nonreductive.
empirical grounds,

it is

neither unstable nor incoherent.
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CHAPTER SUMMARIES
Chapter One: The Commitment

to Physicalism

In order to understand the position that nonreductive physicalists are

advocating,

to

we

first

come up with

need

to

understand what they mean by physicalism.

a definition that

first,

tried

I

and foremost, would be acceptable

to

both reductive and nonreductive physicalists; second, would exclude the views
of

most self-professed non-physicalists; and,

that

all

physicalists should be

thesis that

committed

third,

to at least

every particular in space and/ or time

fundamental physical particulars; and, second,
alien

would not be

is,

two
or

is

is

no particular epistemological claim

that

argue

I

to the

first,

composed out

to the thesis that

of,

any two non-

simpliciter.

worlds that are physical duplicates are duplicates

that there

theses:

false.

I

also argue

would be accepted by

all

physicalists.

Chapter Two:

A Historic Look at Nonreductive Physicalism

In the second chapter

I

try to clear

up some

of the terminological

confusion surrounding the debate over reductionism.
of reduction that philosophers

that

many

have been interested

I

briefly discuss six types

in over the years.

physicalism
of the recent criticisms of nonreductive

their target

because they

fail to

nonreductive physicalists are

fail

I

argue

to attack

understand the type of reduction that

rejecting.

I

take that target to be the classic, and

physicalist positions of philosophers such
historically influential, nonreductive

1

as

Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam,

Thompson, and Richard Boyd.

I

Jerry Fodor, Geoffrey

closely

examine the

Heilman and Frank

details of these classic

accounts in order to understand what nonreductive physicalists are, and are
not, claiming.

Chapter Three: The Multiple Realization Argument

In the third chapter

I

look at four challenges to the multiple

argument (an argument considered by
for

nonreductive physicalism). They

many

are:

i)

to be

realization

one of the main inspirations

the observation that

many

respectable physical properties are just as multiply realized as are psychological

properties;

ii)

the

argument

that the multiple realization of special-scientific,

and psychological-kind, properties

in disparate physical properties

does not

properties;
rule out reductions to abstract-physical, or physical-functional,

the claim that local reductions

reductions enough; and

iv)

(e.g.,

the

iii)

species-specific reductions) should be

argument

that

if

there are nomologically-

mental-kind property and a
necessary biconditional connections between each

complex physical property (perhaps one
predicate), then reductionism follows.

I

that

is

expressed by a disjunctive

argue that although these challenges do

argument to be unsound, they do
succeed in showing the multiple realization
not succeed in establishing reductionism.
that the last

argument (known

I

am especially concerned

to

show

establish a type
as the disjunctive move) does not

physicalism.
core intuitions of nonreductive
of reductionism that threatens the

2

Chapter Four: Additional

In the fourth chapter

reductionism.

I

A priori Challenges to Nonreductive Physicalism
I

consider three additional

a priori

arguments

for

argue that these arguments either rely on suspect premises that

are not universally shared, or they miss their intended target (actual

nonreductive physicalist positions). The three arguments are as follows:

argument from causation against mental

realism.

The

1)

This argument claims that

if

mental events are token-identical, but not reducible, to physical events, then
given the causal completeness of physics, mental properties would be shown to
be causally inefficacious.
inefficacious, then

If

mental properties are shown to be causally

mental realism would be shown

to

be

false. 2)

The argument

argument claims
from physical composition for epistemological reductionism. This
that given a basic

assumption of physicalism — that

all

particulars in space/ and

or time are either fundamental physical particulars, or are

fundamental physical particulars -a

composed out

sort of epistemological reductionism

the properties
follows. Epistemological reduction follows because
of each token-mental event

properties. 3) The

would have some

Argument from Mysterious

that nonreductive physicalism

is

of

committed

and behavior

explanation in terms of

Connections. This

its

physical

argument claims

to the existence of brute,

mental properties and
mysterious, and inexplicable connections between

must be true, the challenger asserts,
physical properties. Reductive physicalism
because only then

we would be

able to explain the existence of such

connections.

3

INTRODUCTION
In 1989

Jaegwon Kim began

of Nonreductive Materialism

out of favor for

many

,

by noting

years." 1

capturing the philosophical

same claim today. Due

for

that,

mood

"Reductionism of

at the time,

in a large part to

all

would be

it

The Myth

psychophysical reductionism

fall

been

sorts has

difficult to

in

make

Kim's influence, the pendulum

swung back and reductionism

is

back

the

of

in favor.

in favor. Philosophers

who

argue

roughly into two camps: those

who

are

psychophysical reductionism

least,

APA meeting address,

Although Kim undoubtedly succeeded

philosophical opinion has since

At

his Eastern

is

back

sanguine about the prospects for an empirical reduction of psychology to neuro
or cognitive science,

and those who argue

assumptions, psychophysical reductionism
includes the so-called

New Wave

is

true a

Reductionists:

Paul Churchland, Patricia Churchland, Berent
Smith. 2 Philosophers falling into the second
Loar, Robert Francescotti,

a priori

of the

given certain metaphysical

that,

priori.

The

first

camp

John Bickle, D. H. M. Brooks,

En q,

camp

C. A. Hooker,

and Peter

include Jaegwon Kim, Brian

and Andrew Melnyk. 3 To distinguish those who

offer

empirically based approach
reasons in support of reductionism from the

New Wavers, let us call the philosophers in the second camp A

Priori

Reductionists. 4

I

intend to defend what

is

essentially a negative thesis: that the

A

Priori

that
to prove. They claim to prove
Reductionists do not prove what they claim

physicalists
the position held by nonreductive

4

is false,

unstable, and incoherent.

argue that instead they prove only that straw versions of nonreductive

I

physicalism

make no

sense.

I

believe that the only types of psychophysical

reductionism that are provable
physicalism, are so

weak

given a prior commitment to

a priori,

nonreductive physicalism

5
.

Nonreductive physicalists can accept these weak

forms of reductionism without compromising
as they

understand

possible that there

reductionism.

I

will not

I

6

it

.

Note

some

is

yet

have a strong

be able to prove

unexamined
intuition that

reduction

is

second chapter,

For now,

let

Some
become

common for

fairly

to talk past

and thus

my

it is

I

argument

it is still

that does prove

no such argument

will be found, but

Reduction?

and reductionism are ubiquitous
left

in

undefined and under-analyzed.

philosophers to use these words equivocally,

one another when discussing issues of reductionism. In
will try to clear

up some

of this terminological confusion.

taken reduction to be.
us look generally at what philosophers have

philosophers define reduction in such a

reductive physicalists. For example,

reductionist because he holds,

truth

to irreducibility,

primarily negative,

a priori

philosophical discourse, they are frequently

a result,

is

commitment

claim here.

this positive

Although the terms

their

that as this thesis

What

As

from

as to be essentially indistinguishable

must be made

true,

"As an

way

that

David Lewis writes

a prion principle, that

somehow, by

most

physicalists

that he

is

every contingent

the pattern of coinstantiation of

5

a

fundamental properties and relations ." 7 In other words, Lewis claims
reductionist

a

because he believes that the fundamental properties and relations

world determine the other contingent properties and

He

claims to be a physicalist because he believes

properties

physical.

to be a

and

relations at our

The problem with

world

this

way

are, as a

it

at

relations at that world.

likely that the

fundamental

matter of contingent

of characterizing reductionism

fact,

is

that

it

obviates the distinction between reductive and nonreductive varieties of

physicalism.

As

the physical

way

I

will discuss in

my first chapter, all

physicalists believe that

things are at our world determines the

way

things are in other

respects.

Others assume that a reduction requires a

much more

stringent set of

conditions. Jerry Fodor, for example, thinks that psychology

physics only

if

for

each psychological-kind predicate

kind predicate that

is

nomologically correlated with

believes that a reduction requires that the reduced

mere terminological variants
characterizing reduction

is

of each other.

that

it

is

we can identify
it

8
.

and reducing

sets the bar impossibly high.

satisfies

a physical-

In other words, Fodor

The problem with

accepted example of intertheoretic reduction

reducible to

theories be

this

No

way

of

generally

Fodor's overly

strict

requirements.

There are a couple of questions that need
discussion of reductionism. The

being reduced. That

is,

what

first is

to

be raised

the question of

what

at the outset of

exactly

is,

or

is

any
not,

to be? The
are the relata of a reduction supposed

6

second

is

what type

the question of

of relationship

needs to be established

hold) between these relata in order to count as a reduction.

concerned with the

first

issue of reductionism,

I

question here.

When

I

first

I

will be primarily

started thinking about the

distinguished between metaphysical reductionism and

epistemological reductionism.

I

now

think that the issue

is

a

more

little

complicated than these two categories would suggest. Fortunately,
the time that

fortune to

I

became

come

dissatisfied

across Robert

Van

a

little

more

useful for

ontological reduction

my

initial distinction,

9 I

now

think that

Van Gulick

Nonreductive physicalism, he

had the good

Van Gulick's

distinction

distinguishes between

— and

representational reduction

tells us,

It is

— which involves a

"Typically combines a denial of

ontological reduction supposedly adequate to secure

agree.

items

(theories, concepts, or models).

form(s) of representational reduction with the acceptance of

I

around

— which involves a relationship between real world

between representational items

credentials ." 10

I

at

Gulick's excellent overview of reductionism

purposes.

(objects, events, or properties)

relationship

my

with

in the Journal of Consciousness Studies.

is

(or to

its

some

some

type(s) of

physicalist

my contention that philosophers who eschew

reductionism generally do so because they believe that

we cannot now

(or,

phenomena, property, or
perhaps, cannot ever) explain a particular theory,

domain

in

terms of a privileged other. This privileged other

is

usually thought to

or physical predicates. They deny that
be physical theory, the physical domain,

such an explanation

is

non-physical theories
available because they believe that

7

(e.g.,

psychological and special-scientific theories), or non-physical predicates

(e.g.,

psychological and special-scientific predicates), do not neatly

physical theories

those

and

who believe

predicates. Reductive physicalists,

and phenomena

that the theories

map

to

on the other hand,

are

at these higher-levels are

ultimately explainable in terms of fundamental physics, albeit perhaps only an

ideal or future

fundamental physics.

Ontological vs. Representational Reduction

As the
past 50 years

different characterizations of reduction

makes

and reductionism over

clear (see Appendix), philosophers

have

traditionally

thought of reduction as a relationship between representational items.
recently, as philosophy has

begun

to

made

It is

a metaphysical turn, that philosophers

speak of reduction as an ontological relationship as

understand what nonreductive physicalists are advocating

the

well.

it is

only

have

To

useful to go

1950s Kemeny and
back to the roots of the debate over reductionism. In the

Oppenheim defined reduction as, " A replacement
body

of theories)

superior to

it."

11

by a new theory

(or

body

Kemeny and Oppenheim,

of

an accepted theory

of theories)

which

is

in

some

(or

sense

then, considered the relata of a

to be replacement. At around the
reduction to be theories and the relationship

same

time, Ernest

Nagel wrote that he considered a reduction

to be,

"The

of
experimental laws established in one area
explanation of a theory or a set of

inquiry,

formulated
by a theory usually though not invariably

8

for

some

other

domain ." 12 Thus

for

short, reduction for

reduction

Nagel as well the

relata of a reduction are theories. In

both of these seminal thinkers

— an explanation of one theory

is

essentially intertheoretic

(or set of theories)

by means

of another

theory (or set of theories).
Each, though, has different requirements for intertheoretic reduction.

Whereas Kemeny and Oppenheim
reducing theory) and Ti

(a

believe that a reduction

reduced theory)

is

effected

between To

whenever

(a

the

observations and facts explained by Ti are equally well explained by the more

powerful and better systemized

To,

Nagel (assuming the Deductive-

Nomological Account of Explanation) believes that a reduction between To and
Ti

To.

is

effected only

when

Logical deduction

is

the laws of Ti can be logically deduced from the laws of

merely one of Nagel's formal requirements

for

non-formal requirements
reduction, however. Nagel also offered the following
for reduction:

i)

that the reduction should herald,

organization of knowledge," and

ii)

"A

significant

it

was

in the

that the reduction should be, "Fertile in

science [TI]/
usable suggestions for developing the secondary

But

advance

13

that captured
the above-mentioned formal requirement

in order to satisfy his formal
philosophical imagination. Nagel observed that

requirement one of two situations had

employ the same

would have

to

the theories

employ

some

to

hold -either:

1)

the

theoretical vocabulary, or

different theoretical vocabulary, there

sort of connection

between the terms

9

of the

two

ii)

two

theories

for cases in

would need

theories.

which

to be

We cannot

formally deduce laws about the behavior of gases solely from the laws of

thermodynamics, as the gas laws contain terms

found

in the lower-level theory.

(read deduction) of Ti to

To

is

For this reason, Nagel argued that reduction

possible only

called bridge laws or bridge connections

two
of

theories. For

some

it

if

T0

is

augmented by something he

between the disparate vocabulary

reason, this artifact of Nagel's theory

an enshrined assumption

recently

like temperature that are not

was common

to

in the debate

assume

of the

became something

over reductionism; and until

fairly

that reductions involve bridge laws in

some

respect.

refer

I

my reader back to the Appendix.
many

included there,

Putnam

Churchland

(1973), Jerry

(1979),

and Jaegwon Kim

see from the quotes

of the philosophers writing about reductionism

and bridge laws. Examples

that reductions require logical derivations

Hilary

As you can

Fodor

(1974),

Heilman and Thompson

Richard Boyd (1980), John Post (1987), David

(1989).

Furthermore, of those

reductions require bridge laws,

many

who do

assume
include.

(1975), Paul

Owens

(1989),

not explicitly claim that

nevertheless assume that a reduction

is

a

intertheoretic explanation). For example,
type of explanation (often a type of

reduced
Alan Garfinkel writes that psychology would be
chemistry only

if,

"Conduct can be explained wholly

to physics

and

in terms of physical

and

Cummings, "Reduction requires
14
chemical phenomena." According to Robert
that the true statements

can

all

and one can make about

be formulated in a different vocabulary

10

a

domain

v’." 15

in a vocabulary v

David Owens writes

that,

"According

to the reductionist, there

is

nothing of explanatory importance, no

laws or nomologically interesting classifications of events which cannot be
formulated in the language of physics."
theory reduced to another

And Harold

when it can do

Kincaid claims

the explanatory

all

work

that,

"One

of the

reducing theory ." 16 For these philosophers as well, then, reduction

a type of

is

explanation.

Notice that

all

the above-mentioned philosophers consider the relata of a

reduction to be theories, explanations, or concepts

who see reduction as an ontological
properties

assume

that there

relationship

would have

to

17
.

Even those philosophers

between

objects, events, or

be some epistemological/

reduction.
representational dimension for the relationship to count as a genuine

reduction are "ontological
C. A. Hooker, for example, claims that the aims of
." 18 Paul and
and explanatory unification

Patricia

Churchland write

that a

as well as two
reduction should connect "two conceptual frameworks"

quoted
"domains ". 19 And Terence Horgan, the only philosopher

Appendix who
is

explicitly

a relationship

between

assumes an ontological reading

in the

of reduction (reduction

properties), suggests that reductions

have

properties are connected with
epistemological import because higher-order

lower-order causal/ explanatory properties

20
.

Even Kim, who has

recently

relationship between properties or
characterized reduction as an ontological

phenomena, motivates

his account with the claim that

should hold.
certain metaphysical relationships

11

it

will help explain

why

Ontological Reduction Does Not
Entail Representational Reduction

Many

philosophers believe

given the plausibility of ontological

that,

should theoretically be possible

reduction,

it

reduction.

Suppose we grant

that

to effect a representational

theoretically possible to establish bridge

it is

connections between mental properties and complex physical properties
the type of properties represented by physical-kind terms).

this

Is

(i.e.,

not

the possibility of

type of property connection sufficient to establish representational

reduction?

•

Some

reasons

we might think

it is

not:

We might have a problem with reducing mental properties to disjuncts of
physical properties. Intertheoretic reductions reduce the laws of one

theory to the laws of another theory, but
disjunctive properties in laws

21
.

with disjunctive properties per

gerrymandered disjunctive

•

We might have a

we do

And even

se,

if

we

not usually find

not have a problem

cio

we might have

problem with wildly

a

properties.

problem with

infinite disjunctions.

properties picked out by predicates in a language

on the properties picked out by predicates

in a

Suppose

L

that the

strongly superv ene

language

L.

Given the

predicate of L'
possibility of infinite realization, every n-adic

extension of
equivalent to an open formula of an infinitary
if

the disjuncts really are infinite,

into L, as the set of disjuncts

recursively enumerable.

incomprehensible

we might never

employed

Any

22
.
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However,

be able to translate L

in the definition

translation

L.

would be

would not be

would be humanly

•

We might have certain practical standards for representational
reduction. For example,

we might understand

intertheoretic reduction that

might believe that

we

no one ever

if

theories in physical terms then

explanation, and thus

•

(or

some

reduction to

scientist)

mean an

can understand.

We

has, or ever will, explain psychological

we would

would not have

not have a genuine

true representational reduction.

We might believe that the physical properties that realize mental
properties are
realizer of a

calls total realizers. 23

what Sydney Shoemaker

mental property

total

M includes the core realizer of M (some

intrinsic physical feature of a person,

the physical inputs

The

and outputs

perhaps a brain

to that

state),

along with

person or person's brain.

We

might believe that there can be no true representational reduction
total realizing

property

fails to

if

the

be taxonomic at the level of any purely

physical theory.

Conclusion

It is

important to remember that the debate over psychophysical

about whether
reductionism in the philosophy of mind began as a debate

psychology

is

inter-theoretically reducible to

Interestingly, the

some

physical science.

assumptions that were originally made

in the context of that

necessary and
debate — e.g., that bridge laws are necessary, or

reduction -still shape the

many

way we

sufficient, for

1950s
think about reductionism today. In the

required for inter-theoretic
philosophers assumed that bridge laws were

of
to Ernest Nagel's positivist account
reductions because they were committed

[D-N] account of
explanatory adequacy (the deductive-nomological

13

explanation).

committed
facie

Now that most contemporary philosophers are no longer

to Nagel's account of scientific explanation,

we have at least a prima

reason for reconsidering our assumption that bridge laws are central to the

debate over reductionism.
of a historical accident

and

for reduction. Ultimately,

falsity of

I

I

believe that the focus

is

something

that bridge laws are neither necessary nor sufficient

agree with the

nonreductive physicalism

on the basis of future

on bridge laws

scientific

is

New Waver's claim that the truth or

an empirical question

to

be determined

work. In other words, the truth or

psychophysical reductionism cannot be established on

14

a priori

falsity of

grounds.
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CHAPTER 1
THE COMMITMENT TO PHYSICALISM
Despite widespread popularity in the 60s, 70s, and 80s, nonreductive

physicalism has fallen from favor in recent years. 1 The general consensus

among

its latest

detractors

that nonreductive physicalism

is

and incoherent view. Although
vague
into

generalities,

it

anyone who

may sound

tries to

plausible

2

intend to

I

when presented

show

to

absurd theses, or

Chapter Two,

some types

I

will

their

view

that several historically

important nonreductive physicalist positions avoid both horns of
Later, in

in

formulate more precise position runs

problems — either they end up committed

collapses into reductionism.

a false, unstable,

is

this

dilemma.

argue that nonreductive physicalists can admit

of reductionism, specifically the types

reductionism and metaphysical reductionism, without

I

will call ontological

compromising the core

of

their anti-reductionist intuitions.

The

first

thing to note about nonreductive physicalism

defenders are committed to physicalism. Although surely

it is

worth belaboring because

irreducibility of qualitative

If

that

this point

of the recent attention paid to

phenomenal experience. 3

is

its

is

obvious,

arguments

philosophers like Frank

Jackson and David Chalmers are right that qualia are neither grounded

determined by, anything physical, they
the expense of physicalism.

To

will

tackle these

18

for the

have proven

in,

nor

irreducibility only at

arguments as well would needlessly

complicate

my

thesis. Instead

my

primary concern will be

defend the

to

coherence of positions committed both to irreducibility and physicalism.
Before

I

get

down

to the

main business

physicalism from the charge that

it

would be

supposed

someone

defending nonreductive

a false, unstable,

and incoherent

position,

useful to spell out to which theses nonreductive physicalists are

to

to

it is

of

be committed.

I

propose that

we

first

be committed to physicalism, before

question of what

it

means

for

someone

to be

look at what

it

means

for

we explore the more difficult

committed

to a

nonreductive

version of physicalism. This second exploration will take place in Chapter Two.

Defining Physicalism
There are a number of
meet.

First,

it

must be

desiderata that

a definition that

any definition of physicalism must

most self-professed

physicalists

would

exclude the views of
recognize and identify with. Second, the definition should

most self-professed non-physicalists- furthermore,

it

should exclude not only

someone like David
Cartesian substance dualism, but also the views of
Chalmers.

And

subtly false.

Let

third,

As we

me

it

will

should pick out a position that

soon

of these

commitments:

neither obviously nor

will not
see, satisfying all three desiderata

try to tackle the first

commitments shared by

is

be easy.

requirement by noting that there are several

all physicalists.

the ontological

I

will start

commitment.

19

I

with the

least controversial

take

be

it

to

fairly

uncontroversial that a physicalist must assent to something like the following
claim:

(OC)

All particulars (objects, events,

fundamental

either

and processes)

out of fundamental physical particulars

that everything that exists simpliciter either

4

particulars.

or

is,

What exists

is

first,

is

Numbers, propositions, algorithms, and
to

a deep

physical stuff

itself to

6
.

Second,

and

of,

interesting

exist that are

not physical.

be constructed out of

important to realize that (OC)

is

insufficient b\

existence of
define physicalism. Although (OC) clearly rules out the

Driesch's entelechies

qualia.

it is

(OC) does not claim

properties, for example, are thought by

real existence, despite their failure to

have

that

composed out

problem, but by most accounts there are things that

many

and/ or time are
composed

.

There are a few things to note about (OC). Note,

fundamental physical

in space

physical particulars, or are exhaustively

If

and Cartesian

it

does not yet exclude Chalmer's

located in time
there are Cartesian souls, then there are particulars

that are neither

fundamentally physical, nor composed out of anything that

fundamentally physical.

On the other hand,

Chalmer's claim that there

depend,

souls,

in

properties

(We

is

exist non-physical facts

any way, on the existence
6

.

(OC)

will discuss

what

it

of

fully

compatible with

and properties

fundamental physical

means

physical property shortly.)
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for

is

something

to

that

facts

do not

and

be a fundamental

So although

it is

must be committed

clear that a physicalist

to (OC),

it is

also clear that in advocating (OC) the physicalist has not yet established her

physicalist credentials.

What

is

missing from (OC)

and properties

that the non-physical objects, events,

fundamental physical properties that
then,

we

will also

need some

sort of

exist there.

their non-physical properties because

Notice that

of,

I

at a

truly capture physicalism,

of,

at a

world.

some way.

how such a

must believe

world have

the instantiation of the

have not yet said anything about the nature

asserted that physicalists

to the effect

world depend on the

and individuals

or in virtue

of,

at that

or in virtue of relation, or about

physical in

To

any statement

dependency claim. At minimum, a

physicalist needs to say that objects, events,

fundamental physical properties

is

relation

may

obtain.

that the non-physical

In the second half of this chapter

I

of this because

I

have only

depends on the

will discuss

whether

relationship
supervenience theses are able to capture the type of dependency

which a

physicalist should commit. For

now,

it is

enough

to note that

to

any

sort of dependency
adequate formulation of physicalism should include some

claim.

Without any

sort of

dependency claim, we would

fail

to satisfy our

non-physicalists positions.
second requirement of excluding most self-professed

Defining "Physical"

Whether

our last desideratum (of
a formulation of physicalism satisfies

picking out a position that

is

on the
neither obviously nor subtly false) hinges

21

definition of physical.

exists in

Remember

space and/ or time

composed out
be nice to

of

is

that

(OC)

either a

is

the claim that every particular that

fundamental physical

fundamental physical

know what makes something

Geoffrey Heilman spells out just what

particulars.

Given

particular, or

this claim,

is

would

it

a fundamental physical particular.

is

at stake in finding the right definition

of physical.

Current physics

is

surely incomplete (even in

ontology) as well as

its

dilemma:
in which case there is every
physics,
current
on
principles are based
reason to think they are false; or else they are not, in which case it is, at
best, difficult to interpret them, since they are based on a "physics" that

inaccurate (in

does not

its

either physicalists

laws). This poses a

exist -yet

we

lack any general criterion of "physical object,

property, or law" framed independently of existing physical theory

Perhaps being a fundamental physical particular
instantiates a single

know what counts

as a fundamental physical property.

fundamental physics.

some

is

being a particular that

are very different claims!

fundamental physics

The

problematic and more subtly

if

One

so,

we still

possibility

need

is

to

that a

any property recognized by current theories

A competing possibility

ideal future theory of

If

just

fundamental physical property. But

fundamental physical property
of

is

7
.

first

claim

is

is

that

will

obviously

it is

come

any property
to recognize

false, the

8
.

that

These

second

false.

that
fundamental physical particulars are those particulars

instantiate

recognized by current fundamental
the fundamental physical properties
physical theory, then the thesis that

all

particulars are, or are

22

composed out

of.

fundamental physical particulars
current physical theories are:

However,

contradictory.

properties

some

if

a)

is

patently false.

bound

to

is

patently false because

change and evolve, and

ideal future theory of fundamental physics will

composed out

of

is

either a

is

that

it is

as physical — such as qualia or psychic

possibility

we would

makes

somewhat
is

phenomena

best

hope

for

unsatisfying.

an adequate definition of

falsified.

falsified.

physical

unfortunately,

is,

We should insist that a fundamental physical property

recognize, provided that the property

is

of

similar

fundamental physics comes

enough

might

take solace in the fact that

still

be the best

we do seem

to

23

we can hope

have some

to

to the properties that

this definition
current fundamental physics recognizes. Yes

it

future

as fundamental features

thereby been

would not have been

whatever property some ideal future theory

hand waving; but

Were

second definition of findatnentally physical

property/particular, physicalism

Our

features

the second characterization of

we would want physicalism to have
to the

not count

phenomena — to be fundamental

physical theory to count qualia or psychic

However, according

is

entirely possible that

fundamental physical property/particular inadequate for our needs.

of our world,

to

fundamental physical

future physical theory will consider things that intuitively

Such a

come

fundamental physical particulars,

problematic for subtler reasons. The problem

of our world.

b) currently

fundamental physical properties are whatever

recognize, then the claim that every particular

particular, or

It is

to

is

do

9
.

vague; yes

At

least

intuitive sense of

it is

we can
what

should count as a physical property, as witnessed by our confidence that were
the fundamental features of the universe to include qualia

phenomena we would want such

and psychic

a discovery to falsify physicalism.

Supervenience

So

far all

one. That

is,

that

and individuals

have said about the dependency claim

I

anyone who
at

is

still

substantive thesis.

that there should be

a physicalist has to believe that objects, events,

our world have their non-physical properties because

virtue of the instantiation of the

However, we

is

fundamental physical properties

need

to flesh out this

It is

now common to

of,

or in

at that world.

dependency claim with some more
try to capture

dependency claims with

supervenience theses. But supervenience theses have been criticized in recent
years for failing to capture genuine dependence.

supervenience theses do a poor job
better than others. In the end,

I

at

I

argue that while most

capturing dependency claims, some are

believe that

most

physicalists should be able to

commit

only over non-alien
to a version of global supervenience that quantifies

worlds.

(I

explain what these are below.)

In order to understand

why

supervenience theses are often thought to be

determination relationship
inadequate to capture the kind of dependence or
think holds

e.g.,

between the mental and the

physical,

we

will

need

separately. Let us look
the various formulations of supervenience

supervenience, then strong, and then global.
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we

to look at

first at

weak

>

Weak

Supervenience

There are two ways that weak supervenience theses are usually
formulated. Let

A and

B be families of properties, and x and y range over

particulars.

A weakly supervenes on B

(I)

all

their B-properties, then x

and y share

all

and

x and y share
their A-properties.

necessarily for any x

y,

if

A weakly

supervenes on B iff necessarily for any property F in A, if an
object x has F, then there exists a property G in B, such that x has G, and
— 3GeB [Gx & Vy (Gy —» Fy)])] 10
if any
y has G it has F. D[VFe A, Vx (Fx

(II)

(I)

iff

says that any two objects at a world that are identical with respect to their

subvenient properties (the B-properties) should be identical with respect to
their

supervenient properties (the A-properties) as well. Suppose that

weak supervenience
physical properties

a relationship,

(II) is

and

a supervenient-family of

any two physical duplicates
if

at

moral properties. Given such

our world should be morally

Mother Theresa was a good person, any physical

Mother Theresa
trickier

than

(I),

at

11
our world would also be a good person.

as in order to

make

sense of

(II)

we have

to

some

property formation.
controversial assumptions about the nature of

have

to

some

assume

specific

that

a

relationship that holds between a subvenient-family of

duplicates as well. So

duplicate of

we have

make

We

there
any time an object has a supervenient property,

is

materially
subvenient property also had by that object that

implies that supervenient property. Thus

complex Boolean combinations

(II) is

plausible only

if

we assume

of properties also count as properties.

25

If

we

that

instead insist that only the so called natural properties (properties in which the

objects

having them resemble one another

be called 'properties' then

(II)

every non-physical property
materially implies

some

in

intrinsic respect)

will likely turn out false

M there

M. The problem

some

is

is

which are plausibly considered

properties.

If

natural, but with disjunctive

(e.g.,

properties, then the physical property

Even
base,

we

if

still

we admit more

might want

biological, psychological,

our

list

^

on which the non-physical property

than just the natural properties in the subvening

to restrict the type of

For example,

when

Boolean operators that are

the subvenient properties are

we might want

on physical

to accept the

to

exclude negation from

properties.

to say that physical properties are closed

would be forced

in disparate physical

12

of acceptable operators

were we

As John Post

points out,

under complementation, we

unusual and absurd result that the property

"not being a physical property"

is

a physical property

properties might legitimately supervene

on which non-physical

14

dependence they pick out

supervenience theses do more than

of

.

However, the main problem with both versions
that the relationship of

and

.

permissible in property construction
physical properties.

unlikely that for

natural - physical property that

economic properties) are generally multiply realized

supervenes will be disjunctive

it is

not with conjunctive or structural

properties,

non-physical properties

— as

deserve to

is

of

weak supervenience

very odd. Note that weak

just establish intra-world relationships

26

is

between properties. Weak supervenience theses have modal import
they hold that at every world in the domain of quantification there

as well, as

is

a

relationship of material implication between the subvenient properties and

supervenient properties. The odd part

is

that they

relationships hold across worlds. (Note that

different

if

and only

if it is

possible for the

I

fail

to insist that the same

am counting a

same

set of

relationship as

subvening properties

related to a different set of supervening properties.)

Weak

are inadequate for the physicalist's purposes, as

consistent with

supervenience claims that whereas
brains are always conscious, at

world

at this

some

it is

to be

supervenience claims

weak

human beings with complex

other possible world

human beings

with

equally complex brains are never conscious. Because they allow the relationship

between the subvenient properties and the supervenient properties
this

way

across worlds,

weak supervenience

dependence relationship

that

is

theses

fail

to

vary in

to capture a type of

appropriate for defining physicalism.

Strong Supervenience
Let us

the

now

turn our attention to strong supervenience theses. As with

weak supervenience

relationship, there are typically

formulating strong supervenience. They

(III)

two ways

of

are:

the
For any worlds, wj and wk, and for any objects, x and y, if x in wj has
same B-properties that y has in wk, then in wj, x has the same A-

properties that y has in wk.
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A strongly supervenes on B just in case, necessarily, for each x and each
property F in A, if x has F, then there exists a property G in B such that x
has G and necessarily if any y has G, has F. D[VFe A, Vx (Fx -> 3GeB
[Gx & Vy (Gy -> Fy)])]

(IV)

it

The possible worlds formulation

of strong supervenience,

(III),

claims that the

family of A-properties strongly supervenes on the family of B-properties just in
case

it

cannot be the case that objects with the same B-properties

same A-properties. That
indiscernibility in A.

again

tries to

is,

fail

to

have the

cross-world indiscernibility in B entails cross-world

The modal formulation

of strong supervenience, (IV),

capture the intuition that the supervening properties depend for

on the subvening properties

their existence

same problems with property formation

as

that necessitate them. (IV) has the

(II)

did, but

we

will put aside those

worries for now. The main advantage that strong supervenience has over weak

due

to the extra necessity operator inside the third set of

supervenience

is

parentheses in

(IV). It is this extra necessity

operator that ensures that the

one world will hold

at all worlds. In

other words, this extra necessity operator ensures that the

same subvening

dependency relationships

that hold at

properties correlate with the

also this

those

same

across worlds.

extra necessity operator, however, that creates

who wish

relationships.

same supervening properties

to

It is

new problems

use supervenience theses to capture dependency

We will discuss these problems shortly when we look at John

Hawthorne's criticisms of global supervenience theses below.

28

for

Before

we begin our

discussion of the putative problems that even strong

supervenience theses have capturing dependence relationships,

few things about the above formulations

us note a

let

of strong supervenience. Note,

first,

that strong supervenience theses require that both the supervenient properties

and the subvenient properties be

instantiated

requirement raises an obvious concern.
higher-order non-physical properties

If

by the same individual. This

the supervenient properties are

property of being a philosophy

(like the

department, or of thinking about one's recent

visit to see friends in Frankfurt),

and the subvenient properties are lower-order

intrinsic physical properties,

the claim that the supervening properties strongly supervene

properties will be false.

for their instantiation

An individual's higher-order

on

then

on the subvening

properties often depend

a combination of the intrinsic physical properties of

that individual, along with a

wide range

of lower-order properties

and

relations

involving various other individuals. This worry about strong supervenience's
co-instantiation requirement

is

one of the primary reasons for the popularity

global supervenience theses. (More

on

this point

of

and on global supervenience

claims shortly.)

The second thing

to note

necessity operators in the

interpretations,

Philosophers

about strong supervenience theses

modal operator formulations can have

depending on the

who want to

specific relationship

one

is

is

that the

different

trying to capture.

use a strong supervenience thesis to capture the

states
relationship they think holds between functionally defined

29

and the

occupants or realizers of those states often interpret the second modal operator
as

mere physical or nomological

necessity, rather than the stronger case of

metaphysical or logical necessity. This
extrinsically

by reference

whether a physical
mental state

and events

state

is

because functional states are defined

to their typical causes

P

and

effects. In

qualifies as the realizer or

other words,

occupant of a particular

M depends essentially on P's nomological relations to other states

in a

world/ system.

On the other hand,

philosophers

who want to

capture a mereological relationship, or a relationship between determinates and
determinables, often interpret the second modal operator strongly, as

metaphysical or logical necessity. 15
Let us

now

turn our attention to the criticism that even strong

supervenience theses

two problems
anyone

who

dependency

that

fail

to capture

genuine property dependence. There are

Thomas Grimes and Jaegwon Kim

tries to

(post 1990) claim beset

use even a strong supervenience thesis to capture a

relationship. 16

They

are:

i)

the fact that supervenience theses are

usually formulated in terms of property covariance leaves open the possibility

that the

two

the other;

families of properties covary without either being dependent on

and

ii)

the fact that most supervenience theses are reflexive and

nonsymmetric means
a

that supervenience theses are

dependency relationship

that,

by most accounts,

asymmetric.
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poor vehicles

is

irreflexive

for capturing

and

Let us look at the criticism expressed by
that

(i) first.

even strong supervenience theses leave open the

might covary without either being dependent on the

were the covariance relationship

to

offers the fictional

a high degree of

(?)

manual

example

dexterity.

manual dexterity covary

is

the appropriate genetic

Here

is

example

I

is

To

is

B

might happen

dependent on

illustrate this

a

problem,

between high IQ scores and

dependent on the

set of properties

thought

other. This

A and

Presumably the reason IQ scores and

and developmental

another example

17
.

of a correlation

not because one

because each depends on a third

possibility that

hold only because each

third set of properties -C-properties, for

Kim

Grimes and Kim claim

of.

other, but

(whatever properties capture

factors responsible for each

The Wiedmann-Franz Law

the degree of electrical conductivity of a piece of metal

is

tells

trait).

us that

correlated with

its

thermal conductivity (and vice-versa). In other words, thermal conductivity

and

electrical conductivity perfectly

which the law holds. Yet
the other.

covary with each other

at

clearly neither type of conductivity

Presumably what explains the amazing

any world

is

fact of their

in

dependent on

covariance

is

the

existence of a third set of properties (the micro-structural properties of the

metals involved).

These two examples are supposed

to

show

that

even strong

supervenience theses are not strong enough to ensure real dependence, as
covariance
strong supervenience theses express only a relationship of strong

between properties, and

it is

possible to have a relationship of strong
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covariance between properties without having a relationship of real

dependence. But before
examples.

we

accept this result,

us look closer at the above

let

We should note that both examples are of cases in which there is a

relationship of strong covariance, without a corresponding dependence
relationship, only

if

the

first

necessity operator in (IV) represents

mere physical

or nomological necessity, rather than the stronger cases of metaphysical or

logical necessity.

It is

nomologically necessary (we will assume) that

intelligence covaries with

manual

dexterity,

and

it is

nomologically necessary

that thermal conductivity covaries with electrical conductivity, but

it is

certainly not logically or metaphysically necessary that there be such

relationships.

intelligence,

If it

really

is

the case that

manual

dexterity does not

and thermal conductivity does not depend on

conductivity,

and

vice-versa, then there

is

depend on

electrical

probably not going to be a

metaphysically necessary strong covariance relationship between them.

If

there

were a metaphysically necessary strong covariance relationship between them,
then

we would

conclude,

it

probably say that (surprisingly) there

seems that

this criticism

appeared to have, as anyone

has less bite to

it

is

real

than

it

dependence

who hopes to use a strong supervenience

necessity
operator fairly strongly — most likely as metaphysical

is

To

originally

interpret the
relationship to capture real dependence should probably

modal operator

18
.

interpreted strongly enough, then

If

the

we should be able

covariance
out examples of asymmetrical nomological

32

19
.

first

20
.

modal

first

to rule

Another problem

for typical formulations of strong supervenience

We usually think of dependency relationships

captured by the second criticism.
as asymmetric — that

is,

we

think that

As

the case that F determines G.

supervenience theses

The following example

moving
time

it

car

is

an

illustrates this

its

destination.

between the speed

highway and the time
investigation

G

determines

irreflexive

we

it

at

which

cannot also be

and asymmetric

relationship.

is

traveling and the

to

determine the

a car travels a certain stretch of

takes to complete this stretch. After careful

discover that

when two

cars travel at identical speeds over the

Furthermore,

same distance

in identical lengths of time their

is

identical.

mathematical investigation convinces us that

when two cars

speed

this

identical.

is

was no

fluke.

travel the

A

little

Given the same

highway, speed and time strongly covary with one another

sense given by

it is

it

however, strong

Suppose we are trying

their time

one, as

then

which the car

same distance

stretch of

F,

problem: The distance traversed by a

a function of the rate/ speed at

takes to get to

relationship

if

typically written,

to ensure

fail

(III)

and

is

(IV).

However, the relationship

dependency relationships usually

symmetric clearly indicates

are.

to us that this

It is

is

is

in the

not an asymmetric

symmetric!

And

the fact that

not a relationship of

dependence.
But perhaps there

is

some

clause

theses to ensure that the relationship

want

to say that

is

we could add

to strong supervenience

asymmetric - for example,

we might

A-properties, the
although the B-properties supervene on the
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reverse does not hold.

need

to

add

Or perhaps,

as Peter

Menzies has advocated,

we will

different clauses for each type of relationship the supervenience

thesis attempts to capture

— be it a logical relationship,

a relationship

between

determinates and determinables, a functional relationship between the

occupants of causal
at least a

roles, or a mereological relationship. 21

mentioned

clause.

mended by adding something

(Grimes and

Kim

reject this proposal,

give for their rejection rests on the criticism given in

to

covary only because each

this criticism

has

much

However, there
theses. This

is

the

less bite to

is

is

it

dependent on

same

like the

I

above-

but the reason they

— that it is possible for A

C — and we have shown that
Kim

assume.)

yet a further problem with strong supervenience

problem

individual.

(i)

than Grimes and

I

hinted at earlier

supervenience theses require the two
the

rate, there is

primn facie problem with the usual formulations of supervenience.

think the problem can be

and B

At any

The problem

when

pointed out that strong

I

sets of properties to

that, as written,

is

be co-instantiated by

they say nothing about the

nature of the properties that are included in the subvenient base.

If

the

subvenient base includes merely the intrinsic physical properties of the
probably
supervenient object, then strong supervenience theses are
properties that
objects possess a multitude of higher-level
that are extrinsic to them. For example,

watching a beautiful sunset
presence of a sunset,

ii)

at 6

whether

depend on

factors

whether you possess the property

PM depends on:
it is

false, as

i)

whether you are

indeed 6 PM, and
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iii)

whether

of

in the

that sunset

beautiful (furthermore, according to

is

external social standards).
properties, however,

If

some

accounts, beauty depends on

the subvenient base properties include extrinsic

and there

is

no principled way

to limit

which

extrinsic

properties are included and which are excluded, then strong supervenience
theses have the potential to collapse into global supervenience theses. Note that

this result

should not surprise

us,

given that

many

believe that strong

supervenience and global supervenience theses entail analogous dependence
relations

.

22 If

they do entail analogous dependence relations, then strong

supervenience theses should be appropriate for our needs only

if

global

supervenience theses are also appropriate for our needs. Without further ado,
then, let us turn to our attention the question of

theses are appropriate for our needs; that

is,

whether global supervenience

to the question of

whether they

satisfy the physicalist's desiderata.

Global Supervenience
Because of the apparent problem that strong supervenience theses have
accounting for cases in which the supervenient properties are determined
partly by extrinsic factors,

many

philosophers have looked to global

They have
supervenience theses to capture the physicalist commitment.

assumed

the physicalist s
that global supervenience theses could satisfy

intuition that there

is

some kind

of

dependence relationship between the

without requiring an
physical and non-physical features of a world
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unnecessarily strong account of this relationship. This assumption has been

undermined

in recent years,

however, as global supervenience theses have been

criticized for failing to capture

Before

we

even the minimal physicalist commitment.

see whether these criticisms hold

up under

analysis, let us first

briefly define global supervenience as follows:

Worlds

(V)

Note

that are B-indiscernible are also A-indiscernible.

that (V) says nothing about

properties

depend on

how particular

their subvenient properties;

relationship that holds globally between

all

we

the relationship that holds between the physical

(PIGS)

Worlds

let

its

supervenient

claim

is

the supervenient

properties distributed over a world. Because

properties at a world,

objects'

only about the

and subvenient

are primarily concerned with

and the non-physical

us speak not of (V) but of the following specific claim:

that are physically indiscernible are otherwise indiscernible.

global
There are two main criticisms that are typically made about

show that the thesis
supervenience theses like (PIGS). Each criticism attempts to
is

too

weak

to capture

even a minimal physicalist commitment.

criticisms are as follows:

i)

Briefly, the

Kim's criticism (inspired by Bradford

Petrie) that

the possibility that a world
global supervenience theses cannot rule out

differing

from our world

in

some seemingly

insignificant physical respect

our world in some significant nonmight, nevertheless, wildly differ from
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two

physical respect, 23 and

ii)

the criticism that global supervenience theses like

(PIGS) are false, due to the metaphysical possibility that worlds physically
identical to our

ectoplasmic

world might

e.g.,

contain additional non-physical angels or

stuff.

In 1987 Bradford Petrie argued that global supervenience theses like

(PIGS) are too

weak

worlds, wi and

W

2,

to rule out the following scenario.

each containing two

objects, a

and

Suppose there
b,

and two

is

a set of

properties,

supervenient-property F and subvenient-property G. Petrie claims that the
following distribution of properties

is

consistent with global supervenience

theses.

W2

Wl
Fa ~Fb

~Fa ~Fb

Ga Gb

Ga ~Gb

Petrie argues that this world-pair

shows

that global supervenience theses

do

of properties in wi and
not entail strong supervenience theses. The distribution

W

2 is

as in each of these worlds
not consistent with strong supervenience theses,

the fact that an object possesses or lacks

possesses or lacks

F. Petrie,

global supervenience.

As

G is irrelevant to whether or not

however, claims

the

two worlds
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this

world-pair

is

it

consistent with

are distinguishable in the distribution

of their base-level properties, they are

allowed

to

be distinguishable in the

distribution of their supervenient-level properties as well.

Kim

argues that Petrie's example shows that global supervenience theses

like (PIGS) are too

Suppose

G

is

weak

to capture

a physical property

even a minimal physicalist commitment

and F

is

24
.

a mental property. Physicalists

believe that the distribution of physical properties determines the distribution
of mental properties, but in these

property

two worlds

G seems irrelevant to whether

it

the fact that an object has physical

has or lacks mental property

extends Petrie's argument with the following analogy.
like (PIGS) are consistent

He

with the possibility that there

is

F.

Kim

argues that claims
a world

indistinguishable from our world physically, save the addition of an extra

one of Saturn's

ammonia molecule

in

in other respects as

you

entirely.

Here

is

please.

Such

rings, that

a

what Kim says about

is

as different

from our world

world might even lack consciousness
the example:

accept global psychophysical supervenience as a significant
with this
form of materialism we should consider this: It is consistent
physically
version of materialism for there to be a world which differs
rings in that
from this world in some most trifling respect (say, Saturn's

Before

we

entirely
world contain one more ammonia molecule) but which is
perhaps totally
devoid of consciousness, or has a radically different,

over
irregular, distribution of mental characteristics

its

inhabitants say,

rocks are conscious). As
creatures with brains have no mentality while
physical respect,
long as that world differs from this one in some

be as
however, miniscule or seemingly irrelevant, it could
25
you please in any psychological respect you choose
.
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different as

Remember

that (PIGS) only claims that worlds with the same distribution of

physical properties have the

According

to (PIGS), then,

same

any

distribution of

other properties.

all

set of physically indiscernible

worlds should be

mentally indiscernible as well. But, by hypothesis, the two worlds under
consideration are not physically indiscernible, as one of the worlds contains one

more ammonia molecule than
that

when

Kim and

the other.

the antecedent of a true conditional

Petrie are merely pointing out

is false,

the consequent can be

false as well.

But perhaps

this criticism is a bit of a

Chapter Three of The Nature

of

True Minds, although

be logically consistent with (PIGS),

we have

metaphysically consistent with (PIGS). 26

is

a

matter of necessity, not stipulation.

possible,

and you make the

red herring. As John Heil argues, in

may

reason to doubt that they are

Remember

If

Petrie's world-pairs

wi and

W

2

that

what worlds

there are

are metaphysically

plausible assumption that intrinsic properties can

be redistributed in any combination, the following world should also be
metaphysically possible. 27

W3
~Fa ~Fb

Ga Gb
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The metaphysical
worlds

is

possibility of

W3 shows

not consistent with (PIGS) after

(PIGS) are supposed to range over
consistent with (PIGS), both

there

would be

all

that at least

all.

one of the original pair

Global supervenience theses

possible worlds.

W2 and W3

It

of

like

cannot be the case

that,

are metaphysical possibilities, as then

a pair of worlds indistinguishable in their subvenient properties

but distinguishable in their supervenient properties. Thus

it is

not clear that

global supervenience theses allow for the sort of disconnect between base and

supervenient properties that would threaten physicalism, as Petrie and Kim's

examples had

initially

suggested.

Cranston Pauli and Ted Sider
in their paper, "In

the extra

raise a similar criticism of

Kim's example

Defense of Global Supervenience." 28 They point out that

ammonia molecule world

the assumption that

it is

is

if

metaphysically possible, then again by

possible to redistribute intrinsic properties in any

combination, there should be a world physically identical to that world without
the extra

ammonia

molecule. In

contain consciousness or not?

If

fact,

our world

not, then the

is

such a world! Does

this

woild

extra-ammonia-molecule world

is

two worlds that are
not consistent with (PIGS), because then there would be
world and this
indiscernible with respect to their physical properties (our
properties. However,
world), but discernible with respect to their mental

world does contain consciousness, then the metaphysical

if

this

possibility of the

properties have
extra-ammonia-molecule world would show only that mental

very bizarre relationship to physical properties.
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It

would turn out

that

a

ammonia

molecules have a surprisingly "all-pervasive influence". In short, either the

world that Kim describes

is

metaphysically impossible, because consciousness

depends on physical properties

in

ammonia molecules make more

some more

of a difference than

either case, the claim that mental properties

left intact.

self

substantial

we

way, or (surprisingly)

originally thought. In

depend on physical properties

Sider and Paul think physicalists should opt for their

first

horn,

is

"No

respecting materialists should admit that mental properties are like that

[dependent on extra ammonia molecules]. She should opt for the first horn
the dilemma,

and claim

that the case

is

simply impossible ." 29

I

agree.

of

The

appropriate physicalists response to Kim's extra-ammonia-molecule scenario

simple to deny that such a world
like (PIGS)

can escape

Kim and

is

is

metaphysical possible. In conclusion, theses

Petrie's criticism,

and may be what we need

for

physicalism.

Possessor and Blocker Worlds
Unfortunately, there

(PIGS)

is

a potentially

— the criticism that they are false.

If

more
(PIGS)

logically or metaphysically possible worlds, then

problem. According to
there to be a

many

philosophers

world physically indiscernible

it is

to

is

making

we have

a claim about

due

example,

might be metaphysically possible

41

all

the following

metaphysically possible for

our world, but otherwise

entities there. For
to the existence of extra non-physical

discernible,

it

serious criticism of theses like

that there

is

a world, w*.

physically just like our world, but metaphysically richer, because in addition to

all

the stuff that our world contains,

w*

also contains non-physical angels

30
.

Let

us suppose that these non-physical angels manifest mental properties without

having

to interact

with the physical world

hover about contemplating the goings-on
John Hawthorne
terminology,

let

calls

us

possessor-worlds

such

call

at their world). In a recent paper,

entities possessors

31
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Extending Hawthorne's

such worlds possessor-worlds. The problem with

that their existence

is

any way (perhaps they merely

in

makes (PIGS)

false, as

possessor-worlds

could be physical duplicates of our world without being duplicates

our world

32
.

One way
of possessors

to

respond

makes

to this

worlds being quantified over. For example,

domain

of

restrict the

domain

to only

possibility

are instantiated, following

natural property that

is

is

to

we might

minimal physical duplicates of our world, following

Frank Jackson's suggestion, or

is

problem -that the metaphysical

unrestricted global supervenience theses false —

restrict the

and

simpliciter of

to only

worlds in which no non-alien properties

David Lewis

s

suggestion.

(An

alien property

is,

not instantiated by any individual in [the actual world],

built up from
not analyzable as a conjunctive or structural property

constituent that are

all

Jackson's suggestion

supervenience

A

instantiated by parts of this

first.

world

33
).

Let us considei

Jackson suggests the following emended global

thesis:

42

(MDGS)

Any world

that

is

a minimal physical duplicate of our world

a

is

duplicate simpliciter of our world.

A

minimal physical duplicate of our world, according

world that contains
exact

all

to

Frank Jackson,

a

is

the physical stuff that our world contains, and in the

same arrangement, without anything

extra

34
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Here

is

how Jackson

explains the concept of a minimal physical duplicate:

minimal physical duplicate? Think of a recipe for making
scones. It tells you what to do, but not what not to do. It tells you to add
butter to the flour but does not tell you not to add dirt to the flour. Why
doesn't it? Part of the reason is that no-one would think to add dirt

What

is

a

unless explicitly told
to

list all

to.

But part of the reason

is

logical.

the things not to do. There are indefinitely

It is

many

impossible

of them: don't

add bats wings; don't add sea water; don't add... Of necessity the
writers of recipes rely on an intuitive understanding of an implicitly

A minimal physical duplicate of
is what you would get if you — or God, as it is sometimes

included 'stop' clause in their recipes.

our world
put — used the physical nature of our world (including of course

In the

physical laws) as a recipe in this sense for

making

above mentioned paper, John Hawthorne

criticizes this strategy.

Hawthorne argues

that

the

a world.

any materialist global supervenience

quantifies over fewer than

all

unwanted metaphysical

its

thesis that

metaphysically possible worlds would allow for

possibility of

something he

calls blockers. Blockers

of properties that
are non-physical entities that block the emergence

would

supervene on physical
normally (given the normal absence of blockers)
properties.

A world

blockers
physically indiscernible to our world that contains

Hawthorne goes on to claim
might, for example, lack consciousness entirely.
entails the possible existence of
that the possible existence of blocker-worlds

43

zombie worlds
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As any

self-respective physicalists

would not be happy with

zombie worlds,

thesis that entailed the possible existence of

a

physicalists should

not be comfortable with global supervenience theses that are too

weak

to rule

out the metaphysical possibility of blockers.

Hawthorne
physicalism only

believes that a supervenience thesis

if it

is

adequate for

admits the metaphysical possibility of possessor-worlds

but denies the metaphysical possibility of blocker-worlds. Possessor-worlds are

compatible with physicalist intuitions because the possessors are merely

something extra that do not have any
existence of blocker-worlds,

effect

on the physical world. The

on the other hand, would undermine the

physicalist' s intuition that the physical facts at a

physical facts at that world

really the

same

as a

36
.

possible

Or, so

world determine the non-

Hawthorne argues. But

zombie world? Another way

is

a blocker world

of putting this question

is

to

ask whether physicalists should really have a problem admitting the

metaphysical possibility of blocker-worlds.

who

Remember

that

David Chalmers,

advocates the metaphysical possibility of zombie worlds, believes that

metaphysically possible, although not physically possible,

foi a

minimal

But advocates of
physical duplicate of our world to lack consciousness.

need not admit

way

this possibility.

way

things are at any minimal physical

duplicate of the actual world. In other words, in

way

(MDGS)

According to advocates of (MGDS), the physical

things are fixes the mental

mental

is it

things are and the physical

way
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Chalmers zombie worlds

things are

come

apart

more

the

easily

than they do in blocker worlds. Physicalists should have clear intuitions about

Chalmer's zombie world

(that they are metaphysically impossible), but they

need not have clear intuitions about blocker worlds. That

is,

physicalists can

disagree as to whether they are genuine metaphysical possibilities or not.

But there

Kim and

is

a further

what holds

fails

at all

(MDGS) make

metaphysically possible worlds, and which worlds are

is

a matter of necessity not stipulation. But theses like

claims about a smaller set of worlds than global supervenience

because they

indiscernible

make

claims only about those worlds that are physically

from the actual world. (MDGS) says nothing about any world

from the actual world

ammonia molecule on one
consistent with

actual

related to

because global supervenience theses make claims about

metaphysically possible

differs

is

Petrie's criticism of global supervenience. Their criticism of global

supervenience

theses,

problem with (MDGS). This problem

world

(MDGS),

in

any physical respect — e.g., by having an extra

of Saturn s (or Saturn s counterpart

then, that such a

in non-physical respects as

s)

rings.

It is

world could be as different from the

you

please. Physicalists should ideally

non-physical propeities
say that the connection between the physical and
stronger than such a possibility implies

Perhaps

that

is
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.

we will have better luck with the

second strategy available

to

under consideration only to those in
the physicalist — of restricting the worlds

which no non-alien properties

exist.

Let us consider the following claim.
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(NAGS)

As long

Non-alien possible worlds that are indiscernible with respect
physical properties are otherwise indiscernible.

as our

world

is

to their

neither a possessor- nor a blocker-world — an

assumption that should be acceptable

to physicalists

— it should be the case

that

any non-alien possible worlds that are physically indiscernible are otherwise
indiscernible.

(NAGS) makes no claim about worlds

are instantiated, however, so

(NAGS) does not

who are willing

which

alien properties

rule out the metaphysical

possibility of either possessor- or blocker-worlds.

Physicalists

in

And

this

seems

right.

to accept the possibility that there are

worlds

containing angels should also be willing to accept the possibility that there are

worlds containing blockers. The possible existence of blocker worlds does not
threaten the truth of physicalism in the

way

that the possible existence of

zombie worlds threatens physicalism. In conclusion,
Hawthorne's requirement that a supervenience
physicalist only

if it

I

thesis

am rejecting
is

adequate for the

admits the metaphysical possibility of possessor-worlds,

but denies the metaphysical possibility of blocker-worlds.

I

believe that an

adequate supervenience thesis can admit both the metaphysical

possibility of

blocker-worlds, as long as
possessor-worlds and the metaphysical possibility of

neither

is

thought to be possible

properties instantiated.

at

worlds in which there are no non-alien

(NAGS) comes

fairly close to

events,
intuition that the non-physical objects,
biological, psychological,

and economic

capturing the physicalist

and properties

objects, events,
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at

our world

(e.g„

and properties) are had

in virtue of, or are

determined by, the physical

objects, events,

and properties

at

our worlci.

Conclusion
There are three main issues about which nonreductive physicalists might
plausibly be thought to have an opinion: ontological considerations about the

types of things that exist at a world, issues of determination involving the
existence

and nature

that exist at a world,

of a

dependence relationships between the types

and epistemological questions regarding the

of things

best

way

describe, explain, or characterize the types of things that exist at a world.

argued that physicalists must be committed
space and/or time
(OC), and

I

is,

or

is

composed out

of,

I

fundamental physical particulars

have argued that physicalists must be committed

still

need

to say

have

to the thesis that every particular in

to the thesis that

any two non-alien worlds that are physical duplicates are duplicates

(NAGS).

I

to

simpliciter

whether physicalism makes an epistemological claim

as well.

I

that

all

think

it

does not. That

physicalists

would

is, I

think there

is

no

single epistemological claim

accept. Reductive physicalists

have a very

different

physicalism than do
understanding of the epistemological requirements of

nonreductive physicalists. In

fact,

one of

my main claims in this thesis is that

primarily with respect to their
reductive and nonreductive physicalists differ
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epistemological claims. Thus

I

would disagree with Beckermann when he

insists that:

Someone

is

a materialist or physicalist

if

and only

if

he claims that there

nothing but physical objects and events, and that all that can be
meaningfully said about these objects and events can be expressed in physical
is

language

Whereas

2’ 8
.

a reductive physicalist might claim that

all

that can be meaningfully

said about objects can be expressed in physical language, one of the

claims of nonreductive physicalism

is

main

have an

that the special sciences

important explanatory role to play that cannot be replaced physics, even
theory. Nonreductive physicalists

deny

that the physical sciences provide us

with the conceptual and representational resources adequate
explaining everything within the physical world

grounds that the taxonomies employed by the
relate to

39
.

for describing

They deny

special sciences

this point

do not

taxonomies in physics. Special-scientific-kinds cannot be

with physical kinds, as

special-scientific

configurationally plastic

physics in this

way
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.

The

in

on the

neatly

identified

kinds are both compositionally and

fact that the special sciences cross-classify

suggests (though

it

and

does not conclusively prove) that

special sciences explain.
physics cannot explain everything that the
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indiscernible object P* existing at our world
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is

a
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(III),
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CHAPTER 2
A HISTORIC LOOK AT NONREDUCTIVE PHYSICALISM
Any

discussion of nonreductive physicalism will have to confront
the

problem that the term 'reductionism' has been used
last several

decades. In

fact, this is

one of

in

myriad ways over the

my main points!

It is

because the term

has been used so variously that philosophers cannot just claim to have
proven
reductionism or claim to have proven nonreductionism without offering a fairly
,

,

detailed explication of

they take the term to

what they mean by

mean can we

'reduction.'

Only

after

it is

clear

what

evaluate their arguments and see whether

they succeed against their intended target. As will become clear in the second
half of this chapter,

physicalism

fail

I

think that

many

to hit the right target.

of the recent criticisms of nonreductive

I

take that target to be the classic, and

historically influential, nonreductive physicalist positions of philosophers such

as

Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam,

Thompson, and Richard Boyd. Each
at least

one

Jerry Fodor, Geoffrey

Heilman and Frank

of the aforementioned philosophers wrote

influential article advocating nonreductive physicalism

years 1965 and 1980. So influential were these
therein have

articles, that the

between the

views articulated

become synonymous with nonreductive physicalism

in

many

philosophers' minds. Thus in order to avoid arguing against a straw man,

critics of

nonreductive physicalism must direct their attacks,

against the positions held by one or

more
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of these thinkers.

in part at least,

Reductionist Theses

Before delving into the details of these nonreductive physicalists'
positions,

it

would be

useful to look at the vastly different types of views that

have been called 'reductive'

in the philosophical literature

begin this chapter with just such a survey. Later,

I

over the years.

will look at

espoused by several well-known nonreductive physicalists
theses they reject (either explicitly or implicitly). Finally,

I

I

arguments

to see

which

of the

will offer a

suggestion as to which theses contemporary nonreductive physicalists should

probably

reject,

and

to

which they should probably

accept. Here, then, are the

candidate 'reductive' theses:

Semantic Reduction - S is semantically reduced to T if and only if S can be
translated into T without loss of meaning (where S and T are words or
sentences). Alternatively, S' is semantically reduced to T if and only if all the
sentences in S' can be translated into sentences in T' without loss of meaning
(where

S'

and

T' are

languages ).

1

Ontological (micro) Reduction - A's are ontologically (micro) reduced to B's
and only if As are just Bs (where A's are macroscopic objects and B's are

if

physical particulars).

“M

-1

and
phenomena, or
phenomena, or

that

M

P if and only if it turns out
refer to identical things (where M and P are objects,
properties, and -M- and -P- are the names for those objects,

Empirical Reduction 2 -

is

empirically reduced to

properties).

Reduction - Reduction is thought of as a relationship between
interThere have been many attempts to capture this relation of

Inter-theoretic
theories.

theoretic reduction; here are three of the

more
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influential ones:

ReductioriN (Nagel's Inter-theoretic Reduction) - Theory Ti is intertheoretically reducedw to theory To just in case the laws of Ti can be deduced
from the laws of To, along with the appropriate bridge statements connecting
the theoretical vocabulary of Ti

and

To.

•

ReductionKO (Kemeny and Oppenheim's Inter-theoretic Reduction) Theory Ti is inter-theoretically reducedKO to theory To if and only if any
observations and facts explained by Ti are equally well explained by To, and
To is at least as powerful and well systematized a theory as Ti.

•

ReductionNw (New Wave Inter-theoretic Reduction) - Theory Ti is intertheoretically reducedNW to theory To if and only if To fulfills the explanatory
role that Ti once fulfilled, and an analogue of Ti (a corrected version of Ti)
can be deduced from To.

Causal Reduction -

A is causally reduced to B

and only if the causal powers
determined, by the causal powers of B
if

A are entirely explainable, or entirely
(where A and B are objects, events, properties, or physical

of

particulars ). 3

Metaphysical (property) Reduction - An A-family of properties is
metaphysically reduced to a B-family of properties if and only if for every

A

there

is

a b in B such that

it is

necessary that a

b.

Before going on to discuss specific nonreductive physicalist positions,

make

a

few short comments about each

a in

I

will

of the aforementioned types of

reductionism.

The
are

first

thing to note about semantic reductionism

no longer sanguine about the

possibility.

Over

is

that philosophers

half a century

ago

in the
philosophers like Rudolf Carnap had argued that statements couched

language of psychology could, without

loss of explanatory

power, be

of physics
reformulated as statements couched entirely in the language

type of reductionism
physicalists

I

is

now

out of favor,

it is

safe to

assume

4
.

this

that the reductive

semantic reductionism.
will be discussing are not arguing for
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As

(Although nonreductive physicalists do sometimes write as
reductionism

is

if

semantic

their target.)

Depending on how

it is

construed, ontological or micro reductionism

either a fairly uncontroversial thesis or a very controversial thesis.

is

The

controversy surrounds the interpretation of the “are just" relationship.

If it

indicates a relation of composition or constitution, then nonreductive

physicalists can accept ontological reductionism

(some would accept the

mereological relationship of composition, whereas others would accept the
relationship of constitution with

commitments).

If it

its

attendant additional ontological

indicates a relation of identity, however, then the claim that

macroscopic objects are ontologically reducible

to microscopic particulars

be very controversial. Recently, Lynne Rudder Baker and

may

Mark Johnston have

argued that the relation between macroscopic objects and the microscopic
particulars that constitute these objects cannot be identity.

It

cannot be identity

because macroscopic objects and collections of microscopic particulars have
different temporal

or gain small

and modal

amounts

properties. 5

Whereas macroscopic

objects can lose

of constituting stuff without going out of existence,

collections of microscopic particulars cannot.

On the

other hand, collections of

microscopic particulars can survive certain compositional changes,

like

6
squashing, that the macroscopic object cannot.

The view

J. J.

C.

that reduction involves an empirical identity claim

Smart and U.

7
T. Place in the 1950s.
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was held by

Relying on Frege's distinction

between meaning and

reference,

physical terms pick out the
differ in their intension or

star'

Smart and Place argue that mental terms and

same phenomena

or property, even though they

semantic meaning. (Just as the phrase 'the morning

denotes the same heavenly body, Venus, as the phrase 'the evening

although these phrases differ in intension.) Smart and Place are often
for

assuming

that the identity relationship

is

contingent, as

have been convinced by Saul Kripke's arguments that
statements are metaphysically necessary
right to point out the lack of entailment

8
.

many

star,'

criticized

philosophers

all-true identity

Nevertheless, Smart and Place were

between semantic

irreducibility

and the

claim that the objects, phenomena, or properties involved are metaphysically

distinct.

Note, though, that their position that mental terms systematically pick

out the same

phenomena

as physical terms

would not be accepted by most

nonreductive physicalists. Physicalists must believe that physical

stuff

composes, constitutes, or realizes the mental on every occasion in which the
mental
there

is

is

instantiated (at least at our world), but they need not believe that

a systematic correlation

between mental phenomena, or properties

picked out
picked out by mental terms, and physical phenomena, or properties

by physical terms

9
.

That

is,

they need not believe in what has been called type

physicalism. 10

The assumption
reduction'

is

that

by 'reduction' we

really

mean

inter-theoretic

often held implicitly by

many

of the participants in the debate over

fact, in

many

cases philosophers

nonreductive physicalism. In
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assume

that the

conditions (or

some

close analogue of the conditions) for inter-theoretic

reduction laid out by Ernest Nagel in his 1949

Reduction

As

I

will

article,

I

do not think

for inter-theoretic reduction.

(I

that satisfying these conditions

do not think

For Nagel, a reduction
theory are

shown

When

two theories

to

be a

is

logical

made

sufficient

successful only

is

times before.) 12

when

the laws of the reduced

consequence of the laws of the reducing theory.

are homogeneous with one another — that

observational and theoretical vocabulary

when

unproblematic. However,

is

that satisfying these conditions

necessary either, but this latter point has been

when

of

Natural Science," are either necessary or sufficient for reduction. 11

in

argue below,

the

"The Meaning

the

two

is

the

is,

when

same — the derivation

their

is

theories are heterogeneous — that

is,

they contain different observational or theoretical vocabulary — a formal

derivation

is

possible only

if

we

can establish bridge connections between the

terms in the reduced theory and some subset of terms in the reducing theory.

These bridge connections are thought
relationship

to

be underwritten either by a logical

between the conventional meanings

by an empirical discovery that the

states of affairs designated

the primary science are sufficient (or necessary

affairs

that

and

by the terms

in

sufficient) for the state of

designated by the terms in the secondary science.
This

is

of the expressions involved, or

much about Nagel's views

Nagel insisted on

is

well known.

logical derivability

What

is

and bridge connections only

two assumptions:
because he was committed to the following
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often overlooked,

1

)

that the

purpose of inter-theoretic reduction
the reducing theory,

and

ii)

that

recast as deductive arguments,

scientific

to explain the

reduced theory by means

of

legitimate scientific explanations can be

all

(ii)

is

amounts

to the claim that

an adequate

explanation would have to satisfy the formal requirements of Carl

Hempel's deductive-nomological model (D-N)

we do

that although

still

inter-theoretic reduction

accept Nagel's

is

first

of explanation

13
.

But

now note

assumption, that the purpose of

reduced theory by means of the

to explain the

reducing theory, contemporary philosophers of science have largely abandoned
his positivist

D-N

second assumption

criteria is

not necessary for

14
.

Thus anyone who thinks

scientific

that satisfying the

explanation should also think that

bridge connections are not necessary for inter-theoretic reduction.

who

thinks that satisfying the

D-N

criteria is

And anyone

not sufficient for scientific

explanation should also think that bridge connections are not sufficient for
inter-theoretic reduction.

At around the same time
theoretic reduction,

that

Kemeny and Oppenheim proposed

that specifically rejects

Hempel's requirement

between the theoretical vocabulary
According

is

to

to explain

Hempel published

of the

Kemeny and Oppenheim,

and predict observations.

powerful and systematic theory

is

his criteria for inter-

a competing account

that there be bridge connections

reduced and reducing

theories.

the central purpose of scientific theories

A reduction is effected when a more

able to explain

and predict

all

the facts and

Note that their account
observations that the old theory once handled.
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preserves the central intuition that reduction

is

bound up with

without saddling the account with any particular theory of
explanation.

Where

their account

seems

to

go wrong

is

explanation,

scientific

in requiring us to

make

sense of the idea that there can be theory-independent facts and observations.
In order for a theory To to reduceKO a theory Ti, To

and observations

that Ti

was once thought

and observations are

that facts

reduction
account.

not the

15
.

made would

Kemeny and Oppenheim's

Thus anyone who

thinks

not be happy with the formal

account of inter-theoretic

Nevertheless, there does seem to be something right about their

We do expect the more powerful reducing theory to play the role

same

role, at least a similar role) that the

According
reduction

is

to

new wave

reduced theory once played.

explanatory unification and ontological simplification.

work) as well as

it

did,

reductionists generally

why

and where

assume

(if

reductionists, the goal of inter-theoretic

reduction should be able to explain

to

to explain.

the same facts

inextricably linked with the theoretical

perspective from which they were

requirements of

must explain

it

the old theory

worked

(or

A successful
was thought

went wrong. Although new wave

that scientific explanations should satisfy the D-

N model's criteria, what gets deduced from the new theory may be only an
image or analogue of the old theory
couched

in the

(a

statements are
language of the new theory). Because the bridge

considered part of the reducing theory
logical status

16
.

corrected version of the old theory

In

we

avoid the problem of specifying

smooth reductions, reductions
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in

which the ontological

their

-

commitments

of the old theory are generally preserved, reductions will license

property identities or correlations. In
the ontological

commitments

17
.

reductions, reductions in which

of the old theory are modified or eliminated,

almost nothing of the old theory
correlations are unlikely

bumpy

preserved and property identities or

is

Thus new wave

theory elimination or replacement

(e.g.,

reductionists consider cases of

the elimination of the phlogiston theory

matter) to be cases of reduction.

Causal reductionism

is

relationships to characterize.

essentially

two types

causal role reduction

the

most

One

difficult of all the reductive

reason

why

it is

so difficult

is

that there are

of causal reductionist theses that are often conflated

and

the mereological reduction of causal powers.

Each

thesis

attempts to capture the idea that the causal powers of one thing are entirely
explainable by, or entirely determined by, the causal powers of another thing.
In order to explain the distinction

reductionism,

I

between the two types

of causal

appeal to the following formulations introduced by Peter

Menzies:

as being G iff (1) G is a
Causal Role Reduction - a's being F causally reduces to
occupies a certain
more fundamental property than F; and (ii) a's being G
that it occupies this typical causal
typical causal role such that the proposition
18
role entails that a is F
.
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.

Mereological Causal Reduction - a's having F mereologically reduces to the
b n 's having G n iff (i) bi, b2.
complex event of bi's having Gi, b2's having G2
b n are constituents of a; and (ii) the proposition that bi has Gi, b2 has G2
bn has
laws,
entail
appropriate
bridge
that
a
has
the
F.
with
together
Gn
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

,

According to some accounts of functionalism — a view traditionally associated
with nonreductive physicalism — functionalists are committed
reduction,

to causal role

because they believe that functional properties are second order

properties

whose

causal powers can be identified with the causal powers of

their realizers. (Just as, for

example,

we might

identify the fragility of a glass

tumbler with some particular causal power of the tumbler's molecular
structure.)

The

to-one relation.

essential thing to note here

An entity

is

that causal role reduction

is

a one-

has a functional property in virtue of having some

particular causal power.

The
to-many
causal

to,

thesis of mereological causal reduction,

relation.

powers

on the other

hanci,

a one-

is

A mereological causal reductionist would claim that the

of a macroscopic event or object are determined by,

and

identical

constitute the event or object
the collection microscopic particulars that

The problem

that mereological causal reductionists face

what should count

as the reductive base.

If

is

that

the reductive base

it is

is

19
.

not clear

confined to the

particulars that constitute this event or
intrinsic properties of the microscopic

object,

then the thesis

is

not very plausible. (Or, so

it

seems

to me.)

On

externalist

supervene on, nor
views objects have causal powers that neither

reduce

the parts that constitute these objects

to,

64
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.

And

although broadening the

reductive base to include a larger spatio-temporal region, or to include
parts' relational properties,

more

would make

mereological causal reductionism a

plausible thesis, the revised version

nonreductive physicalism.
physical explanation

if

It is

what

hard

my

would no longer

to see

much

constitute a threat to

how we would have

a reduction to a

gets included in the reductive base

depends on

individuation conditions established by the special science, as would be the
case

if

we

included only those relational properties that are needed to

determine the object's causal powers (rather than including

all

the object's

relational properties).

In recent years philosophers have

moved away from thinking of

reduction as primarily a relationship between theories, as Ernest Nagel

assumed,

to thinking of reduction as primarily (or importantly) a relationship

between properties. There are many explanations
thought. First, analytic philosophy has

years,

and

critically

talk of properties

important to

many

is

made

for this shift in

language and

a metaphysical turn in recent

at the center of this turn.

Second, properties are

central issues in philosophy, including issues

involving identity, causation, and explanation.

And

third, the last 30 years has

are typically formulated
seen a variety of supervenience theses flourish, which

as relationships

between

of
families of properties. Furthermore, in speaking

preserve
properties, philosophers can appear to

dominant account

some

of inter-theoretic reduction (Ernest

of the details of the

Nagel

s),

by recasting

his

bridge connections between
requirement that there be empirically discoverable
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and reducing

the terms of the reduced

theories.

They can

recast

it

as a

requirement that there be nomically necessary bridge connections between the
properties picked out by the reduced and reducing theory.

There has been an especially
strong supervenience

Philosophers

who

is

lively debate

over the question of whether

really a type of reductionism in disguise

argue that

it is

21
.

a type of reductionism point out that the

strong supervenience thesis allows for nomically necessary bi-conditional

bridge connections between a supervening property and the complex property
that

is

the disjunction of

all

supervenes. Philosophers

the properties

on which the supervening property

who argue that strong supervenience

does not license

reductions claim that identities between macroscopic properties and potentially
infinite disjunctions of

gerrymandered physical properties

is

not a type of

reductionism about which any nonreductive physicalist need worry. They do
not need to worry about this type of reductionism, as mental and specialscientific theories

(and in theory

this

debate

if

and descriptions would

the translation

when

I

fails to

have a role

to play in practice

be recursively enumerable). More on

discuss the disjunctive

The

still

move

in the third chapter.

Classic Accounts

Now that we have specified a few of the more common types of
reductionism,

we can turn to

particular nonreductive physicalists

which type of reductionism they

reject,

and
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ii)

to:

i)

see

determine to which theses

nonreductive physicalists should be committed.

What

follows are discussions

of the classic accounts of nonreductive physicalism — accounts

by Donald

Davidson, Hillary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, Geoffrey Heilman and Frank

Thompson, and Richard Boyd.

Davidson
I

my discussion of the classic accounts of nonreductive physicalism

begin

with Donald Davidson's enormously influential

which he introduces a position he
that although

calls

predicate ." 23

some form
to

"Mental Events,"

anomalous monism

22
.

"No

Davidson argues

has, as a matter of law, the

With

his

commitment

same extension

to monism,

Davidson

as a mental

explicitly endorses

of metaphysical or ontological reductionism; with his

mental/ physical anomaly, he denies that the mental

the physical because

we cannot translate

It is

is

is

commitment

either semantically or

not semantically reducible to

mentalistic descriptions into

physicalistic descriptions without losing explanatory power.

he

As Davidson puts

advocating only a bland monism — although every mental event

physical event,

it is

is

purely physical predicate, no matter

inter-theoretically reducible to the physical.

it,

in

mental events are token identical to physical events, the mental

not reducible to the physical, because

how complex,

article,

is

a

impossible to eliminate mentalistic descriptions (even

in

between mentalistic and
theory) because of the lack of conceptual relationships
physicalistic terms.
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For Davidson, the issue of whether the mental

is

inter-theoretically

reducible to the physical hinges on the question of whether mental predicates
are suitable for law-like statements.

The

suitable for law-like statements hinges

Davidson takes laws

on

whether mental predicates are

his particular

to be true law-like statements;

to be general statements that

that are

issue of

understanding of

laws.

he take law-like statements

support counterfactual and subjunctive claims and

supported by their instances. Davidson believes that the normative and

holistic features of the

statements.

If

mental make mental predicates unsuitable

for law-like

mental predicates are unsuitable for law-like statements, they

cannot figure in laws -thus, a fortiori, they cannot figure in bridge laws. Hence,
psychophysical reduction

no way

to

is

impossible, according to Davidson, because there

reduceN the mental

Davidson has been

is

to the physical.

criticized in recent years for his belief that his

supervenience thesis gets him mental/ physical dependence without

mental/ physical reducibility.^

If

Davidson holds merely

a

weak

super\ enience

to their mental
claim -the claim that at no world can objects differ with respect

properties but

fail

to differ

with respect

to their physical properties

- then he

on the physical.
cannot do justice to the intuition that the mental depends

weak supervenience

thesis

worlds physically identical

Weak supervenience

is

A

compatible with the possibility that there are

to

our world that lack any conscious experience.

that the
theses have this consequence because they allow

dependence relationships holding between
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sets of properties at

one world may

fail

to

hold between those same

Davidson holds

and perhaps

another world.

sets of properties at

however,

If,

a strong supervenience thesis, he gets inter-world comparisons,

a type of

dependence, but only

at the

expense of his

nonreductionism. Or, so the argument goes.

If

we confine

"Mental Events,"

Davidson

is

ourselves to the remarks he makes about supervenience in

it is

not clear which type of supervenience relationship

advocating. The

first

statement he makes about supervenience

consistent with his holding merely a

writes,

weak supervenience

"Such supervenience might be taken

events alike in
the 'cannot'

is

all

to

mean

physical respects but differing in

claim.

Davidson

that there cannot be

some mental

allowing for the possibility that entities

indiscernible to our

respect."

at

Here

worlds physically

world might lack mentality. The second statement

Davidson makes about supervenience, which he mistakenly takes
equivalent to his

that

two

plausibly interpreted as a claim about only intra-world

possibility, thus

"Or

is

first

to be

statement, supports a stronger claim. Davidson writes,

an object cannot

alter in

some mental

physical respect." Here the cannot refers to

respect without altering in

ways

some

that a single object might

have been, and thus ranges over possible representations of that

object across at

admitted to holding merely a
possible worlds. Although Davidson has since

weak supervenience

claim,

it is

not clear that this

should take. In committing himself
forced to

abandon

to a

is

really the position

weak supervenience

his contention that the mental
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thesis,

he

Davidson

depends on physical

is

properties in any real sense.

weak supervenience
unwanted specter

25

I

suspect that Davidson commits himself to a

thesis for fear that the stronger thesis

of reductionism. 26

If

this is the case,

would

raise the

then Davidson would be

better off adopting either a strong or a global supervenience thesis. 27 Although

both strong and global supervenience theses do license property reductions,
they need not license inter-theoretic reductionN, so long as the mere existence of
universally quantified biconditional bridge connections between psychological

terms and non-recursively-definable-infinitely-long disjunctions of physical
terms

fails to suffice for

theory deduction. 28 Moreover, even

involving infinite disjunctions

is

(a

bridge laws

sufficient for theory deduction,

sufficient to establish inter-theoretic

scientific explanation, so

if

reductions they

long as deduction

fails to

may

and thus

not be sufficient for

be sufficient for explanation

claim that even contemporary deductivists hold).

Putnam
and

In the late 60s

early 70s, Hilary

Putnam advocated

believed to be both nonreductionist and physicalist.
states, like the state of

Putnam argued

an entire organism. 29 Putnam

brain state hypothesis

brain states.

that mental

being in pain, cannot be empirically reduced to physical-

chemical brain states, because mental states (unlike brain
states of

a position that he

states) are functional

directs his criticism at

Smart and Place

— the hypothesis that mental states are type-identical

Putnam

points out that the brain state hypothesis
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is

s

to

implausible, as

it is

empirically unlikely that a single physical-chemical correlate will be found

across species for mental states like 'pain' or 'the belief that

P.'

Putnam

expresses his skepticism of the brain state hypothesis in the following

oft

quoted passage:

Consider what the brain-state theorist has to do to make good his claims.
He has to specify a physical-chemical state such that any organism (not
just a

mammal)

is

in pain

if

and only

if

suitable physical-chemical structures;

chemical

must be

state.

(a) it

and

possesses a brain of a

(b) its

brain

is

in that physical-

This means that the physical-chemical state in question

a possible state of a

mammalian

brain, a reptilian brain, a

mollusc's brain (octopuses are molluscs, and certainly feel pain),
the

same

time,

it

must not be

etc.

At

a possible (physically possible) state of the

brain of any physically possible creature that cannot feel pain. Even

if

such a state can be found, it must be nomologically certain that it will
also be a state of the brain of any extra-terrestrial life that may be found
that will be capable of feeling pain before

supposition that

Because

it is

it

may

we can even entertain the

be pain. 30

possible for psychological states like pain to be multiply realized in

different types of physical stuff, psychological states cannot be identical with

physico-chemical brain

states.

Putnam argues

that psychological states should

instead be thought of as abstract functional states that hold of the entire

organism. Note that Putnam's functionalism

is

incompatible not only with the

but also with
brain state hypothesis, which he calls 'empirical reductionism,'
certain versions of micro-re ductionism

and

mereological causal reductionism.

outputs to some
Functional states are characterized by sets of typical inputs and
system.

m

in

If

mental states are functional

states,

then the existence of a mental state

system S would depend on features that are
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extrinsic to

any particular

realization of

m — namely, on the set of typical inputs and outputs that are

characteristic of

m

in S. 31 Thus,

if

Putnam's functionalism

not be true to say that a mental state

is

is

correct,

nothing but a collection of

it

would

intrinsic

physical particulars, as certain versions of micro-reductionism hold, nor

it

be true to say that the causal role of a mental

by, or

even supervenient on, the causal

state is identical to, explainable

roles of the physical particulars that

m, as mereological causal reductionism holds.

constitute

In

would

"Reductionism and the Nature

rejects his earlier (1958)

of

Psychology" Putnam

explicitly

claim that higher-level sciences, like psychology, are

32
inter-theoretically reducible to lower-level sciences, like physics. Here, as in

the article discussed above,

One

reduction.

the laws

science

is

reduced

and observations

He

to another science

if

and only

if

we can explain

of the first science using the conceptual resources of

the second science. Here, again,

reduction.

a representational reading

Putnam assumes

points out that

Putnam

it is

explicitly rejects Nagel's criteria for

often possible to deduce the behavior of a

system from a description of the behavior

of

its

component

parts without being

with such a description. For example,
able to explain the behavior of this system

although

we may

be able to deduce that a particular

through a particular
the

1"

peg and the board

activity,

we may

1"

round hole from a description

square peg will not go

of the microstructure of

in terms of particle positions, velocities,

not be able to explain

round hole from such detailed

why

electrical

the square peg does not go into the

scientific information.
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and

Not every deduction

counts as an explanation whereas the addition of irrelevant premises does not
;

threaten the status of deductions, explanations that include explanatorily

irrelevant details

may

cease to be explanatory.

Putnam's main point

is

that explanation

is

not a transitive relation. The

microphysical explanation of an event can be illuminating without the
microphysical explanation being able to explain

on the event's microphysical

details. Transitivity fails

explanation contains information that
or the information

to recognize.

a particular

is

square peg

form

Putnam argues

peg

irrelevant to

phenomena

whenever

the parent

what we want

makes what we want

rigid,

that depend

may

to explain,

to explain impossible

be able to explain

and physics may be able

go through the round

go through the round

hole. 33 In order to explain

hole,

why

to describe the

pegs and holes, such explanations would not explain

fails to

fails to

that

is

that although physics

peg and board are

relative sizes of the

the square

in a

the

all

we would have

why

why

the

to appeal to

microphysical level.
abstract geometrical principles that are not expressed at the

According to a
that

no explanation

common criticism of the 1973
of a particular

round holes

of approximately the

and the board are made

of

wood,

Putnam

is

claiming

peg and board's microstructure can capture

the abstract generalization that rigid square pegs

rigid

article,

same

do not

size,

in general

go through

regardless of whether the peg

plastic, or metal. In other

words, Putnam

is

would have to make
accused of assuming that the physical explanation
out of
essential reference to the type of material
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which the peg and board

are

constituted — so that a physical explanation of

go through a round hole
similarly sized

wood board would

in a

peg and board made out

same phenomenon. The

why

critic

of

hard

a square

wooden peg

not be able to explain

plastic

fails to

why

a

should produce the

goes on to rightly point out that

many

physical

explanations are abstract enough to apply across material types. The gas laws,

for

example, describe collections of gas molecules in a closed container, not

collections of nitrogen, oxygen, or helium molecules. But this criticism misses

Putnam's main point. Putnam does not

rest his criticism of

assumption that physical explanations make

reductionism on the

essential reference to particular

materials — and thus are unable to capture higher-level abstract
generalizations -but on the assumption that the physical explanation

too convoluted

and detailed

phenomena being

would be

to bring out the salient explanatory features of the

explained. Moreover,

Putnam does recognize

that physical

explanations truck in abstractions. Note that he speaks of the physical

explanation of the peg and the board in terms of

electrical activity,

stuff.

particle positions, velocities,

and

not in terms of the molecular activity of any particular kind of

In conclusion, this criticism does not succeed in attacking

Putnam

s

main

(epistemological) point.

Fodor
In fact, the criticism

is

introduced by Jerry Fodor

more appropriately

in,

"Special Sciences,
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directed at arguments

Or

the Disunity of Science as a

Working Hypothesis ." 34

In this influential article, Fodor argues that

it is

empirically unlikely that the special sciences will reduce to physics because:

(a)

interesting generalizations

(e.g.,

counter-factually supporting

made about events whose physical
have nothing in common; [and] (b) it is often the case

generalizations) can often be

descriptions

that

whether the physical descriptions have anything in common is, in an
obvious sense, entirely irrelevant to the truth of the generalization, or

to

their interestingness, or to their degree of confirmation, or, indeed, to

any of

In other

their epistemologically important properties

words, there

may

be nothing physically in

35
.

common between

the

various event instances falling under a single special-scientific description.
Similarly, there

may

be nothing physically

Suppose

(to

mention

common between the various

M. Without a common physical

instantiations of a special-scientific kind

description, laws that

in

M cannot be translated into physical laws.

use Fodor's example)

into a physical law. (Gresham's

Law

is

a

we

tried to translate

law

in

economics that says that

whenever you have two equally valued monies
one bad, the good money
circulated.)

will

economics to reduce to physics

in the

to formally derive

language of physics

is

will

to

be

order for

be able to derive every true

entirely in the language of physics.

However, because economics and physics use

way

money

one good and

criteria for reduction, in

we would have

economic law from statements couched

the only

in circulation,

be hoarded and the bad

According to Ernest Nagel's

Gresham's Law

different theoretical vocabulary,

economic laws from statements couched

to translate

entirely

economic laws into physical terms.
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Assuming

that

Gresham's law

into physical terms

for 'money.' This

money

is

true, in

we would have

we cannot do

to

would

be able to substitute a physical predicate

given the multitude of physical realizations of

(gold, copper, paper, shells,

physical predicate

order to be able to translate the law

etc.).

be, at best,

The problem

is

disjunction of physical predicates that pick out

still

any candidate

merely an unsystematic disjunction

heterogeneous predicates in physics. Furthermore, even

would

that

money

if

we could

of

identify the

our world, there

at

be an infinite number of physical predicates that pick out money

at

other possible worlds. Chances are slim that this disjunction of physical
predicates — either the disjunction that picks out
disjunction that picks out

money

at all possible

money

at

worlds -is something about

which any relevant physical generalization can be made
physical generalization can be

made about

our world, or the

.

36 If

no relevant

the disjunction, then the disjunction

7
does not pick out a physical kind ?

It is

important to realize that for Fodor kindhood and lawhood are

connected concepts. Something

is

a kind

antecedent or consequent of a true
identified

if

and only

if it

scientific law. If the

appears

in the

kind predicates of S aie

openmerely with unsystematic, heterogeneous, unprojectable, and

ended disjunctions

of physical predicates,

we might plausibly

say that

we have

and the predicates of
discovered bridge connections between the predicates of S
physics, but

we

will not

have established

bridge laws. This

is

because "laws"

Without bridge laws
involving such disjunctions would not be explanatory.
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,

we

cannot satisfy Nagel's requirement that reduced theories be formally deducible

from reducing

theories.

Here

is

a

more formal representation

of Fodor's

argument:

(i)

The predicates representing
at all)

special-scientific

kinds can be identified

(if

only with unsystematic disjunctions of physical predicates.

(ii)

Unsystematic disjunctions of predicates do not pick out kinds.

(iii)

Laws connect kind

(iv)

Thus, unsystematic disjunctions of kind predicates are unsuitable

predicates with kind predicates.

for laws.

law

(v)

Anything unsuitable

(vi)

Reductions require bridge laws.

(vii)

for a

is

unsuitable for a bridge law.

Thus, the laws of the special sciences cannot be reduced to
physical laws 38
.

Note that Fodor seems
true of any particular

to

be assuming (unlike Putnam) that the physical laws

monetary transaction would have

reference to the type of material out of which the

Therefore,

if

Putnam's

critics are right that

money

kind

give Fodor

scientific

is

physical kinds

essential

constituted

34
.

mere

fact that a special

multiply realized in different types of material stuff will not

what he needs

kinds

is

make

physical descriptions can be

abstractions that apply across material types, then the

scientific

to

fail

for his

argument.

He needs

to be identical to physical kinds.

may

be abstractions,

it is still

to

prove that

special-

However, given

an open

that

possibility that these

abstract physical
multiply-realized-special-scientific kinds are identical with

kinds after

all 40
.
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Many

philosophers have pointed out that Fodor's requirements for

reduction are rather stringent. They claim that Fodor
specific picture of

notion of lawhood

what
is

is

wrong

to

have such

a

a law looks like (especially given that he admits that the

somewhat

'murky').

If

we

instead take a law to be any

necessary connection between properties, then necessary connections between
properties represented by disjunctive predicates should count as laws, and

hence should count as 'bridge laws.'

argument when

I

I

will present this objection to Fodor's

discuss challenges to the multiple realization argument in the

third chapter.

Heilman and Thomson
I

will not

be able to do

justice to

difficult article, "Physicalism:

here

41
.

Heilman and Thomson's extremely

Ontology, Determinism and Reductionism,"

Nevertheless, as this article

was very

influential in convincing

philosophers of the coherence of nonreductive physicalism,

what they take reductionism

to be.

facts) are

and

physical determination

(

is

that the

exhausted by mathematical-

physical facts determine

compatible with nonreductionism. They take reductionism

thesis that all scientific terms, including terms

sciences,

worth noting

Heilman and Thomson argue

principles of ontological physicalism (everything

physical entities),

it is

all

to be the

from psychology and the

can be defined in physical terms. They take definitions

the

special

to require

and consequent
nomologically necessary connections between the antecedent
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terms.

is

Heilman and Thomson argue

that this type of reductionism

is false,

as

it

impossible to find finite sentences in the vocabulary of physics that are

nomologically correlated with every special

scientific

law and description.

Thus, like the other nonreductive physicalists discussed so

Thompson assume

that a reduction

(Remember

inter-theoretic reduction.

reduction

is

would have

possible only

when

all

Heilman and

far,

to satisfy Nagel's criteria for

that according to

Nagel

inter-theoretic

the terms that figure in the laws of the

reducing theory can be translated into the language of the reduced theory.)

Heilman and Thompson's main

point, then,

is

that our failure to translate

mentalistic descriptions into physicalistic descriptions

means

that

we cannot

reduceN psychology to physics.

Boyd
In "Materialism

Entail,"

Without Reductionism: What Physicalism does not

Richard Boyd argues

that, contra

what he takes

to be the reductionist's

assumption, physicalism does not require "the definability of
psychological states

states) in the

(or,

on some accounts,

all

all

mental and

token mental and psychological

vocabulary of physics ." 42 Boyd argues that psychological

states are

token-identical with
not definable in physical terms, as they are neither type nor

physical states.

identities of the

Boyd

takes type physicalism to be the thesis that there are

form 'pain =

c-fiber firings,'

thesis that there are identities of the

and token physicalism

form 'John's pain
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at

t

to

be the

= x (where x

is

some

-

specific physiological state of

John

at

t).

Only

same

rigid designators (terms that pick out the

which they

would

if

there

were

object, or

identities

between

type of object,

at

every

the mental reduce to the physical. However,

world

at

we do

not have identities between rigid designators, because mental states are

refer)

compositionally -plastic- functional states.

Although they are

constituted out of physical states, they cannot be identified

is

always possible for them to have been realized

As Boyd

different physical states.

realized in or

with those

states, as

it

in or constituted out of

writes:

Against the definability of mental events, states, and processes in
physiological terms (via even possibly infinite definitions) I argue that,
according to the most plausible materialist understanding of mental

phenomena,

it is

logically possible

-indeed, even physically possible

be realized by entirely inorganic mechanical
computers and, thus, that they can be realized by systems that possess
no physiological definition whatsoever." (p. 93)

phenomena

for these

even possible

Boyd claims

that

event, state,

and process

mental state

is

it is

that

processing role;

it

it is

to

to

(at least, logically possible) for a

be non-physically realized. All that

is

mental

essential to a

possesses a certain computational or informational

not essential that

it

have any particular constitutional or

compositional properties. Hence, although Boyd

(like all physicalists) accepts a

not agree with Davidson and
certain type of ontological reductionism, he does

Fodor that mental events and
states.

states are token identical to physical events

Here, greatly simplified,

is

the

argument against token

80

identity.

and

1)

If

mental states are token

identical to physical states,

then

it

would not be

possible for the same mental state to have been constituted out of
different physical stuff.

2)

However,

it is

possible for the same mental state to have been constituted

out of different physical stuff (either different kinds of
tokens of the same kind of stuff).
3)

stuff, or different

Therefore, mental states are not token identical to physical states.

Leibniz's law tells us that

then anything true of

m

is

if

mental

state

m and

true of p as well. 43

have a property (being necessarily

physical state p are identical,

If (2) is

identical to

true,

m) that p

however,

lacks, so

m would

m and p

m might have

cannot be identical. There are two types of support for

(2): first,

been constituted by a different

counter-factually, the

brain in which

m

is

type of physical stuff

lodged had been made of

have been constituted by a different
the bearer of

m had eaten slightly

if,

silicone; and, second,

token of physical stuff

different food as a child.

if,

m might

counter-factually,

Had

she, for

example, eaten oatmeal instead of barley cereal as a baby her brain would have
44
been constituted by different molecules, and p would not have constituted m.

Notice that Boyd's argument
Fodor's.

in

many

is

open

to the

same

criticism as

was

We cannot assume that just because a mental state is multiply realized
different types of physical stuff that

it is

impossible to translate

a
mentalistic predicates into physicalistic predicates. Physics employs

gamut

of

abstract terminology that refers to multiply-realized-compositionally-plastic
states (e.g., the state of having mass).

states are functional states,

and thus

It

certainly

seems possible both

that mental

entirely configurationally defined, and that
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there

is

a physical expression that captures these functional
or configurational

states. It

may

be unlikely, but

it is

nevertheless possible.

Conclusion

Now that we have examined the classic accounts of nonreductive
physicalism in

some

detail, let

us consider which of the reductive theses

discussed earlier are (and are not) compatible with nonreductive physicalism.
All the classic accounts reject semantic reductionism.

The

belief that mentalistic

descriptions play an explanatory role that cannot be easily replaced

is,

after

all,

one of the central intuitions of nonreductionism. All physicalists should, and
do, accept the uncontroversial version of ontological or micro-reductionism (the

version that interprets the relationship between mental events, states, and

processes and physical events, states, and processes to be that of composition or
constitution rather

somewhat

dated.

than

As

identity).

The debate over empirical reductionism

physicalists, nonreductive physicalists should

assume

mental objects and phenomena are physical. However, they need not
that there are necessarily physical

Most nonreductive
there

is

names

for these objects

that

to hold

and phenomena.

physicalists explicitly reject type physicalism (the

a systematic correlation

is

view

that

between mental phenomena, or properties

picked out by mental terms, and physical phenomena, or properties picked out

by physical terms). All are mental

realists,

that our inability to identify mental

however,

in that they

do not think

and physical kinds threatens the legitimacy
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What about

of mentalistic descriptions.

and Davidson, as token
causation are identical

causal reductionism? Note that Fodor

physicalists, believe that particular

to

examples of mental

particular examples of physical causation.

hand, Boyd and Putnam, as functionalists, believe that

we cannot

On the other

identify

mental events with the physical events that compose or constitute them.

Whether nonreductive
reductionism

in

physicalists believe in property or metaphysical

depends on which version

of supervenience they hold.

Chapter One physicalists must believe

claim — that

you have

in at least a global

they must believe that once you

is,

fixed

all

the facts

45
.

fix

As argued
I

supervenience

the physical facts at a world

Furthermore, any nonreductive physicalist

who

accepts a strong supervenience claim has to believe that there are correlations

between mental and physical properties,

by complex, disjunctive predicates whose

potentially represented

are

gerrymandered

that science

is

(in

albeit physical properties that are

instantiations

other words, not the types of explanatory correlations

apt to discover ). 46

Let us turn our attention to the different accounts of inter-theoretic

reductionism. All the classic accounts of nonreductive physicalism were written
before philosophers started talking about new wave reductionism nevertheless,
;

seems

clear that nonreductive physicalists

would not be sanguine about

it

the

prospects for psychophysical reductionNW. Of course they would not be able to

prove that the mental
historical reasons

I

is

irreducibleNW, as reductionNW

do not yet understand, many
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is

of those

an empirical claim. For

who have argued

that

the mental

mental

is

11

reducible to the physical, and those

who have argue

that the

reducible to the physical, have assumed that reduction should be

is

understood according to Nagel's model, rather than Kemeny and Oppenheim's

model

47
.

Thus, Davidson, Fodor, Putnam, and Heilman and

sufficient to defeat reductionism to

establish bridge laws

the other hand,

(e.g.,

some

prove that

it

Thompson

would be impossible

think

to

between mental predicates and physical predicates
of the

arguments

for reductionism

on

arguments by Kim, Loar, and Francescotti) assume

a priori

that they

it

48
.

On

grounds
have

established reductionism merely by establishing the existence of necessary

connections between mental and physical properties
the third chapter,

derivability

no contemporary philosopher

is sufficient

49

But, as

I

will discuss in

of science believes that logical

for scientific explanation.

So proving that there are

necessary connections between mental and physical properties (or predicates)
will not

prove that mental

objects, events, or properties

physics.

However, neither

will

proving the absence of necessary connections

between mental and physical kinds prove
deductivists logical derivability

is

time to

move on from

can be explained by

fails to

irreducibility,

be necessary for

the discussion of bridge laws.
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if

contra contemporary

scientific explanation.

It

'
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like the language of physics or the language

of psychology.
2

Some have argued

that empirical reduction

is not a type of reduction at
has been called reduction by many nonreductive
physicalists. See, for example, Hilary Putnam, "Psychological
Predicates," in W.
H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill (eds.). Art, Mind and Religion (Pittsburgh:

all.

include

I

here because

it

it

University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), pp. 37-48; reprinted as "The Nature
of
Mental States" in Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology.

(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 216-22. Also see
Richard Boyd, "Materialism Without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does not

vol.

I

Ned

Entail," in

Block

(ed.),

Readings in Philosophy of Psychology,

vol. 1.

(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 67-106.
3

Later,

I

will

suggest two ways that one could read

this causal reductionist

thesis.

Rudolph Carnap, Meaning and Necessity: A Study
Modal Logic (London: Cambridge University Press, 1947).
4

in Semantics

and

Lynne Rudder Baker, "Unity Without Identity," Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 23 (1999), pp. 144-165; Lynne Rudder Baker, "Why Constitution is
Not Identity," journal of Philosophy 94:12 (1997), pp. 599-621; Mark Johnston,
"Constitution is Not Identity," Mind 101:401 (1992), pp. 89-105.
5

,

,

6

Note

that counterpart theorists

would

reject this

argument. See David

Lewis, "Counterparts of Persons and their Bodies," journal of Philosophy 68
(1971), o, 203-211.

7
J. J.

LXVII

C. Smart, "Sensations

and Brain Processes,"

(1959), pp. 141-156; U. T. Place, "Is

Philosophical Review ,

Consciousness a Brain Process?"

XLVII (1956), pp. 44-50; both papers are reprinted in
The Philosophy of Mind (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-

British journal of Psychology,

V. C. Chappell (ed.).
Hall, Inc.).

8

See Saul A. Kripke,

Naming and

Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1980).
9

Here

I

myriad of different ways.
denote not a relationship between properties, but a

Philosophers use the term

use the term to

realization in a

85

9

Here

I

Philosophers use the term realization in a myriad of different ways.
use the term to denote not a relationship between properties, but a

between an object and the stuff that composes or constitutes it. This
not how Jaegwon Kim uses the term, but it does seem to be how Andrew
Melnyk uses the term. See Andrew Melnyk, Thoroughly Modern Materialism:

relationship
is

A

Physicalist Manifesto (unpublished, 10/4/01).
10

argue that physicalists are committed to the view that there
is a systematic correlation between mental and physical properties.
Nevertheless, they are not committed to Smart and Place's type physicalism.
Later,

will

I

Ernest Nagel, "The Meaning of Reduction in Natural Science," in
Danto and Morganbesser (eds.), Philosophy of Science (New York: Meridian
11

Books, 1960), pp. 288-312.
12

Kemeny and Oppenheim, Paul Churchland, and the
themselves New Wave Reductionists. They include John

See, for example,

philosophers

who call

Bickle, D. H. M. Brooks, C. A. Hooker, Patricia Churchland and Peter Smith.
John Bickle, "Mental Anomaly and the New Mind-Brain Reductionism,"
Philosophy of Science 59:2 (1992), pp. 217-30; John Bickle, "New Wave
Psychophysical Reduction and the Methodological Caveats," Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research LVI (1996), pp. 57-78; John Bickle, Psychoneural
,

Reduction: The

"How

New Wave (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); D.

H. M. Brooks,

Perform a Reduction," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54
(1994), pp. 803-14; Patricia Churchland, Neurophilosophy (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1986), chap. 7; Paul Churchland, Scientific Realism and Plasticity of Mind
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), chap. 7; C. A. Hooker,
"Towards a General Theory of Reduction, Part I: Historical and Scientific
to

Setting;" Part

II:

Identity in Reduction; Part

III:

Cross-Categorical Reduction,"

Dialogue xx (1981), pp. 38-59, pp. 201-36, pp. 496-529; Peter Smith "Modest
Reductions and the Unity of Science" in Reduction, Explanation and Realism

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 19-44.

13

See Carl

Hempel and Paul Oppenheim,

"Studies in the Logic of

Explanation," (1948); reprinted in Carl Hempel, Aspects of Scientific
Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Free
Press, 1965), pp. 245-295.

For an excellent discussion of the many problems with the D-N model
Scientific Explanation,"
of explanation see Wesley Salmon, "Four Decades of
of
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Minneapolis: University
14

86

Minnesota Press, 1990). It is fairly
positivist. For an explanation as to

common to label Nagel's assumption
why see C. A. Hooker (1981), p. 38, in which

"Nagel's treatment of reduction belongs in the positivistempiricist tradition that dominated philosophy of science in the first six
decades of this century. Since in that tradition one has only the resources of

he writes

that,

deductive logic and sensation with which to capture science, it was natural
construe reduction as a purely formal relation (deduction) plus
epistemic/ operational conditions of
15

Many

some

to

sort."

philosophers have argued that

it

makes no sense

to

speak of

theory-independent facts or observations. See, for example, Paul Churchland,
Realism and Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
Scientific

and Thomas Kuhn, The Structure
University of Chicago Press, 1962).

1979);

16

of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago:

A well-known problem with Nagel's account is the problem of

analytical
specifying the logical status of bridge laws. (Are they definitions,
conventions?)
truths, contingent identities, or merely useful

17

See note 8 of the Introduction for examples of smooth and

bumpy

reductions.

composed of
According to Jonathan Schaffer, in a hierarchical world
set of quadruples (consisting of a
levels each level can be characterized by a
The fundamental properties are
property, an object, a law and a causal power).
level. The fundamental level
those properties that are part of the fundamental
18

is

realize, nor are supervenient
constituted by the set of quadruples that neither
out of, any other quadruples.
on, nor are mereologically composed

19

Assuming we

20

This

is

take events to be particulars.

Menzies's (1988) view,

Persons and Bodies:

op.

A Constitution View

cit.

.

Also see Lynne Rudder Baker,

(Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2000).

John Bolender, "Is Multiple
For a small sample of this discussion, see
Antireductionism," Southern Journal of Philosophy,
Realizability Compatible with
"Dependence in the Mind of God, m hhas
(1995) pp. 129-142; Daniel Bonevac,
anc
Supervenience: New Essay s, (Cambridge
Savellos and Umit Yalcin (eds.),
Horgan,
Press, 1995), pp. 124-139; Terence

New York: Cambridge University
"From Supervenience

to

Superdupervenience: Meeting the

87

Demands

o a

Mind 102: 408 (1996), pp. 555-586; Jaegwon Kim, "The Myth of
Nonreductive Materialism," Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association 63 (1989), pp. 31-47; reprinted in Supervenience and
Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 265-85; Jaegwon
Kim, "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction," Philosophy and

Material World,"

Phenomenological Research 52 (1992), pp. 1-26; reprinted in Supervenience and
Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 309-35; Harold
Kincaid, "Supervenience Doesn't Entail Reducibility," The Southern journal of
Philosophy 25:3 (1987), pp. 343-56; Ausonio Marras, "Supervenience and

An Odd

Couple," The Philosophical Quarterly 43:171 (1993), pp. 215222; Paul Teller, "Is Supervenience Just Disguised Reduction?" The Southern
Journal of Philosophy 23:1 (1985), pp. 93-99; and Nick Zangwill, "Supervenience,
Reducibility:

Reduction, and Infinite Disjunction," Plulosophia

(Israel) 26:2 (1998), pp. 151-164.

Donald Davidson, "Mental Events," Foster, L., and Swanson, J.W.,
(eds.) Experience and Theory (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press,
1970), pp. 79-101, reprinted in Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 207-25.
22

23 Ibid.
p.

215.

See Jaegwon Kim, "Can Supervenience and 'Non-Strict Laws' Save
Anomalous Monism;" Brian McLaughlin, "On Davidson's Response to the
Charge of Epiphenomenalism;" and Ernest Sosa, "Davidson's Thinking
Causes." Davidson's essay, "Thinking Causes," and the three responses were
24

first

published in Heil and Mele

(eds.)

Mental Causation (Oxford, Clarendon

Press: 1993), pp. 1-50.

25

Davidson admits

(1993), op.

weak

think this

cit. I

merely a weak supervenience claim in
probably not his considered view, however, because

to holding
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dependence.

dependence with

his supervenience relationship
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as follows: In "Mental

dependence
Events" he introduces the concept of supervenience as a type of
relationship.

Davidson

writes,

there are psychophysical laws,

"Although the position
it is

I

consistent with the

describe denies that

view

that mental

some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical
Dependence or supervenience of this kind does not entail

characteristics are in
characteristics....

reducibility
that he

through law or

wants

definition." Furthermore,

to capture a relationship of

thesis. See, for

example, Kim's

(1987), op.
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picks out money. I am interested in seeing what happens when we grant the
existence of necessary property connections between special science properties
and Boolean combinations of physical properties. I am arguing that such
as

likely,

property connections entail intertheoretic reductionism only given an

assumption that most contemporary philosophers
37

irrelevant

Lynne Rudder Baker suggested

common

I

reject.

add the word

relevant to rule out

such

physical generalizations as "being located in space and

time."

Fodor also introduces a second related argument against reductionism
in "Special Sciences." According to this second argument, reductionism is false
because whereas there are laws that mention special-scientific kinds, there are
no laws that mention disjunctions of physical kinds. Suppose a mental cause M
can be realized by physical realizers Pi, P 2 P3...Pn and its effect M* can be
realized by physical realizers Pi*, P 2 *, P3*...Pn*, in this second argument Fodor
argues that although M-»M* may be a law. Pi v P 2 v P3 v... P n -> Pi* v P 2 v P3*
v... P n will not be a law, as it neither Pi v P 2 v P3 v... P n nor Pi* v P 2 v P3* v... P n
38

,

*

*

*

*

are kind-predicates of any special science.
39

40

He
I

is

unable to support his

am reminded

here of

Bill

first

premise without

this

assumption.

Lycan's excellent point that

think of reality as divided neatly into abstract functions and
realizers. Lycan notes that what counts as abstract or functional

we are wrong to

their concrete
is

both relative

and a matter of degree. William Lycan, Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: The

MIT

Press, 1987), chap. 4.
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Ge o«rey Heilman

42

Richard Boyd (1980),

and Frank Thompson, "Physicalism: Ontology,
Determination, and Reduction," Journal
of Philosophy 72 (1975), pp. 551-64.
p. 85.

43

Of course, Leibniz's law only works in transparent, and not in
opaque,
contexts. I am assuming that modal contexts like this one
are transparent.
I owe this example to Pereboom
and Kornblith. See Derk Pereboom
and Hilary Kornblith, "The Metaphysics of Deducibility," Philosophical
Studies

44

63 (1991), pp. 125-145. But note that although the example might show that
token identity is false, it does not show that reductionism is false, as

Pereboom

and Kornblith seem

to claim.

Most forms

of reductionism claim that

identify the predicates or properties of the reduced

Merely having had different food as a child
not reducibly to neuroscience as
predicates true of my brain.
45

it

and reducing

will not

would not make

show

i)

that psychology

is

different neurological

Of course, the global supervenience claim needs

worlds that are

we can

theories.

to quantify only over

minimal physical duplicates of our world, or

ii)

contain no

non-alien properties.
46

Depending on how the

determination

may

theses are formulated, this relationship of

either be written expressly into the theses (as

Peter Menzies's formulations), or
the case
that

if

mental

47

as a separate thesis (as

the case in

would have

to be

one adopted Kim's property-correlation-formulations). Note, though,

someone could accept

that the

left

is

is

either type of supervenience thesis without believing

determined by the physical.

Of course, not everyone makes

this

assumption. For example, Jay

Garfield does not, and neither did Hooker. Jay Garfield, "Propositional

Attitudes and the Ontology of the Mental," Cognition and Brain Theory 6:3
(1983), pp. 319-331;

Hooker

(1981), op.

cit.

by insisting on a very narrow
understanding of laws. Philosophers who argue in favor of reductionism, on
the other hand, usually have a much more liberal understanding of laws. They
48

assume

Davidson and Fodor do

that

this

any nomologically necessary connection
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is

a law.

49

Robert Francescotti, The Non-reductionist's Troubles
with
Supervenience,” Philosophical Studies 89 (1998),

pp. 105-124; Jaegwon Kim,
Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept,” Metaphilosophy
21 (1990), pp 1-27
reprinted in Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical
Essays
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Brian Loar,
7

"Elimination
versus Nonreductive Physicalism,” in D. Charles and K.
Lennon, (eds.),
Reduction, Explanation and Realism (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1992), pp. 239-

263.
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CHAPTER 3
THE MULTIPLE REALIZATION ARGUMENT
One
rests

reason for nonreductive physicalism' s supposed

on an unsound argument -the multiple

third chapter

discuss four challenges to

I

challenges do succeed in showing

MR. argue
I

reductionism,

that multiple realization

I

In

my

that although the

to be false. Multiple realization

necessary nor sufficient for irreducibility. To
is

argument (MR).

it

MR to be unsound, they do not succeed in

showing nonreductive physicalism

assumption

realization

falsity is that

is

show how common

bound up with

is

neither

the

the issue of

offer the following testimonials:

The argument from
reason

why

multiple realizability provides perhaps the main
psychophysical reductionism is out of fashion in the

philosophy of mind
It is

1
.

part of today's conventional

wisdom

in

philosophy of mind that

psychological states are 'multiply realizable', and are in fact so realized,

any variety of structures and organisms. ...And there is an influential
and virtually uncontested view about the philosophical significance of
in

MR refutes psychophysical reductionism once

MR.

This

and

for all

The

belief in multiple realizability

is

the belief that

2
.

is

one of the main reasons

popularity of nonreductive physicalism

for the

3
.

Each of the above quoted philosophers goes on

to

argue — rightly, in

my

opinion — that the multiple realization of psychological-kind properties
disparate physical properties

is

in

not necessarily a barrier to psychophysical
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reducibility.

Each also argues — mistakenly,

in

my opinion -that defeating the

multiple realization argument shows nonreductive physicalism to be false or
incoherent.

hope

I

to convince

my reader that multiple realization is not as

pivotal to the debate over reductionism as

it

may have

first

appeared

to be.

Before going on to discuss specific challenges to the multiple realization

argument,

it

would be

useful to understand the argument a

little better.

Actually there are really two arguments here — Hilary Putnam's argument that
the compositional plasticity of psychological kinds defeats Smart and Feigl's

brain-state identity thesis,

and

realization of psychological-

Jerry Fodor's

and other

argument

that the multiple

special-scientific

kinds establishes the

irreducibility of the special sciences to physics. Let us briefly

examine both

arguments.

Putnam

is

usually credited with having been the

first to

claim that

mental states are multiply realizable. In "The Nature of Mental

Putnam

States,"

argues that mental states are functional states of an entire organism, identified

by

and outputs. 4

their inputs

M

mental state

is

cannot identify
for

If

mental states are functional

always realized by brain

state

states,

B in humans

at

then even

our world,

M with B. We cannot identify M with B, as long as

it is

if

a

we

possible

M to be instantiated without B-e.g., in structurally dissimilar creatures like

animals or Martians. Here, more formally,

1.

If it is

then

possible for mental state

M

is

not identical to

is

Putnam's main argument:

M to be instantiated without brain state B,

B.
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2.

It is

M to be instantiated without B

possible for

dissimilar animals
3.

M

Therefore,

is

not identical with

soundness of

In evaluating the

this

argument we should remember

argument against reductionism

argument against Smart and

Thus

it is

failing to prove

that

M

it is

possible (in this

M to be instantiated without brain

is identical

to B.

unfair to criticize Putnam's multiple realization argument for

nonreductionism, as

On the other hand,

this

was never

in "Special Sciences: or

Working Hypothesis,"
special-scientific

— the

brain states. Against this

hypothesis, the argument works beautifully. As long as

we cannot claim

much

directs his multiple realization

identical to

case physically possible) for mental state

Putnam

"Reductionism and the

Feigl's brain-state identity hypothesis

hypothesis that mental states are

that

in general (he has a

in his 1973 article,

Nature of Psychology"). 5 Rather, Putnam

state B,

in structurally

B.

does not direct his argument against reductionism
better

(e.g.,

and Martians).

Jerry

the intent of the argument.

The Disunity

Fodor does argue

of Science as a

that the multiple realization of

kinds (including psychological kinds) entails the irreducibility

6
of the special-sciences (including psychology) to physics.

picture of the relationship

between the

special sciences

Remember

Fodor's

and physics. Fodor

claims that any case in which a special-scientific law, Si-»S 2 holds there are
,

physical laws between the token realizers of Si and S 2 on something like the

following model:
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Special science law:

Disjunctive predicates of

reducing science:

Laws

of reducing science:

Figure

1:

Fodor's Model

Note that although most of Si's token-physical

realizers cause

one of S 2 's token-

physical realizers to be instantiated, there will always be exceptions, as special-

scientific

been

laws hold only

ceteris paribus. 7

to non-reductive physicalists,

realization presents a

problem

I

Given

take

it

how

important

that those

this picture has

who argue

for reductionism accept

that multiple

something

like the

following argument:

1.

Special-scientific-kind properties (in particular, mental-kind

properties) are multiply realized in disparate physical properties in

something
2.

If

like the

way

that Fodor's

model

pictures.

special-scientific-kind properties (in particular, mental-kind

properties) are multiply realized in disparate physical properties in
something like the way that Fodor's model pictures, then the special

sciences (including psychology) are not reducible to physics.

3.

Therefore, the special sciences (including psychology) are not

reducible to physics.
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This

is

short).

the

argument

I

To convince us

which he

am calling
that (1)

is

MR for

The Multiple Realization Argument (or

Fodor

plausible,

offers the

example

of

money,

rightly points out can be multiple realized in gold, paper, shells, etc.

He offers two

reasons for thinking that

he claims that the

(2) is true. First,

biconditional connections between special-scientific-kind properties and their

— e.g., connections

such as

—

and thus are not

realizers

v. .P* m )
.

are not law-like,

Si<-»

(

Pi

v P2V...Pn

,

P')

and

S2<-> (P*i

v P* 2

suitable candidates for the bridge

laws that Nagel's model of reduction requires. Second, he claims that the
connections between the disjunction of

realizers

— e.g., connections such as

(Pi

law-like. Neither type of connection

is

Si's realizers

and the disjunction

v P2 v...Pn )—»(P*i v

P*2 v...P *m)

of S2's

— are not

law-like, according to Fodor, because

neither type of connection could ever figure in an explanatory scientific law.

I

that

will

many

now

discuss four challenges to

MR. They

are:

i)

the observation

respectable physical properties are just as multiply realized as are

psychological properties;

special-scientific

ii)

the

argument

that the multiple realization of

and psychological-kind properties

in disparate physical

properties does not rule out reductions to abstract-physical, or physical-

functional, properties;

iii)

the claim that local reductions

reductions) should be reductions enough; and

iv)

the

(e.g.,

species-specific

argument

that

if

there are

nomologically-necessary biconditional connections between each mental-kind

property and a complex physical property (perhaps one that

97

is

expressed by a

disjunctive predicate), then reductionism follows. All four challenges

show
still

MR is unsound because its second premise

that

reduce to the physical even

if

is false.

aim

to

The mental could

mental properties are multiply realized

in

disparate physical properties exactly as Fodor describes. The fourth challenge,

known

as the disjunctive move, goes further to argue for a positive claim as well.

Advocates of

this last challenge

argue that the multiple realization insight

supports not the irreducibility of the special sciences to physics, but
(surprisingly) a type of reductionism instead.

challenges

challenge

do succeed

fails to

in

showing

I

will

argue that the

first

three

MR to be unsound, but that the fourth

establish reductionism (at least

it

fails to establish a

type of

reductionism about which nonreductive physicalists need worry).

First

The
like this.

Challenge to
first

It is

MR: The Ubiquity

of Multiple Realization

challenge to the multiple realization argument goes something

observed that

just as

many

respectable physical properties are

multiply realized as are special-scientific properties
of one gram, for example,

like having a

Many

mass of

is

realized in

all

8
.

The property having

because

are paradigms of respectable physical properties.
classic

of a reduced property — is also multiple realized. This point

many

mass

sorts of physical stuff, yet properties

philosophers have pointed out that even temperature- that

example

a

take the identification of temperature with
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is

important

mean molecular

energy to have enabled the reduction of the Boyle-Charles's gas laws

kinetic

statistical

mechanics (one of the paradigm cases of inter-theoretic reduction).

Not only
stuff (after all,

we can

to

is

temperature variously realized in different types of material

samples of helium, carbon, and iron

all

have temperatures), but

identify the property having temperature with the property having mean

molecular kinetic energy only in gases,

conditions. In solids temperature

potential

is

and even then only under

certain

constantly switching between a kinetic and

mode. Even vacuums (where there

is

no mass

at all),

and high

temperature plasmas (where the molecules have been ripped into sub-atomic
parts) are

thought to have temperatures. Obviously temperature in a vacuum or

plasma

not going to be identical with

is

we restrict

mean molecular

the identification to temperature in gases.

out, physicists identify

As

kinetic energy.

C. A.

Nor can

Hooker points

temperature with mean molecular kinetic energy only

gases that have a Maxwellian distribution (are in

random motion ). 9 Neither

single gas particle, nor a collection of gas molecules that are streaming

in

a

down

a

tube in laminar flow, have a temperature that can be identified using concepts

from thermodynamics. What

phenomenon

this discussion

of multiple realization

that kind-property

s

of

some

is

fairly

shows

is this: i)

common, and

special science S

is

that the

ii)

that the

physical property, or the irreducibility of S to physics.

If

in

we do not have correlating laws between
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fact

multiply realized in disparate

types of physical stuff does not entail either the irreducibility of

cases of reduction

mere

s

to

any

even the paradigm
the kind properties

of the reducing

and reduced

science, then Fodor's requirement that there be

such laws for genuine reduction
strict,

then Fodor

fails to

is

probably too

strict. If

prove the irreducibility of the special sciences

physics simply by showing that this requirement
this first

challenge

to

is

the requirement

show

is

is

too

to

not satisfied. The upshot of

that the multiple realization of special-scientific

properties in disparate types of physical stuff

is

compatible with the

reducibility (as scientists understand that term) of the special sciences involving

these properties to physics.

If

this challenge succeeds, the

second premise of

MR will be shown to be false. Multiple realization will be shown to be
insufficient for irreducibility.

Second Challenge

to

MR: Reduction to

Functional Properties

Advocates of the second challenge claim that
the fact that a mental kind

state or

out a physical state or property type-identical to the mental

property

10
.

Several philosophers have argued that this higher and more

abstract level of description

to the physical

to,

multiply realized in disparate types of physical

not some physical description, at a higher and more abstract

stuff that there is

level, that picks

is

we cannot conclude from

is

a functional description.

The mental

is

reducible

because mental states can be identified with, and hence reduced

functional states

functional states

functional state

11
.

Some argue

we have already

is

that merely

by construing mental

states as

reduced the mental to the physical (because

a type of physical state).

I

hope the reader
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a

will agree that this

strategy should be faulted for trying to get reductionism too cheaply. There

is

genuine debate over whether reductionism follows from functionalism, or

whether functionalism shows reductionism
wants

to

to

be likely

false.

Thus anyone who

convince us that functionalism entails reductionism has to do more

than just stipulate this point.

A more sophisticated and
(in

1969 and 1972) and

Kim

substantive position

(in 1998). 12

about a functional reduction of mental

1)

Here

is

is

offered by David Lewis

how Lewis

argues

we

should go

states to physical states:

We construe, using conceptual analysis, a mental state M as the state
that occupies a certain causal role.

2)

We identify, through empirical scientific investigation, the physical
state

3)

P

that occupies the M-role in the actual world.

Finally,

we contingently

identify the mental state

M with the physical

state P.

The

identity

between

than P realize

M and P

it is

,

possible that

different causes

merely a narrow physical
states

contingent as

it is

possible that states other

M (for example, structurally different states in mollusks and

Martians). Furthermore,

P might have

is

and

P

effects). 13

exists

The

defined externally in terms of their causes and
In response to

By

common to all

M (as

because P

is

definition, functional

states, as functional states are

effects.

Putnam's claim that that there

physical-chemical state

fails to realize

latter is possible

state (e.g., a brain state).

cannot be identified with narrow physical

and yet

is

plausibly no single

pains — whether in humans, Martians, or
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mollusks — Lewis argues that type identity
brain state theorist. 14

is

too strong a constraint on the

A more reasonable picture instead.

Would

anticipate that pain might well be one brain state in the case of
men, and some other brain (or nonbrain) state in the case of mollusks. It
might even be one brain state in the

case of Putnam, another in the case of Lewis.

saying the winning number

is

No mystery:

that

is

just like

17 in the case of this week's lottery, 137 in

the case of last week's. 15

Although

this

week

the winning lottery

number' and

'17' is

number

is

17, the identity

lottery

number

(taken de dicto ) might have been 23, had 23 been

modern

philosophical idiom

'the

is

not. This

winning

lottery

week

lottery

winning

lottery

number' picked out

out yet another number.

winning

'17' is a rigid designator ,

'the

If

137,

drawn

instead of 17. In

but 'the winning lottery

number' picks out

and next week

it

17, last

week

will likely pick

mental states are to be understood on the analogy of

numbers, then

psychological and physical

we

types.

will not

Instead

have

identities

we will have

between

a description in

psychological terms that contingently picks out a physical type. Mental

in other

'the

merely contingent, as the winning lottery

winning

number'

between

states,

words, will not be rigid designators.

to
Notice that Lewis does not try to establish the reduction of psychology

empirical facts at our
physics on a priori grounds. Rather, he believes that the

human
world are such that there are brain-state types realizing most

102

psychological-state types.
the reduction of at least

there

is

If

Lewis

is right, this

human psychology

degree of uniformity in nature

this

to

is,

would

some

certainly auger well for

physical science. Whether

however, an empirical question.

Those with reductionist leanings are more sanguine about the
those with nonreductionist leanings. Furthermore,

many

possibility than

believe that there

is

greater cause for optimism for mental states with a clear physiological basis

(like pain),

than for intentional mental states

(like the state of

thinking about

Michelangelo's statue of David), which are plausibly not entirely physiological.

The important point
state

is

that

by merely construing

(or reconstruing) a

M as a functional state (Lewis's step one) you have not yet reduced M to a

physical state. All step one does

reduced only

if it

is

prime

turns out that there

is

M for reduction. In the end, M will be

a single physical-state type that realizes

M for some relevantly large structure class (like a species
empirical.

16
).

Again the

issue

is

A Lewisian functional reduction establishes psychophysical

reductionism only

is

mental

the right

way

if

the empirical facts turn out to be a certain way.

to look at the question of reductionism, although

the reductionist's

optimism regarding the extent

to

which such

I

I

think this

do not share

correlations will

be discovered.

Kim's functional reduction

is

similar to Lewis's, except that he takes

with
functional properties to be second order properties

According

to

Kim,

we

first

construe a mental property

second order property defined by

its

first

order realizers.

M relationally as a

causal role. For example, the property of
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being in pain

would be defined

characteristic causes

and

as the property of having a property with certain

effects (e.g.,

caused by pinpricks and causing yelps

and avoidance behavior). Next we find the properties or mechanisms
satisfy this causal role in the actual world.

be the physical property that
identity of sorts

between

fits

If

M's causal

M and P

17
.

in the actual

is

to

we have an

merely nomologically

necessary, however, not metaphysically necessary, as

its

world P turns out

specification, then

This identity

that

M

is

defined in terms of

causal/ nomic relations to other properties (relations that are contingent on

the laws at a given

world ). 18

Kim

Unlike Lewis,
priori

grounds.

"necessary and

Kim

(surprisingly) claims to establish reductionism

I

have

Suppose we were

to

admit that

what Kim means by

this claim.

believing that there

beer in the fridge functionally in terms of

role,

and suppose further

elsewhere,

Kim says

it

Would

to construe the property of

that despite tons of research

this

mental

state

its

extrinsic-causal

we were

not able to

it is

not clear what benefit

functional conception of mental properties

In conclusion,

any

significant

have been reduced? Given what he says

seems that Kim should answer

no, then

is

am not sure

I

identify a single physical state that realized this mental state for

structure type.

a

argues that a functional conception of mental properties

." 19
sufficient for reducibility

is

on

'no' to this

we

get

from being

is sufficient

Lewis and Kim are right

for

its

20
.

However

told that a

reducibility.

that the functionalization of

mental states/ properties does not guarantee their
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question

irreducibility, or the

if

irreducibility of the sciences that refer to these states/ properties.

that a single physical state, P, realizes

justified in believing that

we could

M in terms of P, even M were to

explain

if

it

were metaphysically possible

M to be differently realized in other-worldly humans.

be

false.

If

we have yet another reason for believing the

Again

we

see that

special sciences than the

more

mere

needed

is

turns out

M in humans at our world, we would be

be differently realized in other species, and

succeeds,

If it

this

for

second challenge

second premise

of

MR to

to establish the irreducibility of the

possibility that special-scientific kinds are

multiple realized.

Third Challenge to MR: Local Reductions

The

third challenge to the multiple realization argument, the argument for

local reductions, is

closely related to the second challenge. Proponents of this

Putnam

challenge claim that even

if

are realized differently in

mammalian

and Martian

is

right that psychological-kind properties

brains, reptilian brains,

It is still

possible that within each species or structure type

a single physical state that

is

both necessary and sufficient for the

instantiation of that psychological property

of

mental properties ensures that

the

model

mollusk brains,

brains, such multiple realization does not rule out local or species-

specific reductions.

there

is

of M<h>P,

we might still have

where

M

is

we will

21
.

Although the multiple

not have completely general laws on

a mental property

species-specific laws

realization

and P

on the model
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of

is

a physical property,

Sp->(M^P), where Sp

represents

some

particular species or structure type. Surely such local

reductions, the challenger insists, are reductions enough.

And

in fact

it

does seem right to say that were

we

to identify mental-

kind properties with physical-kind properties within even a single species

would be

physical correlates for most

would

justify

properties, laws,

would

Were

human mental

us in saying that

reduced to neurology, as

brain.

our ciiscovery a

justified in calling

this

reduction.

Suppose we discovered

kinds. Certainly such a discovery

human psychology would have

we would

then be able to explain

and generalizations

in

we

thereby been

human

psychological

terms of physical states of the

human

type of local reductions to be widespread, such a discovery

we cannot

certainly threaten nonreductive physicalists' intuition that

explain psychological laws and generalizations using the conceptual resources
of physical theory.

It is

less clear,

however, whether

would threaten non-reductive

much more

we would have

physicalists' intuitions

if

a type of reduction that

Sp turned out

to be a

fine-grained structure, such as the structure that consists of Hilary

Putnam's brain

at

time

t.

claims that even in cases

In his recent book,

Mind

in a Physical

World Kim
,

of.

Wildly heterogeneous multiple realization everywhere among humans,
and for the same individual over time, there still would be structurerealized),
specific biconditional laws (if psychology is indeed physically
and there would be perfectly good local reductions, even if they are only
for single individuals at a particular

moment
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of their lives

22
.

Although wildly heterogeneous
specific reductions,

Putnam/

we could

or 'pain in

Putnam

multiple realization

still

at

t'

would not give us

species-

reduce mental properties like 'pain in
to physical properties

laws such as the following: (Putnam's brain

because

at f)-»(M<-»P).

we would have

But do such

connections entail reductionism? Certainly philosophers are free to define their

terms as they wish. They are
relationship a 'reduction'

if

free, for

example, to

they so desire.

claim that as a result of this definitional

nonreductive physicalism, as the view

type of property

What they cannot

fiat

is

call this

do, however,

they have thereby

held by

its

is

shown

advocates, to be false or

incoherent.

Fourth Challenge to

MR: The

Move

Disjunctive

Advocates of the fourth challenge, known as the

much

bolder claim than was

They claim

that not only does

spectacularly.

It fails

(surprisingly)

it

based physical properties

begin.

It is

first

a

three challenges.

MR fail to establish nonreductionism,

anyone committed

committed

reductionism because

we

advocates of the

make

it

fails

because a closer analysis of the multiple realization

relationship reveals that

before

made by

disjunctive move,

to multiple realization

also

to reductionism. Multiple realization entails

shows mental properties

(I

is

will explain

what

this

to be reducible to multiply-

means

shortly).

A quick caveat

important to realize that although Jaegwon

written a great deal about the disjunctive

move
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Kim

in recent years, the

has

argument

does not really represent his considered views. Often,

move

dialectically to

Kim

briefly discuss

still

worth arguing

s

advance a position he

Kim

calls mental property irrealism.

strategy at the end of this paper.

against, however, as

uses the disjunctive

many

The

disjunctive

I

move

is

philosophers do believe in and

have advocated such a move. 23
I

now

will

attempt to explain the assumption undergirding the

disjunctive

move. Note that any given instance

instance of

some

of a mental kind

physical realizer or another. Let us assume that

realized by Pi, P2...Pn,

and

that,

realizers of

M.

If,

realizes (as

we

will see below,

as

is

furthermore.

customary

to

M must be an

M can be

Pi, P2...P11 are all the possible

assume, a realizer

is

sufficient for

what

by no means an innocent assumption), then

it

M

is

nomologically correlated with the property that represents the exhaustive
disjunction of

what

I

the Ps (Pi

v P2 v...P n ). Let us

call

such a property Pf. P|

am calling a multiply-based physical property.

relationship

disjunctive

1)

all

between mental and physical

move

to

be offering something

Given

properties,

like the

I

is

this picture of the

take advocates of the

following argument:

multiply realized in the physical, then there are
nomologically necessary bridge connections between every mental
property and some multiply-based physical property (on the model of
If

the mental

is

M^Pf). 24
2)

there are nomologically necessary bridge connections between every
mental property and some multiply-based physical property (on the
If

model

of M<->Pf), then psycho-physical reductionism
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is

true.

:

3)

Therefore,

if

the mental

physical reductionism

The onus

of this

argument

is

is

rests

multiply realized in the physical, then psycho-

true.

on the second premise.

Is

the existence of

nomologically necessary connections between every mental property and some
multiply-based physical property sufficient to establish a type of reduction that

would threaten nonreductive physicalism? 25

I

think

it is

not. Let

me explain

why.

Given the myriad
the last several decades,

The

first

of uses to

we need

which the term

premise claims that mental properties have a certain metaphysical

M there

is

it

claims that for each mental

some, perhaps complex, physical property P that

necessary and sufficient for

this

been put over

to be especially careful to avoid equivocation.

relationship to physical properties. Specifically,

property

reduction has

it. I

think this premise

premise does establish a type of reductionism.

type of reductionism that in Chapter

remind the reader, here

An

is

how

I

A-family of properties

properties

if

and only

if

Two

I

is

true.

is

Furthermore,

Specifically,

it

both

I

think

establishes a

called metaphysical reductionism.

defined metaphysical reductionism

is

metaphysically reduced to a B-family of

for every a in A, there

nomologically necessary that a

is

a b in B such that

it is

<-> b. 26

So advocates of the disjunctive move are right that multiple realization
establishes

some type

To

of reductionism, as

it

establishes metaphysical

reductionism. But metaphysical reductionism does not threaten the classic
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accounts of nonreciuctive physicalism- accounts by Donald Davidson,
Hilary

Putnam, Jerry Fodor, Richard Boyd and Geoffrey Heilman and Frank

Thompson. At

least,

not without further argument. The metaphysical

reductionist relationship

is

very weak;

it is

so

weak

that

anyone who

physicalist (either reductive or nonreductive) should probably accept

none

in fact,

above mentioned nonreductive physicalists

of the

is

a

it.

27

And,

explicitly reject a

relationship like metaphysical reductionism. In fact, Fodor, in "Special Sciences:
Still

Autonomous

After All These Years," explicitly accepts such a

relationship. 28 All do,

be captured

however,

explicitly claim that psychological

by, or explained by, physical laws.

That

is, all

laws cannot

explicitly reject

some

form of epistemological or representational reductionism. Thus anyone who
wants

to

show

that the multiple realization

argument supports

a type of

reductionism that threatens the coherence of nonreductive physicalism

view

held by

is

(as the

advocates) will have to prove that metaphysical

its

reductionism has some epistemological import, perhaps by showing that
establishes

This

some form
is

just

Address, "The

of intertheoretic reductionism.

what Kim

Myth

it

of

tries to

do

in his

1989 Eastern

Nonreductive Physicalism." Here

APA Meeting
is

what Kim says

in

this address:

thought to
require the derivation of the laws of the reduced theory from the laws of
the reducer via "bridge laws". If a predicate of the theory being reduced

As we have

seen, reduction of one theory to another

is

has a nomologically coextensive predicate in the reducing theory, the
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universally quantified biconditional connecting the two predicates will
be available for use as a bridge law. Let us say that the vocabulary of the

reduced theory is "strongly connected" with that of the reducing theory
if such a biconditional bridge law correlates each
predicate of the former
with a predicate of the latter. It is clear that the condition of strong
connectibility guarantees reduction (on the assumption that the theory
being reduced is a true theory). For it would enable us to rewrite basic

laws of the target theory in the vocabulary of the reducer, using these
biconditional laws in effect as definitions 29
.

If

we

can identify mental-kind properties with multiply-based-physical

properties,

we can make

the following move. For each mental predicate p,

representing mental property M, there will be a complex bridge law of the form

p<-»7ti

v

v...7in

represents

like

7i2

v.

v

.

.7i n

7i2

that holds with at least nomological necessity (where

all

v... 7T n

the physical realizers of M).

The existence

rci

v

712

of bridge laws

allows us to translate — in theory, at least — any law that

mentions p into laws that mention only

ns. If

we can

theoretically translate

psychological laws into statements couched entirely in the language of physics,

then Ernest Nagel's requirements for intertheoretic reduction will be satisfied

30
.

Metaphysical reductionism will be shown to have epistemological implications,
as

psychology will be shown
In the remaining pages

disjunctive

move

to satisfy Nagel's requirements for reduction.

I

offer

two

criticisms of the claim that the

establishes intertheoretic reductionism. First,

I

point out that

type of bridge laws between psychological and physical predicates that the
disjunctive

move

establishes does not threaten the core intuitions behind

nonreductive physicalism. Second,

I

argue that a closer investigation of the

realization relationship

establish

shows

either that the disjunctive

any type of reductionism, or

that, again,

it

move does

not

establishes a type of

reductionism that does not threaten the core intuitions behind nonreductive
physicalism. At the end of the paper,

move

to

I

will look at

how Kim uses

argue not for reductionism, but for a view he

the disjunctive

calls mental property

irrealism.

First Criticism of the Disjunctive

In the

Move

APA address Kim suggests that the existence of nomologically

necessary bridge connections between psychological properties and physical
properties,

on the model

establishes the existence of universally

of

quantified biconditionals between every mental predicate and

of physical predicates,

on the model

that this strong connectability

of p<-» 7nv

712

v... 7t n

.

He

further suggests

would

it

(in

theory at

rewrite the laws of psychology in the vocabulary of physics.

second suggestion

many

rests

on

I

least)

allow us to

will argue that

a mistaken conception of reduction. There are

reasons to question the assumption that the existence of a purely

theoretical translation suffices for intertheoretic reduction, but this

here.

disjunction

between mental and physical predicates guarantees

psycho-physical reductionism, because

this

some

Nor am

I

raising the point that

realizers of psychological properties

it is

possible that

may

some

is

my claim

of the possible

not be physical, and thus that

we may

not be able to correlate the psychological property with even a complex physical
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property

Nor am

31
.

I

resting

my criticism on

nomologically correlated with p

is

the fact that the disjunction that

plausibly infinite,

and thus

that

impossible to perform a translation in any finite amount of time

wish

to point out that

it is

curious that any philosopher

connectability guarantees intertheoretic reduction.

prove that physicalists are committed

commitment

basis of their

Instead,

would hold

Remember

would be

like p<-» 7n

v

712

that in order to

Remember,

reduction.

too, that

on the

v. ..n n, critics of

nonreductive physicalism have to assume that satisfying Ernest Nagel's
suffices for intertheoretic

I

that strong

to psycho-physical reductionism,

laws

to bricige

32
.

it

is

criteria

Nagel required bridge

laws between terms in heterogeneous theories only because he was committed
to the

now

discredited

disjunctive

move

relies

D-N model
on looking

intertheoretic reduction.

reductionism
disjunctive

is

false

move

of explanation.

Thus

my

first

criticism of the

closely at Ernest Nagel's account of

A lot rests on this account.

because Nagel's

Fodor argues

criteria are unfulfilled;

argues that reductionism

is

that

whereas, the

true because Nagel's criteria are

fulfilled.

According to Nagel's
reduction
science

is

is

a relationship

classic

account of intertheoretic reduction,

between theories construed as

reduced to another science only

are

shown

the

two

to

be a

logical

when

sets of sentences.

One

the laws of the reduced theory

consequence of the laws of the reducing theory.

When

theories contain different observational or theoretical vocabulary, a

formal derivation

is

possible only

if

we

can establish bridge statements, or bridge
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laws,

connecting each term in the reduced theory with some term in the

reducing theory. As

pointed out in Chapter Two, contemporary philosophers

I

often forget that Nagel insisted on logical derivability

and bridge laws only

because he was committed to the following two assumptions:

i)

that the

purpose of intertheoretic reduction

is

the reducing theory,

legitimate scientific explanations can be

and

ii)

that

all

to explain the

reduced theory by means of

recast as deductive

arguments

accept Nagel's

assumption -that the purpose of intertheoretic reduction

to explain the

first

33
.

Also remember that although

reduced theory by means

of the

we do

still

is

reducing theory — contemporary

philosophers of science have largely abandoned his positivist second

assumption

34
.

Although contemporary philosophers

whether satisfying the D-N model's

criteria is necessary for explanation,

philosopher of science believes that deduction

assumption that the disjunctive move
In fact,

deduction

who is committed
is

no

for explanation (the

on ). 35
that theory

explanation and reduction. For example, Philip Kitcher,

to a

view he

deductive)

calls deductive

chauvinism (the claim that

expressly not committed to the claim that

is

deductions are explanatory

36
.

According

fundamentally a matter of showing
the

relies

is sufficient

even contemporary deductivists do not think

suffices for

explanation

of science disagree as to

world can be derived from

to Kitcher, explanation

how numerous

is

Deductions become

the explanatory store
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all

disparate conclusions about

a small set of premises.

explanatory-in Kitcher's words, part of

all

- only when

the

pattern they exemplify helps us systematize and unify our understanding
of the

world. For Kitcher (and for other contemporary deductivists) deductions,

although necessary, are expressly not

Here
for D,

case.

and

an analogy

is

it is

shown

However,

if it is

that

sufficient for scientific

for the situation

B cannot

we

are

be satisfied,

merely shown that B

is

in: If

explanation.

A, B, and

C are

we know that D

then

satisfied after

all,

then

necessary

is

not the

we are

unable to infer anything about the status of D. Fodor had argued that

we could

not have a reductionN between the special sciences and physics, because a key

requirement of reductionN — that there be adequate bridge laws between
special-scientific-kind terms

disjunctive

and

move shows

that in fact

and physical-kind terms — is

adequacy were too

that Fodor's conditions for

we do have

unsatisfiable.

adequate bridge laws between

fails.

He

is

wrong

strict,

special-scientific-

move shows

kind terms and physical-kind terms. Thus the disjunctive
Fodor's criticism of reductionism

The

that

to claim that the fact that

psychological states are multiply realized "Refutes psychophysical

reductionism once and for

reductionism

fails,

we

all." 37

that

all

if

Fodor's criticism of

are not thereby entitled to claim anything about the

status of reductionism; that

mean

However, even

one condition

for reduction

satisfied

is

does not

the conditions are satisfied.

One reason

the disjunctive

move may have seemed

to the attention that footnote five of

plausible to us

Chapter 11 of Nagel's The Structure

is

due

of

38
Science has attracted over the years. Nagel begins this footnote by pointing
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out that connectability via uniconditional bridge laws between terms in the

reduced theory (what he
he

calls 'B terms') is

if it

calls

'A terms') and terms in the reducing theory (what

not generally sufficient for reducibility. However, he adds,

should happen that for some theory T every A-term

biconditional to

some B-term

in the

is

linked via a

reducing theory, on the model of

T would be reduced. T would be reduced because

for

any law

in

A

it

does look

move

like the disjunctive

B,

then

T we would be

able to replace the A-terms found there with the appropriate B-terms.

strength of this footnote, then,

iff

On the

establishes

reductionismN.

But before jumping to such a conclusion,

remember
for

the reason that Nagel

Nagel a reduction

is

was

I

urge

my reader to once again to

interested in bridge laws.

"The explanation

Remember

that

of a theory or a set of experimental

laws established in one area of inquiry, by a theory usually though not
invariably formulated for

assumed

some other domain ." 39 Remember,

that in heterogeneous reductions bridge laws are

the conditions of

what he considered

explanation (the

D-N

in footnote five

account).

two

it

words,

it

seems

fulfill

scientific

seems plausible

of biconditional connections

theories. In other

Nagel

needed only

be the best account of

Given these assumptions,

Nagel was thinking

predicates of the

to

too, that

that

between actual

likely that

Nagel was

merely admitting that were the reduced theory to turn out to be merely a
count
terminological variant of (some part of) the reducing theory this should
as a reduction.

Such a discovery would

certainly satisfy Nagel's nonformal
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requirement that reductions be explanatory - that they offer

advance

in the organization of

knowledge" and "Be

"A

fertile in

suggestions for developing the secondary science ". 40

significant

usable

On the other hand, the

existence of nomologically necessary connections between special-scientific-

kind terms and complex, potentially

infinite,

Boolean combinations of physical-

kind terms would not offer any significant advance in knowledge. Thus the
disjunctive

move does

not in fact establish reductionist, as

it

fails to satisfy

Nagel's nonformal requirement for reduction: that the reduction be
explanatory.

Second Criticism of the Disjunctive Move

To explain

my second criticism of the disjunctive move we need to

some

define better

of the terms

scientific

kind (or property)

P2 ...P n

and only

it

if

mean for

disjunctive

if

is

41
.

for each Pi in the realization base, Pi realizes

When Kim

move, he follows Ernest LePore and Barry Loewer

M, then

Although

the instantiation of P,

this is a

sufficient for

M,

P,

is

would have

to

M. What does

introduces the

in

assuming

that

sufficient for the instantiation of

common interpretation of the

also a fairly contentious interpretation.

realizer of

Let us take a special-

M to be multiply realized by physical kinds Pi,

a kind (or a property) to realize another?

P, realizes

M

if

we have been using.

Note that

realization relationship,

in order for Pi to be

be what Sydney Shoemaker

M (as opposed to what he calls a core-realizer
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42
)

calls a total-

it

To explain the

distinction

between core-realizers and

us consider the following example. Suppose

my

occurrent belief that

I

my head

(e.g.,

are thinking of the core-realizer of

neural pattern by
the belief

is

itself is

are looking for the realizer of

am sitting at my desk typing.

realizer as being located in

we

we

we think

If

of the

as a neural pattern or process), then

my belief. As many have

not sufficient for the

instantiated or not

total-realizers, let

belief.

This

is

pointed out, the

because whether

depends on environmental circumstances and

laws that are extrinsic to anything going on within
pattern cannot be the total-realizer of

my belief.

my head 43 So the neural
.

The

total sufficient realizer of

my belief will consist of a much larger spatio-temporal

region than that

occupied by the core-realizer (the neural process).
In light of this distinction

clear that

is

many

nonreductive physicalists have assumed

an insufficient

realize

money

between core-realizers and

core-realizer.

After

all,

along that a realizer

or not depends on factors that are extrinsic to the physical

this point, consider the following

intrinsic duplicate of

suddenly

it is

whether pieces of copper, gold, or paper

properties of the pieces of copper, gold, and paper.

convinced of

all

total-realizers,

one

world

that did not

Clearly this duplicate piece of paper

Suppose, further, that an

you

are not already

thought experiment. Suppose an

of the green pieces of

to materialize at a

If

would not

paper in

my wallet were

have any

institution of

constitute

intrinsic duplicate piece of

money

at that world.

paper were suddenly

materialize at our world. Clearly this second duplicate piece of paper
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money.

to

would not

money

constitute

either, as

it

would not have had

the right historical

connections with the monetary institutions at our world.

experiment shows
it

is

that

even when

realizes,

will be insufficient

sometimes a core-realizer can be

it is

when

What

is

total-realizers?

thought

insufficient for

what

situated in the appropriate environmental context.

it is

important for

that core-realizer to

right historical connections to the contingent features at the

What

this last

have had the

world

44
.

the importance of this distinction between core-realizers and

Well remember that an advocate of the disjunctive move

is

M of

arguing that a special science S reduces to physics whenever for each kind
S,

realized

p<-> 7tiv

7i 2

by physical kinds

v... 7in that

Pi, P2...P11, there are

connections of the form

hold with nomological necessity (where p

representing

M and

now see

whether

that

711

v

712

v...tt

is

the predicate

are the predicates representing Pi, P2...P n ).

this is true or not

depends on whether

M represented by tuv

realizers. If they are

merely core-realizers, as Putnam and Fodor seem

In fact,

if

we cannot

each

P, is

merely a core

large

we can

v... 7t n ,

identify the properties

designate a special-scientific kind.

then although

712

realizer,

If

identify the properties,

include

all

It

712

v.

.

.

7i n

712

to

v... 7r n " is false.

will not

even

they are total-realizers, on the other hand,

each

gerrymandered spatio-temporal region

would be very messy.

are core-realizers or total-

and "p-^tiv

then tuv

We

Pi, P2.. .P n , the

physical realizers of

assume, then

It

that

7ii

would represent such

a

any physical law invoking

would be messy because such

a law

would have

it

to

the physically sufficient conditions, both local and non-local, for the
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instantiation of that mental property.

your laws

to

be explanatory.

If

each

Messy laws are a problem

P, is a total realizer,

if

you want

then although the

disjunction of predicates will designate a special-scientific kind,
find an explanatory-scientific law that uses such predicates.

we

will never

Not only

will

not find an explanatory-scientific law that uses the disjunctive predicate
v.

.

.Tin,

we

will not find

an explanatory-scientific law that uses any

we

mv 712

of the n

predicates singularly either.

I

hope

have succeeded

I

not as simple as

it

first

in

appeared

convincing you that the disjunctive

to be.

move

is

Although the disjunctive move does

establish metaphysical reductionism, metaphysical reductionism does not

threaten the core intuitions behind non-reductive physicalism. The core

intuitions

behind nonreductive physicalism are epistemological

the disjunctive

no one seems

move

to hold

has epistemological import only given an assumption that

— that deduction is sufficient for explanation.

looking closer at the nature of the realization relationship

two

situations

must

first

realizers of

we see

Moreover,

that

in

one of

hold: Either the physical realizers of mental properties are

core realizers, in which case

and the

in nature, but

we cannot identity

mental properties with them,

premise of the disjunctive argument

mental properties are

is false,

total realizers, in

or the physical

which case such an

identification will not help us explain special-scientific laws in physical terms,

and the second premise

of the disjunctive

move
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is false.

Kim's Views

As

I

mentioned

move, Kim

disjunctive

Kim

earlier, despite

is

having done

much

to popularize the

not necessarily an advocate of the move. Oftentimes,

often uses the disjunctive

move

in the context of a

that either psycho-physical reductionism

is

true,

dilemma. Kim argues

because mental predicates are

reducible to disjunctive physical predicates via the disjunctive move, or mental

kinds are not reducible, because they are not respectable
all 45
.

As Kim

kinds after

scientific

writes:

we allow

and construe pain and other mental
properties as such kinds, or else we must acknowledge that our general
mental terms and concepts do not pick out properties and kinds in the
world 46

Either

disjunctive kinds

.

In short,

at

all,

as a physicalist

if

you

will

As neither

bullet

physicalism

clear,

he

have

is

is

is

you believe

that the mental

is

realized in the physical

to bite the bullet as either a reductionist or

an

compatible with nonreductionism, nonreductive

thereby

shown

to

be false and incoherent. As

Kim soon makes

advocating the second (eliminativist) horn of the dilemma.

To convince us

of the plausibility of the eliminativist

move, Kim

exploits Fodor's justification in "Special Sciences" for dismissing

disjunctive

eliminativist.

skillfully

moves

like the

move. There Fodor claimed any connection involving disjunctive

terms, and
predicates cannot be a law, as laws connect kind terms with kind

disjunctive predicates

do not represent

kinds. For
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Fodor a law represents more

than just a nomologically necessary connection between properties.
Laws are

found only
predicates

in the context of explanatory theories.

do not generally

However,

figure in explanatory laws, because, like negative

predicates, they can apply to objects that have

in

little

another. For example, the predicate "being either a
true both of the

many London bridges and

there being anything physically in

an explanatory

scientific

something

If

disjunctive

bridge v

because

ant.' In

it is

London bridges and

to

no

ants

fail

scientific

is

ants of this world without

of

which

47
.

why Fodor dismisses the
Kim

to share

argues that

it is

any explanatorily

law uses the predicate 'London

fails to

designate a natural-kind not

disjunctive, but because the disjuncts represent physically

If

this

is

indeed the

predicates, however, then the

If

or an ant"

common between them on the basis

other words, the predicate

dissimilar objects.

terms.

many

a powerful response.

significant physical properties that

common with one

London bridge

above reasoning explains

move, then Kim has

precisely because

the

law might be constructed

like the

disjunctive

real

reason for excluding disjunctive

same reasoning should apply

to mental-kind

the physical realizers of a mental kind are vastly physically dissimilar

one another, as Fodor maintains

is

the case, then neither the disjunctive-

physical predicate nor the mental predicate will represent a kind, and thus

neither

would

legitimately figure in scientific laws.

The important moral

mind

of

As Kim

writes:

MR [multiple realization] we need to keep in

is this: if psychological

properties are multiply realized, so
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is

psychology

physical realizations of psychological properties are a "wildly
heterogeneous" and "unsystematic" lot, psychological theory itself must
itself. If

be realized by an equally unsystematic

According

to

Kim, then,

we

physical theories

48
.

should draw one of two conclusions from the

that a special-scientific property

realizers are

lot of

behaved enough

M

that

is

it

fact

multiply realized: either M's physical

makes sense

M

to disjunctively identify

with them, or M's physical realizers are so unsystematic and heterogeneous
that

M does not constitute a genuine kind. Neither option supports a real but

irreducibly distinct

M. As I mentioned previously, Kim

the second (eliminativist) option.

Kim argues

is

eliminativism on the following grounds

vitiate

mental properties,

it

scientific kinds,

49
.

Jerry

Fodor have

They argue

criticized

Kim's

that not only does the

also threatens the legitimacy of

order-special-scientific properties (properties like being a

planet, or a species ). In other

and, by

a science with a unified subject matter.

Lynne Rudder Baker, Tyler Burge, and

argument

ultimately advocating

that multiple realization calls into

question the legitimacy of mental properties as
extension, the claim that psychology

is

cell,

all

higher-

a mountain, a

words, the argument proves too much.

If

mental

properties are merely ontologically on a par with these other special-scientific
properties, then mental properties are not in that

is

an excellent rejoinder

suggest that there

but

it is

is

to

Kim's argument

bad shape

after

for eliminativism.

all.

I

think this

Kim seems

to

something especially untoward about mental properties,

not clear what

it is

that

makes them more suspect than other
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special-

scientific properties, especially

given that

Kim believes

that

all

mental

properties, save qualitative mental properties, can be functionalized

Were non-reductive

physicalists,

and other defenders

50
.

of mental realism,

forced to take the eliminativist horn of the dilemma. Baker, Burge, and Fodor's

argument would be the best response

to the eliminativist charge.

However,

non-reductive physicalists are not forced to take the eliminativist horn of the

dilemma. As

I

hope

happily accept the

move

establishes

my criticism of the disjunctive move has shown, they can

first 'reductionist'

is

too

weak

horn. The type of reductionism that the

to threaten the core intuitions

nonreductive physicalism. Unless

critics of

behind

nonreductive physicalism can prove

that nonreductive physicalists reject metaphysical reduction, or unless they can

prove that metaphysical reduction has some epistemological import, they

will

not have proven that anyone committed to the multiple realization argument

is

automatically committed to a type of reductionism that threatens nonreductive
physicalism.

The dilemma

eliminativism and

(real)

is false.

Physicalists are not forced to choose

between

reductionism.

Conclusion

I

have argued that the multiple realization

of psychological kinds

is

neither sufficient for nonreductionism nor sufficient for reductionism. Along

the

way

first

I

discussed four challenges to the Multiple Realization Argument. The

challenge shows that Fodor's criteria for reduction are too stringent.
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If

in

even the

classic cases of intertheoretic reduction the

multiply realized, then there

may

is

good reason

reducing properties are

to think that multiple realization

not be a problem for reduction. The second challenge shows that the

multiple realization of psychological kinds in disparate types of physical stuff

does not rule out reductions to abstract-physical, or physical-functional,
properties.

If

ever

we found enough

explained psychological laws

physical-functional properties that

and events, we would have

case of psycho-physical reduction. The third challenge

mental properties are plausibly multiply realized
species

is

not enough to establish reductionism.

explanations for significant bits of

count as a reduction (even

However, neither
the disjunctive

move

is

if

Were we

human psychology

that the fact that

to find physical

that should certainly

only a local reduction).

multiple realization sufficient for reductionism, as

(the fourth challenge) argues.

about nonreductive physicalism. Or,

many

shows

in structurally-dissimilar

Many

convinced that the disjunctive move shows that there

argument,

a pretty convincing

in

is

what amounts

philosophers seem

something incoherent

to essentially the

same

philosophers believe that any version of physicalism that

accepts a supervenience claim strong

enough

to respect the intuition that the

mental depends on the physical (such as some version of a strong supervenience
claim)

is

committed

physicalism

.

51 If I

to a

form

of reductionism that threatens nonreductive

am right that the disjunctive move establishes nothing

stronger than the relationship

I

have called metaphysical reduction then
,
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nonreductive physicalists
thesis

can easily accept

intuitions

who

this

understand reduction as an epistemological

type of reduction without threatening their

about the irreducibility of the special sciences

To prove

that

anyone committed

should bite the reductive

bullet,

some epistemological import.

It

to physics.

to the multiple realization

argument

metaphysical reduction would have to have

would have

to entail that theories

about the A-

family of properties can be explained in terms of theories about the B-family of
properties.

On no one's account of scientific explanation -neither the ontic,

modal, nor epistemic accounts (see note 35) — does mere property/ predicate
identities suffice for scientific explanation.

what these property
properties,

identities are

and other

Moreover,

supposed

no threat

to

should not forget

to look like. Psychological-kind

special-scientific-kind properties, can be identified only

with open-ended disjunctions of heterogeneous

is

we

any actual nonreductive

total realizers.

physicalist position.
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Such a

reduction
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there
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that the barometric reading explains

the storm. Although the barometric reading
is

is

a

good predictor

of the storm,

not relevant to the storm's occurrence. The fact that such explanations

the
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is

it
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CHAPTER 4
ADDITIONAL A PRIORI CHALLENGES TO REDUCTIONISM
In

my fourth chapter,

I

consider three additional challenges to

nonreductive physicalism. Like the challenges to the multiple realization

argument discussed
to the

in

Chapter Three, these are challenges either

to the truth or

coherence of nonreductive physicalism. The three challenges are as

follows: 1) The argument from causation against mental realism. This challenge

worries that

if

mental events are token identical

to physical events, but

mental

properties are not reducible to physical properties, then, given the causal

completeness of the physical, mental properties would be causally inefficacious.

The worry

is

diminished
properties.

that causally inefficacious mental properties

(a greatly

If

would have

a

diminished!) ontological status relative to physical

they have a diminished ontological status relative to physical

properties, then mental realism (a cardinal tenet of nonreductive physicalism)

would be shown

to be false. 2) The argument from physical composition for

epistemological reduction. This

physicalism — that

all

particulars in space

physical particulars, or

(alternatively, that

all

argument claims

composed out

of,

that given a basic

and/or time are

either

assumption of
fundamental

fundamental physical particulars

properties are either physical properties, or are realized

by physical properties) — a sort of epistemological reduction follows.
Epistemological reduction follows because there will always be some physical
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explanation of special-scientific properties, events, and objects. And,

Argument from Mysterious Connections. This argument claims
physical ism

between

is

committed the existence

special-scientific properties

of brute

3)

The

that nonreductive

and inexplicable connections

and physical

properties. Reductive

physicalism has to be true, the challenger asserts, as only then would

we be able

to explain these otherwise mysterious connections.

First

Challenge: The Argument from Causation Against Mental Realism

Advocates of the
genuine options when
mental has causal

first

it

challenge claim that physicalists have only two

comes

efficacy,

to

mental causation. Either they accept that the

but only because mental properties are identical to

physical properties, or they maintain their anti-reductionism, but only at the

expense of their commitment to mental realism. In order
this challenge, let

fully to

understand

us again reflect on the picture that Fodor paints in “Special

Sciences" of the relationship between special-scientific laws and physical laws

(see

diagram

in

Chapter Three). Fodor, remember, claims that whenever an

event that consists in the instantiation of special-science-kind property

an event that consists
have a physical
us

call

left to

it

make

in the instantiation of special-science-kind property

realizer of Si (let us call

p 2 ), such that

causes

Si

pi

it

pi),

and a physical

realizer of

causes p 2 The problem with this picture
.

sense of two competing causes of S 2

135

(Si

and

pi).

is

Unless

S2

that

S2

,

we

(let

we are

we are

willing to countenance massive causal over-determination,
one of these causes

must be the

What
that

is

Here

cause.

real

is

how

Paul Moser describes the problem:

the precise relation between

my arm rose because wanted

(a)

a psychological truth such as

and (b) an 'alternative [true]
which does not mention
psychological categories'?...We have, then, two truths regarding the
I

to

lift it

specification of a sufficient antecedent,

causes of

arm

my

One

One

truth, (a) identifies a

truth, (b), entails a

my
of my

mental cause of

nonmental cause

1
.

initially attractive

Donald Davidson

rising:

and the second

s rising,

arm's rising

arm's

s

solution to this problem of competing causes

suggestion that the mental

is

to accept

is

causally efficacious because

concrete mental events are token-identical to causally-efficacious concrete
physical events

2
.

My desire for some chocolate caused me to walk downstairs to

the vending machine, because the concrete event that consists in

my desire is

token identical to some causally efficacious neurological event. There

is

mystery about the relationship between the mental and physical cause
walking downstairs. The mental cause
different description.

just

is

of

my

the physical cause under a

According to Davidson, then, mental causation

unproblematic because physical causation

Many

is

no

is

unproblematic.

philosophers have criticized Davidson's solution to the problem of

mental causation for

failing to

ensure a causal role for mental properties

point out that Davidson's claim that causality

between concrete event particulars

is

is

3
.

They

an extensional relation holding

compatible with the claim that

when

events are causally related, they are so related in virtue of something about
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each: their properties. 4

Whenever one event a causes another event b,

something (we think) about those two events that explains

One

plausible explanation as to

event of kind K, and b
If

Davidson

to

is

is

why

and b are causally

a

an event of kind

remain true

L,

and there

to his thesis that the

is

there

why a caused

related

is

that a

is

b. 5

an

is

a law relating Ks to Ls.

mental

is

anomalous

subject to laws), he cannot hold that the kinds represented by

K and

(not

L are

mental kinds. But

if

properties, then

looks like an event's mental properties are either causally

it

two events are never

related in virtue of their mental-kind

inefficacious or epiphenomenal.

Thus

in

order to

make

realism — we need to do
mental events,

properties.

sense of mental causation -and vindicate mental

more than

we also need

to find

just establish the causal efficacy of concrete

some causal-explanatory

role for mental

Davidson's solution to the problem of mental causation

is

ineffective

against the following argument:

1)

2)

Token Physicalism - Every concrete mental event
some concrete physical event.
The Completeness

token identical to

of Physics - The causal powers of a physical-event

token are completely determined by
3)

is

Irreducibility of the

Mental

-

its

intrinsic physical properties.

Mental properties are neither identical

with nor reducible to physical properties.
4)

If (1)

and

(2),

then the causal powers of a mental event are completely

determined by
5)

If

the causal

its

intrinsic physical properties.

powers

of a mental event are completely determined

intrinsic physical properties,

and

(3),

then mental properties are

causally inefficacious.
6)

Therefore, mental properties are causally inefficacious.
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its

If

7)

mental properties are causally inefficacious, then mental
realism, a
cardinal tenet of nonreductive physicalism, is false.

8)

Therefore, mental realism, a cardinal tenet of nonreductive
physicalism, is false.

this

If

argument

is

sound, the mental will be shown to have a diminished

ontological status relative to the physical, because mental properties will be

shown
(3)

are

to lack

all

any genuine causal

But

role.

is

this

argument sound?

(1), (2),

problematic premises. Although Fodor and Davidson would accept

token physicalism, premise
this premise. 6

Any

(1),

philosopher

many

nonreductive physicalists would

who believes

that the mental

is

By Leibniz's law

identical things

have

all

reject

constituted by

or realized in the physical, rather than being identical to the physical,
reject (1).

and

their properties in

would

common,

but concrete mental events and the microphysical events that constitute or
realize

them do not have

all

their properties in

common, because

with respect to their temporal and modal properties.

it

(2) is

they differ

problematic because

suggests a controversial picture of causation — that micro-level causation

metaphysically prior to (or more real than) macro-level causation. As
discussed in Chapter Three, Baker, Burge, and Fodor have

this picture.

They argue

generalized that

would

that

were the assumptions behind

cast aspersions

on most

all

1

urged us to

this picture to

of our familiar

is

reject

be

examples of

singular causation, including such paradigmatic examples of causation as the

interaction

between two colliding

billiard balls.
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It

would

also vitiate

most of our

favorite

examples of causation

the tides to rise

physicalists

and

have

fall.

little

do generally believe

'

in the special sciences -e.g., that the

Finally, as

I

argued

reason to accept

that

we will

(3).

M there

claim

made by nonreductive

it.

Although nonreductive

sorts of

all

For example, they can accept the claim

nomologically correlated with

Chapter Three, nonreductive
physicalists

not find a physical-kind type-identical to each

mental-kind, they can easily accept

each mental-property kind

in

moon causes

is

weaker property connections.

made by

a

metaphysical reduction that for

complex physical-property P

that

is

Whereas type physicalism would threaten

the

physicalists that mental explanations cannot be

replaced by physical explanations, mere metaphysical reductionism would not

have

this epistemological implication.

then every mental-kind property

is

If

identical with the

property that represents the potentially
physical realizers.

I

find

it

metaphysical reductionism

is

true,

complex physical

infinite disjunction of that kind's total

hard to imagine

how

the existence of such property

connections would threaten either the ontological status of mental-kind
properties, or the value of mental explanations.

I

wish that

my criticism of the above argument were enough to vindicate

mental causation, and, by extension, mental realism. Unfortunately,

this is not

the case. Proponents of psycho-physical reductionism need not assume token

physicalism, thesis

work

(1),

as a relationship of realization or constitution

equally well in this argument.

And

being told that technically

would

(3) is false,

because mental-kind properties are identical only to properties representing the
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disjunctions of

all

the total physical realizers of those mental kinds
does not

why

satisfactorily explain

causes of P 2 (Si and

(2),

Fodor's picture

if

is

correct there

seem

still

to be

two

pi).

however, remains a problematic premise. As written

unnecessarily strong.

It is

important to distinguish

(2),

it is

which claims

that only

physical properties have causal powers, from the following weaker
and

more

plausible thesis:

(2')

Any

physical event that has a cause has a physical cause that

sufficient to

The

make

it

basic intuition behind the causal closure of the physical

that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause.

does a better job than

(2) at

neither

(6),

If

is,

this is true,

by replacing

(2)

with

(2')

in the

(8),

the claim that mental realism

emendation. The main complication

is

that

being more than one causal story for every

we seem committed

physical story.

(as

then

(2')

is

above argument,

is false,

However, there are some obvious complications with

least,

submit, merely

the claim that mental properties are causally inefficacious or

epiphenomenal, nor

very

I

capturing the intuition that the physical world

causally closed. Furthermore,

was

happen.

If

would

my

follow.

proposed

we now seem committed
special-scientific process

to there

— at the

to there being a special-scientific story

and

a

the special scientific story does not reduce to the physical story

nonreductive physicalists believe),

point slightly differently,

(2')

how exactly are they

related?

To put

allows for the possibility that events are
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the

causally/ explanatorily over-determined in

some events have

possibility that

I

believe that this

is

convince

I

might work.

led

I

it is

realize that

try to justify the position, let

I

why went downstairs.
I

explanation that refers to
desires for chocolate,

I

need

will

to say

more

if I

am to

me first say

a

little

more about how

is

There

is

many

different

a folk-psychological

a mechanistic explanation that refers to the

my antecedent neurological states.

explanatory in a different context.

Many other

there are

my antecedent beliefs about vending machines and

and there

physical properties of

I

Each 'explanation'

is

am not claiming that this is an original

philosophers have offered similar solutions to the problem of

mental causation. For example, David
event has only one cause)

is

Owens claims

that causal exclusion (an

compatible with explanatory pervasion (there are

true explanations of a single event ). 8

what we

and physical causal explanations.

am claiming that although there is only one causal process that

explanations as to

many

allows for the

the result that best reflects our actual

me downstairs to the vending machine,

claim.

is, it

my reader of this point.

Before

it

both mental

the right result, as

explanatory practices. However,

some way. That

call a 'cause' is partly a

And David Lewis

pragmatic matter

9
.

points out that

There are different causal

explanations of a single concrete event, Lewis claims, because different features
of single causal processes are salient in different explanatory contexts.

Again

I

wish that

my arguments were sufficient to vindicate mental

causation, and, by extension, mental realism. Unfortunately, this
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is still

not yet

the case.

The suggestion

that

we

can have multiple explanations of a single

causal process has been criticized by

which he advocates a position he

Jaegwon Kim

in a series of papers in

calls explanatory exclusion.

Thus

in order to

establish the causal-explanatory relevance of the
mental

we will need

confront Kim's argument directly.

that

to this

It is

argument

I

to

turn to next.

Explanatory Exclusion
In several important papers

Jaegwon Kim argues

that the

above

picture -causal exclusion but explanatory pervasion -is a mirage
that a tension exists

single event.

Here

is

whenever we seem

how Kim

to

10
.

Kim claims

have multiple explanations

of a

frames the problem of competing

causes/ explanations:

Given

any physical event has a physical cause, how is a mental
cause also possible? This call The problem of causal-explanatory
exclusion', for the problem seems to arise from the fact that a cause, or
causal explanation, of an event, when it is regarded as a full, sufficient
cause or explanation, appears to exclude other independent purported
that

I

causes or causal explanations of

Kim argues

that the tension

is

it

11
.

resolved only

when we

explanation screens-off any other explanation. This

is

realize that the physical

because no event can be

given more than one complete and independent explanation, and because

assumes that the physical explanation
to

understand EE, then,

let

is

both complete and independent. In order

us try to understand what

explanation, complete (or full),

and

Kim

independent.
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Kim means by

We can think of an explanation as consisting of two types of statements:
the explanandum

phenomenon
supposed

and the

explanans.

The explanandum

is

the statement of the

to be explained; the explanans are the statements that
are

to explain the

explanandum. Kim urges us

to accept a claim

explanatory realism -explanations are explanatory only

when

that a certain event e occurred,

and C

is

when

relation

R

the events they pick out, c

to

each other.

necessary, that

So

now

R

is

that

why

notes that

a causal relation

e,

it is

bear

C

is

an explanans

some determinate

and

for

E

objective

plausible, but not absolutely

12
.

we know what Kim means by an explanation,

what he means by a
to

Kim

and

the

is

the explanans for E

the statement that event c occurred. According to Kim,

only

calls

the explanans pick

out an objective relationship to the explanandum. Suppose E

explanandum

he

let

us explore

complete (or full) explanation. Consider the explanation as

Princess Diana's car crashed. According to the

news

reports, the car

crashed because they were speeding to escape the paparazzi on motorcycles,
the driver

drunken

was drunk, and

driver,

was dark and narrow. The

and the treacherous tunnel are each only

car crash, however.

insufficient

the tunnel

They are only

what Kim has

to say

about a case similar

Neither explanation

is

causal conditions that

partial causes of the

partial causes because each

by themselves (we will assume)

to

paparazzi, the

would have been

have caused the

crash.

Here

is

to this:

complete: each gives only a partial picture of the

make up

a sufficient cause of the
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effect....

where

a

particular causal relation gives us a cause event that
is only a partial
among the many constituents of a sufficient cause the

cause, or one

corresponding explanans, too, can be thought to be only
partial and
incomplete. Conversely, when the causal relation provides
a sufficient
cause, the explanans can also said to be complete and sufficient.
1 -^

For Kim, then, a complete explanation of an event
causally sufficient cause of that event.

As

is

an explanation that

cites a

neither the unrelenting pursuit of the

paparazzi, nor the drunken driver, nor the treacherous tunnel would have
been
sufficient for the crash, neither is considered a complete explanation of the
car

crash. But

why

know why

does

Kim

require that explanations cite sufficient causes?

epistemic accounts of explanation insist that the explanans be

sufficient for the

explanandum- because they

believe that

all

genuine

explanations can be recast as deductively valid arguments -but
causal account require sufficiency?

Owens

in

which

Although we often think

scientific

why would

a

Why not follow David Lewis and David

holding that there are potentially

single event, each of

up our

We

many

different explanations of a

cites a different feature of a single causal process.

of causes as sufficient for their effects

belief in determinism),

it

seems strange

(it is

hard

to give

to require a causal explanation

to spell out causally or nomologically sufficient conditions.

Given Kim's assumption
cite the sufficient

that a causal explanation of

cause of that event,

explanation of an event

is

that event in every detail.

we might think

an explanation that

Kim agrees

that a complete

cites the entire causal history of

that this type of
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some event must

comprehensive

explanation exists in theory, but denies that this

is

what he means by a complete

explanation.

The

realist scheme also yields a more global sense of
"complete
explanation," one in which a complete explanation of an
event specifies

entire causal history in every detail (as

we noted earlier, under
explanatory realism each event has a unique determinate causal
history).
This is an idealized sense of completeness, and no explanation
can be
complete in that sense 14
its

.

If

in

order for explanations to count as adequate they had to be complete in

idealized sense, then

all

existing explanations

would be inadequate.

this

We never

see such idealized explanation because they are pragmatically useless.

However,

if

complete explanations are not explanations that cite the entire causal

history of events,

what are they?

Kim claims

that a complete explanation of

an event

that cites causally sufficient conditions for e's occurrence.

an explanation

to

be complete in

this

the necessary ceteris paribus clauses.

way,

e is

However,

we would have

Remember

that

conditions are causally sufficient for an effect only

an explanation

to be able to

by definition a

when

could guarantee the occurrence of an

effect.

we

conditions are satisfied. As there are likely to be an infinite

of

we will

never be

will ever
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be

set of

ceteris paribus

number

of ceteris

in a position to cite the full sufficient

an event.

in all

set of

Each

conditions will be causally sufficient only given that the requisite

paribus conditions,

fill

those conditions

guarantee that the effect will take place. But no set of conditions

in a position to cite

in order for

cause

Consider the case of
get the chocolate. Earlier

behavior.

I

I

explained that

my walking downstairs to the vending machine to

gave a folk psychological explanation
I

went downstairs because I desired

for

my

chocolate,

and

I

believed there to be chocolate in the vending machine.
Clearly this folk
psychological explanation does not describe a set of sufficient
conditions for

walking downstairs, as

it

does not rule out

all

the possible countervailing

factors. In

order to truly be a sufficient explanation,

have

hedged by

to be

ceteris paribus

have other more urgent desires

my folk explanation would

clauses to eliminate the possibility that

(like the desire to fit into the

new dress

I

bought), or other beliefs (like the belief that vending machine chocolate
poisoned).

And

this

problem

is

will,

I

just

is

often

not particular to folk psychological

explanations. Mechanistic explanations that cite the physical properties of

antecedent states

my

my

they are to be causally sufficient, need to rule out

if

possible paralysis, neuro-physiological breakdown, and various external
interventions.

As there are good reasons

impossible to specify
that

we will

it is

plausible

e, if

that cites causally sufficient conditions for

We can eliminate many of the ceteris paribus conditions by

holding the context fixed, but then

If

in principle

never be in a position to give a complete explanation of an event

occurrence.

context'?

it is

the appropriate ceteris paribus conditions,

all

by complete we mean an explanation
e's

to believe that

the context

is

we would want

to ask

what counts

as 'the

everything external to the person's body, then a

complete physiological explanation as to

why went downstairs would
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I

have

to

include the entire causal history in every

detail,

which Kim expressly

stipulates he

does not require.

To sum up
a complete cause.

It

the points

made

cannot be:

a) the entire causal history of

so

not clear what

far, it is still

stipulation, b) a cross-section of the causal history of e

of them;

c)

more than one such

to

make e happen, because
.

^

by Kim's

e

occurred, as there

set 16 ; or d) a set of conditions that are causally sufficient

it is

impossible to unpack

all

the ceteris paribus

Kim's requirement that an adequate explanation of an event

sufficient conditions for that

explanations

event

unnecessarily stringent.

is

cite

Too many good

to cite causally sufficient conditions. 17 In fact,

fail

many

as there are too

a set of statements that entail the statement that

is

clauses

,

e,

Kim means by

it is

not clear that

any explanation anyone has ever given has cited such conditions.
Let us

explanation.

that

now

turn to the question of what

Suppose we are trying

an event

e

occurred, and

pick out two causes for

six possible

1)

It

ways

It

an explanandum

occurrence,

we can explain

for the

same

E,

independent

which

states

we have two claims, Ci and C2, which purport to
ci

and

C2.

Kim claims

objective cause of

could turn out that one

is

that there are only

the relationship between

could turn out that ci=C2, and that Ci and C2 are

names
2)

that

e's

to explain

Kim means by an

reducible

ci

and

C2.

just different

e.

to,

or supervenient on, the

other.
3)

ci

and

C2

might be only

4)

ci

and

C2

might be different

event

partial causes of

links in the

e.
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e.

same causal chain leading

to

5)

One might be

6)

ci

Remember

and

part of the other.

might each be

C2

sufficient for

e,

and

over-determined.

e

that for explanations to conflict, according to Kim, each

to be both complete

and

independent.

Only the

would have

possibility represented

by

(6),

then, poses a real threat to EE. (3) does not threaten EE, as neither
Ci nor

why E occurred

complete explanation as to

sufficient

by themselves

to

make e

(as neither ci

happen).

(1), (2), (4),

threaten EE, as they represent cases in which

one another. Only

(6),

ci

and

then, represents a possibility in

would be

nor

C2

and

(5)

c 2 are

C 2 is a

also

fail

to

not independent of

which there are two

complete and independent explanations of the same event. But are
nonreductive physicalists advocating that mental and physical causal
explanations

fit

Usually

the pattern that

when we

of redundant causation

(6)

represents?

say that an event

e is

over-determined

been absent. 18 Consider

which would have caused

this classic

dead. Suppose that at the very same
also fires her

of these bullets reach the

which

it is

e

even

if

the other one

had

example of redundant causation: An

assassin pulls the trigger, the bullet rips through the

first,

are speaking

— in which there are two numerically distinct conditions

for e's occurrence, each of

unrelated to the

we

air,

and a man

moment another assassin,

gun

at the

man. Suppose,

falls

down

causally

further, that each

man's heart simultaneously. Here we have a case

natural to say that the man's death

is

causally over-determined. Here

we do have two complete and independent causal
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in

processes. Each of the bullets

would have

killed

him even

argue that an event

if

the other one

may have both

had been

absent. But those

who

mental and physical causal explanations are

not arguing that each explanation cites two such complete
and independent
causal processes. Rather, they believe that there

is

a

more intimate

between the mental and physical cause. As Jonathan Schaffer puts

relationship

it

"the

overdetermining parts are lawfully yoked."™ They believe that the physical
cause
(along with the appropriate background conditions)

is

sufficient for the

mental

cause. Kim's prohibition against competing explanations, then, does not rule

out the types of competing causal-explanations that Owens, Lewis, and

nonreductive physicalists are advocating

20
.

Second Challenge: The Argument from Physical Composition

A different kind

of challenge to nonreductive physicalism has

in recent years. This challenge argues that

is

realized

in,

composed out

of,

anyone who believes

or constituted by the physical

is

that the mental

committed

claims that, "closely conform to the spirit of reductionism ." 21 Here

argument usually proceeds. Suppose

is

how

to

the

that mental kind-properties are multiply

realized in physical properties. Their being so realized

we will have some

emerged

means

that, in principle,

physical explanation for each instantiation of a mental kind

and each implementation

of a mental law.

The

existence of any physical

explanation of mental kinds/ laws would, so the challenger claims, count as a
reductive explanation. Furthermore, the challenger continues,
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if

we can

theoretically provide this type of 'reductive' explanation
for every instance of a

mental kind/ law, then

As Casey

we

will

have established psychophysical reductionism.

O Callaghan asserts, "If we have explained each 'implementation' of

the psychological law in terms of the physical, then we've
succeeded in

reducing

it." 22

As Andrew Melnyk
let

me spend some

perhaps the most vocal advocate of

time on an argument he presents in a

monograph. 23 Melnyk
article,

is

"Two Cheers

also presents a similar

for Reductionism; Or,

argument

still

this challenge,

unpublished

in his

published 1995

The Dim Prospects

for

Non-

Reductive Materialism," but the arguments in that paper are even harder
untangle. In the monograph,

classic

accounts of reduction

scientific

Melnyk begins by pointing out
(e.g.,

accounts of reduction

that both the

Ernest Nagel's account), and contemporary

(e.g.,

Mann, and Francis Crick) assume

to

those by Steven Weinberg,

that reduction

nonreductive physicalists would accept

this

is

Murry

Gell-

a type of explanation. 24

Most

assumption. However,

nonreductive physicalists would not accept the further assumption being made
here — that just any explanation of the mental in physical terms counts as a

reductive explanation.

Melnyk then argues

calls realization physicalism (the

claim that

that a

all

commitment

to

something he

higher-level properties are

functional properties realized by physical properties) commits one to the

following reductionist thesis:
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(CR)

nomic special- and honorary scientific facts, and all positive
non-nomic special and honorary scientific facts, have an
All

explanation that appeals only to (i) physical facts and
necessary (i.e., entirely non-contingent) truths.

Melnyk explains

that

by

'special-

and

(ii)

honorary-scientific facts/ he

means

facts

expressible in the proprietary vocabularies of the special and honorary
sciences;

and

that

by 'nomic

special-

and honorary-scientific

facts/

he means the holding

of such counterfactually-supporting regularities as can be expressed

by

generalizations couched in the proprietary vocabularies of the special and

honorary sciences
argues, because

it

25
.

Realization physicalism

allows for the derivability

is

committed

of: (i)

to

CR, Melnyk

every proposition asserting

the existence of one of the special-and honorary scientific tokens that actually
exist;

and

(ii),

in the case of

each regularity holding

among

special-

and

honorary-scientific tokens, every proposition asserting the holding of an

instance of this regularity

Here

is

26
.

an example

Melnyk claims

of the type of physical explanation

exists,

given the truth of realization physicalism. Suppose there

on the

table,

that

it is

and someone asks why there

open

is

a can

opener

there.

is

a can opener

Melnyk argues

to the realization physicalist to offer the following physical

explanation of the can-opener:

swarm

Well, there

is

can-opener

role,

is

a

and

of physical particles there

all

it

which plays the

takes for there to be a can-opener there

that something there should play the can-opener role
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27
.

Melnyk admits

that such

needs. For example,

how

unlikely to satisfy

is

would be a very

our explanatory

unsatisfactory answer to the question of

still

have a perfectly good physical explanation

a perfectly good explanation of the can-opener because

that a can-opener

is

couched primarily

on the

table,

and

role is

However, Melnyk's argument
calls

it is

reduction in the "core sense"

earlier published paper,

and

it

it is

insists,

of the can-opener.

It

allows us to predict

a physical explanation because

in physical language. (Of course,

physical language, as can-opener

he

all

the can opener got from the drawer to the table. Nevertheless,
he

we would
is

it

an explanation

it is

not couched entirely in

not a term from physics.)

that realization physicalism entails

is

what

not entirely convincing. Both in the

unpublished manuscript, Melnyk

in this

repeatedly claims that physicalism entails reductionism because

we are able

to

derive a statement claiming that the special-scientific particular (or instance of a

regularity) exists

from statements couched

in the

we

language of physics, or that

are able to predict that the special-scientific particular (or instance of a

regularity) exists

from the physical

derivability/ predictability

is

facts. In

other words,

sufficient for reducibility in

Melnyk

some

believes that:

core sense,

and

the derivation/ prediction that a particular (or instance of a regularity) exists

i)

ii)

is

a

reductive physical explanation. Both assumptions are worth arguing against.

Responding

remember

to

Melnyk's

that (as

I

first

assumption

is

relatively simple

— we have only

to

discussed in Chapter Three) no contemporary philosopher

of science believes that derivability,

and

its
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converse predictability,

is sufficient

for reduction.

Remember

that

anyone who

rejects the

deductive-nomological

account of explanation would not believe that deduction/ prediction
sufficient for explanation,

and

that

believe that deduction/ prediction

it

necessary). In

what core

even contemporary deductivists do not
is

sufficient for reduction

sense, then, has

Melnyk reduced

honorary-scientific tokens/ laws simply because
the existence of the special-

is

we

and honorary-scientific

(though they think

special-

and

are able to derive/ predict
particulars/ laws

from

statements couched in physical language?

Responding

to

to establish a type of

Melnyk needs
honorary

to

Melnyk's second assumption

slightly trickier. In order

reductionism that threatens nonreductive physicalism

show

scientific

is

that merely predicting the existence of a special- or

token from the physical facts

is

the type of reductive

'explanation' that nonreductive physicalists consider to be impossible.

However,

as

I

argued

in

Chapter Two,

this is

not the claim that nonreductive

physicalists are making. Rather, nonreductive physicalists claim that the

special-sciences have a unique explanatory role that cannot be replaced by

physics, even in theory.

It is

not the existence of special-scientific particulars that

cannot be explained, according to nonreductive physicalists,

powers

that cannot be explained.
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it is

their causal

A General Argument?
But perhaps there
physicalism to be

a

here.

more general argument

seems

to

hang on

Melnyk, the claim that

Although Melnyk speaks of a relationship of

this particular

fundamental physics
is

is

is

like a

can-opener role

just

not mentioned as such in

purely physical in the same sense in which the can-

can-opener
.'

24

is

'the

In other words,

like a relationship of

swarm

of physical particles' playing the

Melnyk's realization relationship seems

composition or constitution than of realization.

certainly not Kim's realization relationship, in

scientific

is

purely physical ." 28 Later Melnyk claims that the physical realizer of

something

more

metaphysical commitment. For

special-scientific kinds are realized in the physical

the claim that, "Everything of a kind that

opener

against nonreductive

than a relationship of composition or constitution, nothing

realization, rather

substantial

made

is

property

is

a single physical property.

which the

Given

that

It is

realizer of a special-

Melnyk's argument

does not depend on Kim's controversial interpretation of the realization
relationship,

I

think

we

can present his argument more perspicuously as the

claim that physicalism in general (not just
of reductionism.

If

physicalism

is

realization physicalism ) entails a

committed

to reductionism, then there

type

would

certainly be something incoherent or self-contradictory about the nonreductive

physicalist position.
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Here

is

commitment

some

a general argument that

I

think captures the claim that a

to physicalism automatically

core sense.

Note

that because

physical reductionism,

I

we

commits one

to reductionism in

are primarily interested in psycho-

have phrased

this

argument

in

terms of the reducibility

of the mental.

The Argument from Physical Composition
PI.

and/or time (objects, events, and
processes) are either fundamental physical particulars, or are
exhaustively composed out of fundamental physical particulars.

P2.

If (1), then there is an explanation of any actual
particular object, event, or
process solely in terms of its fundamental physical properties.

LI-

Therefore, there

P3.

If

All actual particulars in space

is an explanation of any actual particular object, event,
or
process solely in terms of its fundamental physical properties

then there is an explanation of each implementation of mental
laws and regularities solely in terms of its fundamental physical
(LI),

properties.
L2.

Therefore, there

and
P4.

If

is

an explanation of each implementation of mental laws
its fundamental physical properties.

regularities solely in terms of

(LI)

and

(L2),

then the mental

is (in

some

core sense) reducible to the

physical.

C.

Therefore, he mental

is

(in

some core

Before commenting on the above argument,

its

sense) reducible to the physical.

I

would

premises separately. (PI) shoulci be familiar

from the
claimed

first

all

chapter

(OC

is

first like to

to the reader, as

the basic ontological

commitment

physicalists should be committed). (P2) trades

'explanation'. (P2) holds that

any time we have a

constituted by physical particulars,

it is

to

just

which

(OC)

I

on the term

special-scientific particular,

we have some explanation
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explain each of

of this particular

in physical terms. This will not, of course, be
a causal explanation telling us

how or why

that special-scientific particular

the type of explanation that

explanation,

lemma,
(P2).

is

if

(PI)

Each time there

there will be

is

when

a

calls

that

all

will

swarm of particles

(P3) are true. (P4),

analysis

30
.

(LI), a

same claim

is

to

why

a can opener opens

playing a can-opener role comes into contact
role,

and when these two swarms

way, the can opens.
however,

prove that

we have

is

(L2),

another lemma,

is

true

is

if

the key to this argument. (P4) claims

some

the above-mentioned types of explanations.

What both Melnyk's argument and
claiming, then,

as

special-scientific law, e.g., a causal law,

the reductive physicalist needs to do, to establish reductionism in

core sense,

be

a constitutional

essentially the

the following explanation as to

interact in such-and-such a

and

makes

it

description of that law's instance in physical terms. For

with a swarm of particles playing a can

(LI)

an explanation by

(P2) are true. P(3)

an instance of a

we might have

example,
a can:

some

and

into being. Rather,

Pereboom and Kornblith call

and Robert Cummings

true

came

the

that the existence of

argument from constitution are

any

sort of physical explanation of the

mental threatens the epistemological claim allegedly made by nonreductive
physicalists that there can be no physical explanation for mental

Of course,

I

do not think

phenomenon. 31

that non-reductive physicalists are

making such

an implausible claim. Remember that non-reductive physicalists are
physicalists. Principles of charity require that

that so easily conflicts with their

commitment
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we

not

foist

on them any position

to physical ism. Rather than insist

that there can be no physical explanation of a particular or instance
of a law,

non-reductive physicalists argue that

it is

unlikely that there will be a physical

explanation capable of replacing special-scientific explanations, or of capturing

what

special-scientific explanations capture.

or process

is

The mere

fact that

an

object, event,

constituted by physical stuff ensures that there will be

explanation of that object, event, or process in physical terms, but

it

some
does not

ensure that there will be an edifying explanation. As Hilary Putnam pointed
out early on:

Very often we are told that if something is made of matter, its behavior
must have a physical explanation. And the argument is that if it is made
of matter (and

deduction of
this

we make

its

a lot of assumptions), then there should be a

behavior from

its

material structure. What makes you

call

deduction an explanation ? 32

In this article,

Putnam (one

of the early advocates of nonreductive physicalism)

argues that only 'explanations' that meet our explanatory needs are candidates
for reductive explanations.

As not every deduction meets our explanatory

needs, not every deduction counts as an explanation.

In his third chapter,

all

the anti-reductionist

is

special-scientific facts will

Indeed,

it is

Melnyk considers and dismisses

claiming

is

that

any physical explanation we have

be so convoluted that

possible that

reductionists have ever

all

the possibility that

it

would

fail

to be explanatory

that certain physicalist anti-

wanted

to insist

on

is

that,

given multiple

realization, special-or honorary-scientific regularities will turn out
to
if

have only highly disunited explanations in physical terms; and
their point has really been so modest, then I happily concede it.
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of

But

obviously does not entail the falsity of reductionism
in the
core sense. For even if a unified explanation
is better,
it

ceteris

paribus, than a disunified one, a disunifed
explanation is still an
explanation; and reductionism in the core sense
only requires that
special-and honorary-scientific regularities should
have an

explanation that appeals to only physical facts plus
necessary
truths.

But that

is

exactly

what nonreductive

physicalists

have traditionally argued!

Remember Putnam's peg and board example, from "Reductionism and

the

Nature of Psychology ." 33 There Putnam argues that any detailed
microphysical
explanation of the peg and board would not be able to capture the
high-levelabstract geometrical explanation that square pegs

round holes

of approximately the

same

size.

do not

in general pass

though

And remember Fodor's claim,

in

"Special Sciences," that the special-scientific explanations cannot be replaced by

physical explanations because, "Not

all

the classes of things

and events about

which there are important, counterfactual supporting generalizations
are, or

correspond

to,

physical kinds."

explanations consisting of

34

Remember

open-ended disjunctions

to

make

too that for Fodor

of physical kinds are not

explanatory primarily because they do not meet our interest in explanation

35
.

Third Challenge: Mysterious Connections
Like the second challenge, the third challenge also rests on the

assumption that reductions are types of explanations. Advocates
challenge begin by pointing out that any physicalist
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who

of this

holds that the physical

facts

determine

all

other facts

is

committed

to there being necessary connections

between every non-physical property and physical

properties.

The challenger

then urges us to agree with him/her that such connections
cry out for
explanations. Finally, the challenger insists that

only

reductionism

if

is

Here

true.

is

we

will find

how David Papineau

such explanations

presents the

challenge:

My difficulty with this picture
special sciences

physically in

how come
namely

and

[Fodor's picture of the relation between
physics] is this. If the different Ps have nothing

common,

they

all

as required by the non-reducibility of SI, then
Qs which do have something in common,

give rise to

that they are

all

realizations of S2?

heterogeneous Ps always yield Qs with

Papineau argues that Fodor's picture

Why should such

this

is incredible,

homogeneous

as

it

feature? 36

commits us

to the

existence of certain patterns, but denies that these patterns can be accounted for

uniformly in terms of physical laws.

world

just

happens

to contain a

Necessarily, for any x

P',

if

then x has M. Ralph

example
"The
say,

in

by

is

bunch

would seems
of brute

far too

modal

mysterious

if

Wedgwood
firing

is

our

facts like the following:

x has P, then x has M; and, necessarily, for any x

which C-fiber

fact that pain

It

if

x has

agrees. Invoking the oft used fictional

responsible for pains,

Wedgwood writes,

necessitated by C-fiber-firing in particular (rather than,

Z-fiber-firing) surely cries out for further explanation." 37 Both

and Wedgwood argue

that

if

reductive physicalism were true would

to explain these erstwhile brute

modal

facts.
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Papineau

we

be able

Let us adopt Terence

Horgan and Mark Timmons's language

in calling

the above types of property connections "specific
supervenience facts." 38 Note
that the challenger

is

not necessarily arguing for reductionism a

is

rather that reductionism has to be true empirically,
as

it is

priori.

His point

just too

unbelievable to imagine that there are no reductive
explanations of specific-

supervenience
challenge. Let

facts.

Here

is

what I see

be the general argument behind

to

P and P represent physical

properties,

and S some

this

special-

scientific property.

Argument from Mysterious Connections
1)

All physicalists are

committed

to there being specific-supervenience

facts.

2)

Nonreductive physicalists believe that specific-supervenience

facts

cannot be explained by physics.
3)

specific-supervenience facts cannot be explained by physics, then
such connections are brute, mysterious, and inexplicable.

4)

Therefore, given

If

committed

(1), (2),

brute, mysterious,
5)

If

(3),

nonreductive physicalists are

and

inexplicable.

reductive physicalism were true,

supervenience
6)

and

to the existence of specific-supervenience facts that are

It is

more

facts

explain these specific-

facts.

we

will

(4), (5)

and

be able to explain specific-supervenience
will be unable to explain specific-supervenience

likely that

than that

we could

we

facts.

7)

And

here

Therefore, given

is

how

I

(6),

reductive physicalism

think nonreductive physicalists

challenge. Nonreductive physicalists

would respond

would probably accept
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is

(1)

likely true.

to this

and

(2),

but

deny

(3).

Just because the connection cannot be explained

(from the perspective of physics) does not mean that
explained. In

fact, it is

explained!

The

it is

from the bottom-up
inexplicable.

Physics

is

we

learn

what

involved only because

is

it is

needed

for

something

able to explain

a

mind from

a gaseous substances, this

will) specify the conditions

is

It is

from the

e.g.,

to be a mind.

why certain

conditions can, and others cannot, meet these conditions.

make

can be

special-sciences set the individuation

conditions for the instantiation of their properties and laws.
special-sciences that

It

If it is

physical

impossible to

because psychology has (or

under which a mind

is

present,

and

it is

physically

impossible for gaseous substances to meet these conditions. 39 The connections
are not brute, mysterious, or inexplicable simpliciter.

They may be so from

the

perspective of physics, but they are not so from the perspective of the special
science.

Both Papineau and
supervenience

facts

Wedgwood

some

it

has

way

that specific

can avoid being brute, mysterious, and inexplicable

they are functionally realized.

out that

argue that the only

M just in case

it

is if

We explain how something has M by pointing
has “the complex physical property of having

physical property that meets one of these physical conditions."

If e.g.,

mental properties are functionally realized then,

fundamental necessary truth about each mental property that it
equivalent to the "functional property" of having some physical
property that plays a certain causal role (where this causal role can be
It is

a

is

specified in completely physical or topic-neutral terms); and, at least in
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the broad sense of the term that
counts as a "physical property"

properties

would deny

am using here, this functional property
A non-reductive conception of mental
I

that mental properties are physically reducible
in

this sense 40
.

Both Papineau and

Wedgwood

claim that this functional explanation

physical explanation. Perhaps, but
the higher-level explanation.

explain

why

it is

is

a

not a physical explanation that replaces

The higher-level explanation

needed

is still

to

these particular physical circumstances realize this mental

property. The real complaint being

made by

be that they are unable to appreciate

the reductive physicalists seems to

how the

special-sciences

have any

explanatory role to play. But they do have an explanatory role to play. The fact
that they

do

is

not something philosophers have control over.

Conclusion
In

Chapter Four

I

considered three additional challenges to nonreductive

physicalism. All the challenges assume that reductions are types of non-causal,

synchronic explanations. The

mental causation

is

first

challenge argues that the only

to accept reductionism.

assumption that physical explanations
explanation. While

I

will

Undergirding

could not possibly cover

of

,

all

I

argument ultimately

hope
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rests

is

the

rival

the permutations of the

to

doubt regarding whether the argument

the soundness of this

to explain

this challenge

always crowd out any

argument from causation against mental realism

some seeds

way

have
is

at least

sound.

I

sowed

argued that

on the soundness of Kim's

explanatory exclusion argument, and that the explanatory
exclusion argument
is

not entirely convincing.

I

also discussed

two recent challenges

to

nonreductive physicalism-the argument from physical
composition

for

epistemological reduction and the argument from mysterious
connections. For
the second challenge,

I

argued that the type of 'explanation' that

establishes does not threaten

second challenge

relies

any actual nonreductive

this challenge

physicalist positions.

The

on interpreting nonreductive physicalism uncharitably

as claiming that there can be no possible physical explanation of
specialscientific particulars or instances of special-scientific laws.

succeeded

in

convincing

I

hope

I

have

my reader this is not the non-reductive physicalists'

claim. For the third challenge,

I

argued that reductive physicalists are wrong

to

claim that nonreductive physicalists are committed to the existence of brute,
mysterious, and inexplicably connections between properties. The argument
that they are reflects a unjustified bias in favor of lower-level physical

explanations over upper-level special-scientific (including psychological)
explanations.

Thus

this

argument does not succeed

in attacking nonreductive

physicalism directly, but instead merely reflects the ideological divide that
already exists between reductive and nonreductive physicalists.
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26

I
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28

29

Andrew Melnyk
See

(2001),

Andrew Melnyk

Chapter

III.
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(2001),

I.
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MIT
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30
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The Nature of Psychological Explanation (Cambridge, Mass and London:
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MIT

Press, 1983).

31

Notice that the argument from composition makes the assumption that
there can be multiple explanations of particular objects, events or processes.
This argument accepts that there could be both a physical explanation and a

some particular
an assumption I am making as well.

higher-level functional explanation of

Of

course, this
32

and

is

object, event, or process.

Hilary Putnam, "Philosophy and

Our Mental Life," Mind, Language,
(London: Cambridge University Press,
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35

See, especially,

36

David Papineau,

(1974), p. 143.

Fodor

(1997).

"Irreducibility

and Teleology," Reduction,

Explanation and Realism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992),
37

p. 46.

In "Non-Reductive Physicalism," Nous 34:3 (2002), p. 404 Ralph

Wedgewood

explains that what he

explanation that either

i)

needs no

means by

a reductive explanation

further explanation, or

ii)

is

an

can be explained

purely on the basis of fundamental necessary truths that themselves need no
further explanation.
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APPENDIX

QUOTES ABOUT REDUCTIONISM
To show how
t

truly divergent the uses are to

which the terms reduction and

eductionism have been put by philosophers, here

is

a small sample of what has been

said about reductionism over the past fifty years:

Kemeny and Oppenheim
Scientific progress

(1956)

may

broadly be divided into two types:
(1) an increase
in factual knowledge, by the addition to the total amount
of scientific

observations;

designed

(2)

an improvement

to explain the

observations.

known

in the

facts

and

body
to

which is
predict the outcome of future
of theories,

An especially

important case of the second type is the
replacement of an accepted theory (or body of theories) by a new theory

body of theories) which is in some sense superior
an improvement in this sense.
(or

to

it.

Reduction

is

1

Oppenheim and Putnam

(1958)

branch of science] reduces B2 [another branch of science], it
explains everything that B2 does (and normally, more besides). Then,
even if cannot define in Bi analogues for some of the theoretical terms of
B2, we can use Bi in place of B2. Thus any reduction, in the sense
explained, permits a "reduction" of the total vocabulary of science by
If

Bi [a

making

it

possible to dispense with

some

terms. 2

Ernest Nagel (1961)

Reduction, in the sense in which the

word

is

here employed,

is

the

explanation of a theory or a set of experimental laws established in one
area of inquiry, by a theory usually though not invariably formulated for

some

other domain. 3

Kenneth Schaffner

(1967)

which one theory is explained by another,
a different domain, is generally terms theory

Intertheoretic explanation in

usually formulated for
reduction

Hilary

Putnam

4
.

(1973)

Reductionism asserts that psychology
organization of the

brain. 5

169

is

deducible from the functional

Jerry Fodor (1974)

Reductionism is the conjunction of token physicalism
with the
assumption that there are natural kind predicates in an
ideally
completed physics which correspond to each natural kind
predicate
any ideally completed special science 6

in

.

If psychology is reducible to neurology,
then for every psychological
kind predicate there is a coextensive neurological kind
predicate, and the
generalization which states this coextension is a law 7
.

Heilman and Thompson
[Reductionism

is

(1975)

the

view

that] all scientific

definitions in physical terms

terms can be given explicit

8
.

Paul Churchland (1979)

As even causal scrutiny will reveal, the reduction of one theory to
another bears certain substantial similarities to the translation of one
language to another. In both cases we find a mapping of one vocabulary

mapping that preserves certain features thought to be
In sum, what a successful reduction shows us is that one

into another, a

important

way

—

of conceiving things can be safely, smoothly,

empirical content of

and

-

if

the excess

Tn [reducing

theory] over Sn [an equipotent image
of the reduced theory within the idiom of the reducing theory] is
corroborated - profitably displaced by another way of conceiving things 9
.

Richard Boyd (1980)

The reductive analysis of materialism asserts] the syntactic reducibility of
the vocabulary and laws of all the sciences to the vocabulary and laws of
physics... [also] the definability of all mental psychological states (or, on
some accounts, all token mental and psychological states) in the
vocabulary of physics

Alan Garfinkel

The

10
.

(1981)

and chemistry amounts to the
claim that conduct can be explained wholly in terms of physical and
chemical phenomena.... So reduction, which is on its face an ontological
reducibility of psychology to physics

question,
that

is

about the possibility of explanation: to say
reducible to something else is to say that certain kinds

really a question

something

is

of explanations exist.... One realm of discourse

the reduction theory gives us

being reduced

all

is

the explanatory

11
.
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reducible to another

power

of the theory

if

C. A.

Hooker
I

(1981)

shall take as the

unification.

aims of reduction ontological and explanatory

Under appropriate circumstances

(but not universally)
satisfying these requirements will also yield conceptual economy
and/or
increased systematicity-with-simplicity 12
.

Robert

Cummins

(1983)

important to distinguish the claim that a theory identifies
instantiations from the claim that it licenses reductions. As I use the
term, reduction requires that the true statements one can make about a
domain in a vocabulary v can all be formulated in a different reducing
vocabulary v\ It is now commonplace (I hope) that one can hold that
everything is physical -has some physical description- without holding
It is

that everything

physics

John Post

worth saying

in science

can be said in the language of

13
.

(1987)

Physical reduction... occurs

when terms from

another domain are

defined solely by terms from physics. The strongest variety requires that
the two terms — one nonphysical, the other from physics — be fully

synonymous, or

one into the other without
meaning. The weakest requires only that they be
coextensive. Somewhere between is a coextensiveness that is not
at least "translatable"

significant loss of

accidental but entailed by the laws of science, hence a lawlike

coextensiveness

14
.

[Nonreductionism is the view that ] not everything real can be brought
under some physical or other objective description, and physically
irreducible talk is far from automatically false or meaningless 15
.

David Owens

(1989)

According

to the reductionist, there

is

nothing of explanatory

importance, no laws or nomologically interesting classifications of events

which cannot be formulated in the language of physics. To put it another
way, someone who knows all the laws of physics and all the physical
facts can explain and predict anything that the economist can explain or
predict

16
.
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Jaegwon Kim

(1989-90)

Reduction of one theory to another requires the
derivation of the laws of
the reduced theory from those of the reducer,
and for

this to be possible,
theory must be appropriately connected, via
'bridge
principles , with those of the second. And bridge
principles must be
either conceptually under-written as definitions,
or else express
empirical lawlike correlations ('bridge laws' or
17
'theoretical

terms of the

first

identities ').

When reduction is at issue, we are talking about theories,
couched
Patricia

in their distinctive theoretical vocabularies

and Paul Churchland

Inter theoretic reduction

theories

18
.

(1990)
is

bottom a relation between two

at

distinct

conceptual frameworks for describing the phenomena. The whole
point
of reduction is to show that what we thought to be
two domains is

one domain, though they may have been described
more) different vocabularies 19

actually

in

two

(or

.

Steven Weinberg (1994)
[Reduction

is] the perception that scientific principles are the
way they
are because of deeper scientific principles (and, in some cases, historical
accidents) and that all these principles can be traced to one simple

connected set of laws

20
.

Francis Crick (1994)

[Reduction
a

is]

the ideal that

phenomenon

it is

possible, at least in principle, to explain

in terms of less complicated constituents

21
.

Terence Horgan (1996)

A very plausible-looking condition on genuine reduction is that each
higher-order causal/ explanatory property be nomically coextensive not
just with any old lower-order property, but with some lower-order
causal/explanatory property. For,

if

this condition is

not met, then the

higher-order causal/ explanatory properties will cross-classify the lowerorder ones, and thus will figure in higher-order causal/ explanatory
generalizations that are not directly mirrored at the lower theoretical
level 22
.
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David Chalmers

A

natural

(1996)

phenomenon

lower-level properties
is

A

reductively explainable in terms of some
the property of instantiating that phenomenon

is

if

globally logically supervenient on the low-level properties
in question.
phenomenon is reductively explainable simpliciter if the property of

instantiating that

phenomenon

physical properties

is

globally logically supervenient

on

23
.

Harold Kincaid (1997)

One

theory reduces to another

when

it can do all the explanatory work
were good reasons to think that
molecular biology and statistical mechanics could not do all the

of the reduced theory.... If there

explanatory work of their higher-level counterparts (and there is), then
whatever they have achieved, it is not reduction. To claim reduction

while admitting explanatory incompleteness
semantic one. It is not 24

is

to

make

the issue a trivial

.

Jaegwon Kim (1998)

To reduce
reconstrue

a property, or
it

phenomenon, we

— functionally,

in

terms of

other properties and phenomena....

its

first

construe

it

— or

causal/ nomic relations to

We then find properties or

mechanisms, often at the microlevel, that satisfy these causal/ nomic
specifications and thereby fill the specified causal roles.... Reductions
therefore are doubly relative: in systems with different structures, the
underlying mechanisms realizing the reduced property may vary, and
reductions remain valid only when the basic laws of nature are held
constant — that

is,

reference world

only for nomologically possible worlds (relative to the

25
.

Daniel Steel (2003)

an explanatory strategy that can be pursued
in order to achieve a variety of different goals, and what form the
reduction should take depends on its purpose 26
I

propose that reduction

is

.
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